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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
The essential reason why firms exist is a cost advantage of using resources within the firm over
negotiating each transaction on external markets (Coase, 1937). Regarding personnel, efficiency
gains can be realized if two or more individuals work together in a team. Team production
is typically characterized by an overall output which exceeds the sum of individual outputs if
the production function is not separable (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Therefore, Lazear and
Oyer (2012, p. 506) conclude that “[p]erhaps the greatest value of the firm is that it provides a
mechanism for people to work together and take advantage of complementarities in their skills
and interests”.
This thesis comprises experimental studies on three different aspects which are prevalent in the
workplace if individuals are required to work together: cooperation, coordination, and sabotage
in tournaments. The former ones focus on individuals’ willingness to align common interests
which may conflict with individual incentives. Situations which require individuals to cooperate
typically provide incentives to free ride at the same time, i.e., due to the fact that individuals
who do not contribute in the production stage cannot be excluded from the benefits of the
joint surplus, it is favorable from an individual perspective to rely on contributions by others
(Andreoni, 1988). Coordination, on the other hand, often depends on a weakest link mechanism,
i.e., the lowest individual effort level is decisive for the total output of the group (Hirshleifer, 1983).
This situation comprises a set of equilibria in which all individuals choose the same level of
effort. These equilibria can be Pareto-ranked; the equilibrium in which all individuals choose the
highest possible level of effort is not Pareto-dominated by any of the other equilibria. Yet, strategic
uncertainty about other individuals’ actions can result in coordination failure which describes a
situation in which the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is not attained—or no equilibrium at all
(Van Huyck et al., 1990). In contrast to situations focusing on cooperation and coordination,
tournaments are used to provide incentives when individual performance in absolute terms is
difficult to measure and, hence, is replaced by relative performance evaluation. While rank-order
tournaments exhibit both, theoretically and practically, desirable properties (Lazear and Rosen,
1981), they also provide adverse incentives. In particular, not only increasing one’s own effort
increases an individual’s probability of winning the tournament, but also decreasing the output
of the opponent by means of sabotage (Lazear, 1989; see also Sheremeta, 2016).
Cooperation Cooperation appeals to individuals’ willingness to forgo private benefits to in-
crease the social return. This situation is frequently stylized in the linear public good game.
Public goods are characterized by non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability. The latter
property refers to the fact that an individual can benefit from the public good once it is provided
without having contributed to its funding before. This kind of free riding behavior arises when
private costs exceed private benefits from the provision of the public good. As a consequence,
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it is individually rational not to contribute to the funding of public goods assuming standard
preferences of money-maximizing individuals and rely on others instead—which eventually
results in a situation in which the public good is not provided at all (Olson, 1965). To study this
social dilemma in a controlled environment in the laboratory, n ≥ 2 individuals indexed i form a
group.1 Each individual receives an endowment qi which can be allocated to the individual’s
private account or a collective account. The sum of contributions to the collective account by all
individuals is multiplied by some factor α and distributed to each individual. Thus, individual i ’s
payoff πi is given by
πi = qi − ci +α
n∑︂
i=1
ci ,
where ci ≤ qi denotes the individual’s contribution to the collective account.2 α is the marginal
per-capita return (MPCR) which represents the relative gain from an individual’s contribution
of one unit to the collective account as compared to a contribution to her private account. If
1
n <α< 1, a social dilemma arises as the individual return from a contribution to the collective
account is smaller than the associated costs for the individual.3 Yet, contributing to the collective
account is socially beneficial as all individuals—irrespective whether or not and how much
they contributed themselves—receive a return α
∑︁n
i=1 ci from the collective account which in
total exceeds the individual costs of contributing since n ·α > 1. Thus, the Nash equilibrium
is characterized by total free riding, i.e., all individuals keep their endowment, whereas the
Pareto-efficient social optimum is attained if all individuals contribute their entire endowment
to the collective account (Andreoni, 1988). In one-shot public good games and the first period of
repeated public good games, individuals frequently contribute 40–60% of their endowment to
the collective account. Contributions typically decline over the subsequent periods in repeated
public good games and approximate the Nash equilibrium with a particularly sharp decline
in the final period (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). This raises the question why individuals’
aggregate behavior initially corresponds neither to the Nash equilibrium nor the social optimum.
One explanation proposed by Andreoni (1988) is the learning hypothesis, i.e., individuals do not
fully understand the structure of the game and the associated consequences for their payoffs
right at the beginning. Instead, they need some experience with the game to learn its incentives.
As cooperative behavior is usually observed in public good games with a fixed number of periods
until shortly before the final periods, he introduces a second argument which refers to strategic
behavior. According to this hypothesis, it can be beneficial to adhere to cooperative behavior
to some extent even after learning about the incentive to free ride for some repetitions prior
to the final periods. In the related experiment, however, he does not find support for either of
these hypotheses. Another explanation for cooperative behavior in public good games despite
its incentives to free ride which is frequently discussed in the literature addresses individuals’
altruism; in general, there is only weak evidence for this explanation. Therefore, Andreoni
(1989, 1990) introduces the concept of “warm-glow” giving which relates impure altruism. In
contrast to the notion of pure altruism which increases the individuals’ utility as contributing
increases the size of the public good for the entire group, impure altruism focuses solely on the
act of giving. This extension is by and large consistent with frequently observed behavior in
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situations which exhibit similar incentives as public good games, e.g., fundraising for charity.
Another explanation for cooperative behavior in public good games is that individuals may not
understand the instructions and, as a consequence, split their endowment arbitrarily between
the private and the collective account. Indeed, Andreoni (1995) finds evidence that a substantial
share of positive contributions to the collective account in public good games occurs due to
confusion about the structure of the game. The previous results are largely confirmed by Palfrey
and Prisbrey (1997) who find that pure altruism is not decisive for individuals’ contributions in
the public good game. Instead, impure altruism as reflected by warm-glow giving and ignorance
about the incentives of the game explain contributions to a large extent. Whereas these results
are based on aggregate behavior, Fischbacher et al. (2001) identify different types of contributors
in a one-shot public good game using the strategy method (Selten, 1967). Individuals who
indicate higher contributions if other group members also contribute higher amounts to the
collective account are deemed conditional cooperators which applies to half of the individuals in
the study.4 While contributions of these individuals are highly positively correlated with others’
contributions, they do not always match the contributions of the other group members exactly.
In fact, negative deviations by conditional cooperators occur more frequently than contributions
above the average of the other group members. Approximately one third of the individuals
are free riders, i.e., they behave as predicted by standard theory assuming money-maximizing
individuals and keep their entire endowment for themselves. The third category of individuals
contribute according to a hump-shaped or triangular pattern, i.e., they behave like conditional
cooperators up to a certain point and steadily decrease their contributions beyond this threshold.
This behavior is observed in approximately one of seven individuals in the study by Fischbacher
et al. (2001). The remaining individuals cannot be allocated to one of these types.
Coordination In contrast to cooperation which offers individuals incentives to free ride off
others’ contributions, coordination requires individuals to align their actions. This situation
is frequently represented by the minimum effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). Each of n
individuals indexed i who form a group chooses an effort level ei at cost b per unit. The return
for all individuals is determined by the minimum effort level of the entire group multiplied by
some factor a. Hence, individual i ’s payoff πi is given by
πi = a min{ei ,e−i }−bei
with a > b > 0 and e−i =min{e1,e2, . . . ,ei−1,ei+1, . . . ,en} as minimum effort level of all individuals
except i . There are several equilibria in this game in which all individuals choose the same effort
level. Although these equilibria can be Pareto-ranked with the equilibrium in which all individu-
als choose the highest possible effort level as Pareto-dominant option, it is not straightforward to
predict which equilibrium will actually be chosen. All outcomes in which the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium is not attained—including other equilibrium points—are considered coordination
failure. The concepts of payoff dominance and risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988)
allow to identify choices which may be salient for all individuals of a group in absence of com-
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munication. The former alternative points at the highest possible effort level as coordinating
on this level yields the highest payoff for all individuals. In contrast, risk dominance favors
the other extreme of possible effort levels as this choice is consistent with a maximin-strategy
which avoids incurring excess cost if another individual chooses a lower effort level than the
individual herself. The results of Van Huyck et al. (1990) show that groups converge to the lowest
possible effort level after a few rounds. They explain this observation with strategic uncertainty,
i.e., an individual does not know whether or not the other group members choose the same
effort level and, therefore, the individual harks back to the risk dominant option. There are
some approaches discussed in the literature to overcome coordination failure in minimum effort
games. Brandts and Cooper (2006a) introduce financial incentives which increase the monetary
return from successful coordination. While this approach is effective in overcoming coordina-
tion failure, its success does not depend on the intensity of financial incentives. Furthermore,
even temporary increases of financial incentives are sufficient to achieve a lasting effect. In
a related study, Brandts and Cooper (2006b) directly compare changes in financial incentives
and different information policies to overcome coordination failure. In the first dimension,
they switch from high incentives to low incentives at one point during the study and vice versa.
Additionally, they vary whether individuals are informed about all effort levels chosen in their
group or only about the minimum effort level. Extensive feedback about the effort levels of all
group members turns out almost as effective as financial incentives in overcoming coordination
failure. When trying to prevent coordination failure after a cut of financial incentives, however,
the resolution of information provided to the individuals is only of minor relevance. To study
the impact of heterogeneity on groups’ ability to coordinate successfully, Brandts et al. (2007)
introduce different costs which individuals have to bear for each unit of their effort choice. The
idea is that individuals with low costs choose a higher effort level and serve as role model for
the remaining individuals in the group which eventually overcomes coordination failure. Quite
contrary, it turns out that those individuals whose type is most prominent within a group drive
the outcome. Put differently, heterogeneity is detrimental for successful coordination and groups
of homogeneous individuals are likely to have an advantage in this respect.
Besides minimum effort games discussed above, coordination can alternatively be studied in
a stylized way in threshold public good games (Weber et al., 2001). In contrast to linear public
good games, a public good is only provided if at least some pre-defined amount of contributions
to the collective account has been raised. Individual i ’s payoff πi is, thus, given by
πi = qi − ci +α
n∑︂
i=1
ci ·1[︁∑︁n
i=1 ci≥T
]︁,
where 1[︁∑︁n
i=1 ci≥T
]︁ is an indicator function which assumes a value of one if the group’s total
contributions
∑︁n
i=1 ci meet or exceed the threshold T and zero otherwise (Isaac et al., 1989). The
specific properties of the game depend on the refund rule and the rebate rule. The former one
defines what happens to contributions if the threshold is not reached, i.e., whether contributions
are refunded or not.5 The rebate rule determines the utilization of contributions above the
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threshold. Common alternatives are a no-rebate rule which means the size of the public good is
fixed ex ante and contributions beyond the threshold are wasted, or a linear rebate rule which
increases the size of the public good above the threshold along with the contributions—as
in the linear public good game. As in the minimum effort game, the threshold public good
game exhibits multiple equilibria. The full free riding equilibrium corresponds to the unique
Nash equilibrium in the linear public good game, i.e., all individuals keep their endowment.
Additionally, there is a set of threshold equilibria which include all combinations of contributions
by the group which equal the value of the threshold. Unlike in the minimum effort game, these
threshold equilibiria cannot be Pareto-ranked. Finally, a third set of equilibria exists if the
threshold is not met in case of a full-refund policy (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999).6
Sabotage in Tournaments Tournaments are particularly beneficial if absolute performance
is difficult to measure as they rely on a relative ranking using ordinal information. Following
Lazear and Rosen (1981), two individuals compete for a prize, e.g., a bonus or promotion. The
principal does not receive a precise measure about the individuals’ effort levels. Instead, she
receives a noisy signal and awards the prize to the individual with the higher signal. It can be
shown that both individuals choose the same effort levels in the equilibrium and, thus, the
winner of the tournament is determined by noise in the individuals’ signals. On the other hand,
Lazear (1989) shows that an individual can improve her relative position in a tournament by
inflicting sabotage on her opponent. Sabotage is indeed frequently observed in experimental
studies.7 Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005) examine the impact of the principal’s discretion to
choose the winner prize on effort and sabotage in a tournament. The choice of the principal in
this experiment influences both, the prize spread and the total sum of wages. Whereas higher
incentives are expected to increase effort and sabotage from a theoretical point of view, a higher
winner prize can also trigger reciprocity in agents resulting in lower levels of sabotage. Although
both, effort and sabotage, increase with a higher winner prize, the increase in sabotage activities
is more pronounced. Moreover, agents punish their principal by using higher levels of sabotage
if she decides to award a winner prize from the lower end of the possible range. While this
experimental design does not allow to disentangle the effect of a higher prize spread from an
increase in the total sum of wages, Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011) provide additional insights.
As before, they find that both, effort and sabotage, increase with a higher prize spread with a
steeper increase for sabotage activities. Due to reciprocity, however, a higher sum of total wages
yields more productive effort. Other potential determinants for behavior in tournaments are the
number of competitors and the number of available winner prizes. These issues are addressed
by Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008). Whereas theory predicts no influence of these factors on
effort and sabotage, the results of the related experiment indicate that this is only true for the
number of competitors. An unbalanced distribution in the number of winner and loser prizes
leads to more intensive sabotage activities. To reduce the extent of sabotage, a balanced share of
winner and loser prizes seems favorable as agents perceive a proper chance to receive one of the
winner prizes. In a Tullock contest with heterogeneous agents, Harbring et al. (2007) introduce
treatments with and without disclosing the identity of individuals who inflict sabotage on other
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agents. Whether or not this information is provided is not expected to influence the decision of
payoff maximizing individuals as no monetary consequences emerge. Yet, sabotage activities
decrease if the identity of the saboteur is revealed to the sufferer compared to the corresponding
treatment maintaining anonymity. In contrast to the studies discussed so far, Vandegrift and
Yavas (2010) use a real-effort task in a tournament setting. More specifically, individuals in
their setting are supposed to predict the value of a fictitious stock in a multiple-cue-probability-
learning task. The individual with the more accurate estimation is awarded the winner prize.
Besides changes in the prize spread, Vandegrift and Yavas (2010) distinguish between settings
with a partner and stranger matching, respectively. While they find no impact of a higher prize
spread on performance, sabotage activities increase. In the partner setting, sabotage is generally
used more reticently; in subsequent rounds, however, sabotage is retaliated emphatically among
partners. Finally, individuals who exhibit a higher ability suffer more frequently from sabotage,
whereas there is no difference in the levels of sabotage individuals inflict on their opponent
depending on their own ability. In a more elaborate setting, Carpenter et al. (2010) let individuals
in their study prepare envelopes for mail shipping. Individuals in all treatments are paid a
piece-rate per prepared envelope. In the tournament setting, the individual who prepared the
highest number of envelopes is additionally paid a bonus. Performance is measured along two
dimensions, quantity which can be assessed objectively and quality which is predominantly a
subjective domain. Both ratings are either based on an assessment by an employee of the US
Postal Service to ensure objectivity or other individuals of the same session. In some settings
individuals have, thus, the opportunity to sabotage their opponents by rating the quality of their
work low or reporting a lower number of envelopes than actually prepared by the respective
individual. While the bonus increases performance compared to the piece-rate, the opportunity
to inflict sabotage in the tournament discourages individuals from exerting effort and results
in an average performance even below the plain piece-rate. Irrespective of the opportunity to
sabotage the opponents, quality decreases in both tournament settings relative to the baseline
with the piece-rate. Furthermore, financial incentives in the tournament induce individuals to
sabotage their opponents severely. This relates predominantly to the quality rating due to its
subjective nature and only to a lower extent to the reported number of envelopes prepared by the
opponents. Furthermore, some degree of sabotage is observed in the tournament setting even
in absence of any financial incentives when the assessment of the employee of the US Postal
Service is relevant for determining the recipient of the bonus.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
To address different aspects which are decisive for success in the labor market and the workplace,
this thesis comprises three experimental studies on coordination, cooperation, and—as an
example of adverse incentives—sabotage behavior in tournaments.
Section 2 presents the results of a laboratory experiment on coordination in a threshold public
good game. The experimental design employs several collective accounts of which at most
one is feasible with the given endowment. Hence, coordination is required in two domains as
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individuals have to agree independently on one alternative and contribute sufficient funds to
reach the corresponding threshold. In absence of communication coordination is particularly
difficult in this situation. To alleviate this issue, a first-moving leader allocates her endowment
to her private account and the collective accounts. The remaining individuals of the group
are informed about this allocation before they decide on the allocation of their endowment
simultaneously and independently. While individuals have no reason to object to the first
mover’s choice of a particular collective account in case of homogeneous incentives, a selfish
first mover who exploits her strategic position in case of heterogeneous incentives by choosing
the alternative which yields the highest payoff for herself may decrease followers’ inclination
to act on her example—even though followers are better off when they support a selfish leader
compared to a situation in which no threshold is reached at all. The results, however, show
that there are no material differences in groups’ ability to coordinate under homogeneous and
heterogeneous incentives, respectively. Moreover, first movers do not systematically exploit their
strategic position within their groups. Quite contrary, first movers are in a substantial number of
instances willing to bear a fair share in their groups’ effort to reach a threshold and, thereby, act
as a good example which induces followers to contribute as well.
The results of an intervention study focusing on cooperation are reported in Section 3. Children
aged 10–13 years at upper secondary schools in Germany are provided with enhanced physical
education lessons for six weeks. These lessons address a broad range of social skills, including
cooperation. To study the effect of the intervention which conveys inter alia examples on
challenges and advantages of cooperative behavior in a playful way on actual behavior, children
participate in an incentivized linear public good game at different times during the course of the
study. The first measure of cooperativeness in terms of contributions to the collective account
in the public good game is elicited before the beginning of the intervention. To examine the
effect of the intervention, this procedure is repeated right after the end of the intervention and
nine weeks later. Besides the individuals who participate in the intervention, other children
from the same schools form a control group to allow for the identification of the causal effect of
the intervention on cooperative behavior. The results regarding cooperative behavior indicate
only weak effects of the intervention which may be attributed to its short duration. However, a
subset of individuals in the treatment group who live in households with low socio-economic
status respond positively to the intervention, i.e., their cooperative behavior in the incentivized
public good game is improved as a result of enhanced physical education lessons. This particular
effect even occurs in the third measurement nine weeks after the end of the intervention in the
Treatment group.
Finally, Section 4 provides evidence on adverse incentives in a tournament setting. Whereas
tournaments exhibit advantageous properties such as inducing individuals to choose the first-
best level of effort even under asymmetric information which make their application common
in the workplace (Prendergast, 1999; Lazear and Shaw, 2007), sabotage is also prevalent in
settings which rely on ordinal rankings. The present study considers in particular the impact
of private and social image concerns on the decision to inflict sabotage on the opponent. To
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disentangle these effects, the experimental design employs several treatments which differ in
their information policies, i.e., either the individual herself or both, the individual and the
opponent, are or may be informed about the implication of the individual’s sabotage activities.
In a second stage, individuals have the opportunity to prevent information disclosure by paying a
price. Whereas the decision to inflict sabotage on one’s opponent does not vary between different
information policies, individuals’ willingness to pay does depend on whether or not information
may be disclosed to the opponent. More specifically, individuals exhibit a significantly higher
willingness to pay to prevent disclosure about the implication of their sabotage activities to their
opponent which may be attributed to maintaining a positive social image.
Notes
1. The prisoner’s dilemma (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) can be considered as special case of the
linear public good game with n = 2 individuals (Roth, 1995).
2. Thus, qi − ci is the amount kept by the individual for her private account.
3. Since ∂πi
∂ci
=−1+α< 0. Note that in case of α< 1n even the social return from the public
good is lower than the individual costs of contributing. On the other hand, α> 1 yields a
private return from the public good which exceeds the associated costs of contributing.
4. For a different use of the term conditional cooperation, see Keser and van Winden (2000).
5. There is also the possibility that contributions are only partly refunded.
6. Note that both, the full free riding equilibrium and the equilibria which do not reach the
threshold in case of the full-refund rule, are Pareto-dominated by the threshold equilibria.
7. Providing reliable figures about the extent of unethical behavior is challenging. Alem
et al. (2018) provide evidence that individuals’ revealed behavior differs from their stated
behavior which suggests that non-experimental approaches such as surveys are not fully
appropriate to study determinants of unethical behavior.
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2 First Movers in a Threshold Public Good Game*
We study coordination among individuals in a threshold public good game with several collective
accounts. As resources are scarce, only one public good is feasible. Coordination, therefore, is
required in two domains: (i) Individuals have to choose one out of several public goods and
(ii) they have to coordinate their contributions to reach the corresponding threshold. To facilitate
coordination, we employ a semi-sequential structure with a first-moving leader and second-
moving followers who decide simultaneously and independently after being informed about the
first mover’s allocation. The main treatment variable distinguishes groups with homogeneous
and heterogeneous incentives for particular public goods. The institution of a semi-sequential
move order fosters coordination even in the case of heterogeneous incentives. Overall, we do
not observe substantial differences between both treatments.
2.1 Introduction
The notion that individuals are sometimes not able to accomplish extensive projects on their own
is prevalent. Moreover, projects often exhibit step-level character, i.e., success is only achieved if
a certain level of input has been contributed. If there is more than one alternative it is essential
that individuals not only contribute to a project, but also coordinate their contributions. In
cases with simultaneous contributions, coordination is difficult in absence of communication.
When alternatives are virtually indistinguishable and individuals have identical incentives, the
allocation of a first mover who contributes prior to other individuals is expected to serve as a
blueprint for subsequent contributions by second-moving followers and, therefore, can foster
coordination. If individuals have, however, divergent incentives and the first mover behaves in a
selfish manner by choosing the alternative which yields a higher return just for herself, it is less
clear whether second-moving followers still act on the first mover’s suggestion.
We use a threshold public good game with several collective accounts. The parameters are set in
a way that only one threshold is feasible. Moreover, coordination is aggravated by the fact that
no individual can reach a threshold on her own. The institution of a first mover who allocates
her endowment before all other individuals do is expected to foster coordination by making
one collective account salient, i.e., once the first mover has contributed a decent amount to one
collective account, followers are concerned with only a subset of the initial coordination problem,
namely how to raise the remaining input which is necessary to reach the corresponding threshold.
In case of homogeneous incentives with symmetric monetary returns from all collective accounts
for all individuals, followers have no reason to object to the first mover’s choice. Heterogeneous
incentives, on the other hand, may induce divergent attitudes towards the choice of a specific
collective account by the first mover. In particular, followers’ reactions to a selfish first mover
who chooses the collective account which yields a higher return for herself can be ambiguous:
A first mover who contributes a decent amount of input herself can set a good a example for
*This section is based on Haas (2019). Submitted to Experimental Economics on November 26, 2018 (manuscript no.
EXEX-D-18-00300); rejected on January 21, 2019.
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followers who, in turn, are inclined to act similarly. The mere fact that followers are better off
if they act on the suggestion of a selfish first mover and receive a monetary return from the
collective account compared to a situation in which the threshold is not reached, however, does
not guarantee that they behave accordingly. The reason for this conjecture is the way followers
may perceive actions of the first mover. Unlike in the case of homogeneous incentives, followers
cannot rely on the notion that contributions by the first mover are an act of pure generosity. If
they suspect the first mover only to be focused on maximizing her own monetary payoff and
trying to lure followers into contributing substantial inputs, the institution of a first mover can
have detrimental effects on overall contributions (Glöckner et al., 2011).
Hence, the aim of this paper is to study whether groups of several individuals with a first-
moving leader and several second-moving followers are able to coordinate contributions in
a threshold public good game with several collective accounts if individuals have divergent
incentives for particular collective accounts. To address this research question, we conduct a
laboratory experiment with two different treatments in which individuals interact repeatedly in
fixed groups. One individual in each group is exogenously assigned the role of the first-moving
leader. Individuals can allocate their endowment between their private account and several
collective accounts which only generate a monetary return if a pre-defined amount of input is
raised. As mentioned above, only one threshold is feasible and all individuals are required to
contribute in order to reach the respective threshold. The latter constraint refrains individuals
from “cheap riding” which relates to individuals who try to reduce their own contribution in
the group’s effort to reach a threshold at the expense of other individuals (Isaac et al., 1989).
This phenomenon must not be confused with free riding which is frequently observed in linear
public good games (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). Threshold public good games, in contrast,
are concerned with coordination, i.e., each individual’s contribution is essential for a successful
outcome of the entire group which imposes a strong incentive to contribute on each individual.
In particular, coordination games require individuals to behave similarly to achieve a successful
outcome, whereas it is individually optimal to free ride irrespective of the other individuals’
actions in linear public good games (Weber et al., 2001).
The results of this study show no substantial differences between both treatment groups. Individ-
uals in groups with heterogeneous incentives are even slightly more successful in coordinating
on a threshold than individuals in the treatment with homogeneous incentives although the
difference is not statistically significant. On average, first movers in both treatments contribute
almost the same amount as followers. In more than 45% of all instances, first movers in both
treatments contribute their entire endowment, i.e., first movers are indeed willing to set a good
example for second-moving followers rather than exploiting their strategic position within the
group. The so-called first mover’s curse which can occur in experiments with sequential con-
tributions due to followers whose contributions fall short of the first mover’s contribution (e.g.,
Cappelen et al., 2016; Gächter and Renner, 2018; see also Murnighan et al., 1993) is not observed
in this setting. Implementing a semi-sequential move order with a first-moving leader and
second-moving followers is, hence, beneficial for coordination in a threshold public good game
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with several collective accounts—even if individuals have divergent incentives for particular
collective accounts.
2.2 Related Literature
Absence of leadership can be blamed for coordination failure among individuals (Brandts and
Cooper, 2006a; Brandts et al., 2007). When an individual takes the responsibility and emerges
as leader, there are different approaches how to convince followers. Two notable examples
frequently discussed in the literature are leading by words and leading by example. Whereas
the first alternative relies on a non-binding announcement of intentions, leading by example
necessitates a binding commitment of the leader which is usually costly and irrevocable. Leading
by words, on the other hand, can be classified primarily as cheap talk and has only limited
influence on followers’ behavior (e.g., Pogrebna et al., 2011; Dannenberg, 2015).
In a team production setting with asymmetric information a leader can induce followers to exert
high levels of effort by using costly signals. Hermalin (1998) describes a model with hidden
information in which a leader with private information exerts effort before all others individuals
do. Followers interpret the effort level of the leader as signal about her private information
and choose their effort levels subsequently. The payoff generated by the group depends on
a state of the world which is only known by the leader and the total amount of effort exerted
by the group. Followers, therefore, do best by adapting to their leader’s effort level. Empirical
evidence by Meidinger and Villeval (2002) indeed shows that followers imitate the leader’s effort
choice. Differences in situations with symmetric and asymmetric information occur due to
different behavior of the leader. Whereas symmetric information induce leaders to strive for
high levels of coordination which is reciprocated by followers, leaders who face an environment
with asymmetric information behave contrarily and prefer to free ride which is detrimental for
coordination within groups.
While a large number of contributions emphasize the positive effects of sequential contributions
on cooperation a linear public good games (e.g., Moxnes and van der Heijden, 2003; Vesterlund,
2003; Potters et al., 2005, 2007; Güth et al., 2007; Levati et al., 2007; Gächter et al., 2010, 2012), the
effect of leadership in coordination settings has received little attention so far. Based on these
results, Sahin et al. (2015) study the effectiveness of leading by example compared to leading
by words on both, cooperation in a linear public good game and coordination in a minimum
effort game. In the latter case, both leadership styles result in substantially higher effort choices
compared to the benchmark setting with simultaneous decisions after the first period. Leaders’
effort choices in the case of leading by example are slightly higher than in the case of leading by
words, albeit the difference is not statistically significant. The relation between both treatments
is reversed for effort choices of followers. Overall, effort choices of first-moving leaders and
followers are not different. Under either leadership style, followers react reciprocally to the
example or suggestion by the first-moving leaders and almost match their increase in effort
choices.
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Cartwright et al. (2013) study the effect of first movers on preventing coordination failure in
minimum effort games. In particular, they compare the minimum effort choice in groups of
three and four individuals who decide simultaneously to groups of four individuals in which the
role of the first-moving leader is either exogenously or endogenously assigned. The presence
of a first-moving leader who sets an example for second-moving followers reduces strategic
uncertainty and is, hence, expected to facilitate coordination on higher effort levels (Cartwright
et al., 2013). Over the course of the experiment, minimum effort choices in both, the treatments
with a first-moving leader and the three-player treatment with simultaneous effort choices, are
stable, while the trend in the four-player treatment with simultaneous effort choices is decreasing.
This limited effect of leading by example on the prevention of coordination failure is to due to the
fact that leaders do not persistently choose higher effort levels than individuals in the treatments
with simultaneous decisions. Only for later periods differences in leaders’ effort choices in the
treatments with a first-moving leader and the three-player treatment with simultaneous effort
choices on the one hand and the four-player treatment with simultaneous effort choices on the
other hand are observed. To summarize, even though Cartwright et al. (2013) observe a positive
correlation between first-moving leaders’ and followers’ effort choices, coordination failure can
be attributed to leaders’ low effort choices to a large extent.
More recently, Dong et al. (2018) compared the effect of different leadership styles—leading by
example and leading by words—on restoring coordination after coordination failure and on
preventing coordination failure in a minimum effort game, respectively. The experiment consists
of two blocks with ten periods each. Between the treatments, the timing of the introduction of
the mechanisms varies: In the restoration treatment, individuals play a minimum effort game
with simultaneous decisions in the first ten periods and one of the leadership mechanisms
is introduced for the subsequent block—and vice versa for the prevention treatments. The
benchmark scenario consists of two blocks with simultaneous decisions. Regarding the timing
of introduction, the effect of leadership on coordination in a minimum effort game is more
pronounced when introduced at the beginning to prevent coordination failure as compared to
restoring coordination after a series of unsuccessful attempts. Effort choices in the restoration
setting with a mechanism of leadership being introduced at the beginning of the second block
quickly converge to effort choices made in the benchmark case with simultaneous decisions. In
contrast to this observation, effort levels in the prevention setting with leadership mechanisms
in the first block are higher than in the benchmark case with simultaneous decisions and in
the restoration case after the first two rounds. A comparison of the leadership mechanisms
reveals that followers are more inclined to adapt their decision to a higher effort choice if the
first mover’s decision is binding compared to a non-binding suggestion.
Kaplan et al. (2018) study a situation in which coordination is crucial for efficient cooperation.
In a two-player game, each individual is assigned an integer between 1 and 5 and has to choose
between the two alternatives to enter or leave the game, respectively. An individual who leaves
the game receives a payoff of zero. If one individuals enters the game, whereas the other individ-
ual does not, the former one receives the value of her number. Finally, if both individuals enter
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the game, each individual receives on third of the value of her number. In the related experiment
Kaplan et al. (2018) use three different treatments in which individuals can either decide simulta-
neously, sequentially, or wait until the other individual has made her decision. One cooperative
solution of this setting is that one individual enters the game and the other individual does not.
Although the treatments employing two stages lead to an increase in uncooperative behavior,
payoffs in the sequential treatment with an exogenous move order are substantially higher than
in case of simultaneous decisions. It should be noted, however, that this effect is driven by
a subset of cooperative groups who use the information due to the sequential structure and
coordinate on outcomes which are efficient for the group.
Another setting in which coordination matters are threshold public good games. Unlike in linear
public good games, the public good is only provided if contributions reach at least a pre-defined
level (e.g., Isaac et al., 1989; Croson and Marks, 2000, see also Section 2.4.1). Early evidence on
the effectiveness of a sequential move order in the provision of threshold public goods is found by
Erev and Rapoport (1990) who let individuals in their experiment make a binary decision whether
or not to contribute. In the sequential case, individuals decide one after another with perfect
information about the decisions of preceding individuals. Compared to the case of simultaneous
decisions, Erev and Rapoport (1990) observe a higher frequency of public good provision if
individuals decide sequentially. Similarly, Coats et al. (2009) study the effects of sequential and
simultaneous contributions under a full refund and a no refund scheme, respectively. As before,
a sequential structure with information about preceding individuals’ contributions turns out
more successful regarding the provision of threshold public goods compared to simultaneous
contributions.
Whereas in the studies discussed above situations with only one threshold level are considered,
Normann and Rau (2015) add a second threshold level in their setting. More precisely, they
study simultaneous and sequential contributions in groups of two individuals in environments
with one or two threshold levels, respectively. One potential weakness of sequential moves in
coordination problems is the fact that individuals who decide early can exploit their position
and try to make successive individuals bear the major part of the burden. Individuals who
decide later, however, have the opportunity to punish a first mover by contributing zero. The
introduction of a second threshold level by Normann and Rau (2015) is likely to induce first
movers to make higher contributions such that the second threshold level is feasible for the
successive individual. The follower, in turn, has no incentive to punish the first mover. In line
with other studies on sequential contributions in threshold public good games, Normann and
Rau (2015) find this approach to be more successful regarding the provision of threshold public
goods than the simultaneous alternative. As expected, having a second threshold level increases
contributions. Yet, the frequency of public good provision is not affected by the additional
threshold level.
The approach which is most closely related to the present study is introduced by Corazzini et al.
(2015) who do not use several threshold levels but several threshold public goods. Groups of
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four individuals can simultaneously allocate their endowment to either their private account
or one or more of four collective accounts. The collective accounts only yield a return to each
individual if contributions meet or exceed the corresponding threshold. As individuals decide
simultaneously, coordination is difficult. Therefore, different treatments try to make one col-
lective account salient either by assigning a marginal per-capita return1 which is different from
the other collective accounts or by using a computer-generated message which appears on
individuals’ screens. Without saliency as coordination device, the frequency of public good
provision is lower than in the benchmark case with a single threshold public good. If the salient
alternative is identical to the threshold public good which yields the highest potential payoff, the
frequency of provision is the same as in the benchmark case. If saliency is at odds with efficiency,
however, individuals tend to ignore the coordination device and try to reach the threshold of any
of the collective accounts which yield a higher potential payoff—which eventually results in a
lower frequency of public good provision. Providing a randomly generated signal as coordination
device results in a higher frequency of successful coordination than in absence of a coordination
device or with a coordination device which is at odds with efficiency. At the same time, the
randomly generated signal is less successful regarding the provision of threshold public goods
compared to situations with a single threshold public good or when the salient alternative is also
the most efficient one.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
2.3.1 Set-Up
Consider a group of n > 2 individuals indexed i = 1, . . . ,n with i = 1 as first-moving leader and
i ̸= 1 as second-moving followers. Individual i ’s endowment is denoted by qi . Each individual
can either keep her endowment or allocate some fraction to one or more of n collective accounts
indexed k. The contribution of individual i to collective account k is denoted by ci ,k . The
individual’s total contribution to the collective accounts is denoted by Ci =∑︁k ci ,k ≤ qi . For each
collective account k, there is a threshold Tk . For simplicity, the thresholds are identical for all
collective accounts, i.e., Tk = T ∀k. Each threshold T satisfies the following properties: (i) the
threshold is feasible: T ≤∑︁i qi ; (ii) the group can reach at most one threshold: ∑︁i qi < 2T ; (iii) all
individuals have to contribute to reach the threshold: T > n−1n
∑︁
i qi . Hence, the thresholds are
defined by n−1n
∑︁
i qi < T ≤
∑︁
i qi . The third property imposes strong incentives to contribute in
order to reach a threshold as it confines individuals’ incentives to cheap ride (Isaac et al., 1989).
Whenever the group’s contribution to a collective account meets or exceeds the corresponding
threshold, all individuals of the group receive a return αi ,kCk , where αi ,k represents the marginal
per-capita return of individual i from collective account k with 1n < αi ,k < 1 and Ck =
∑︁
i ci ,k
denotes the group’s total contribution to the corresponding collective account k. Thus, individual
i ’s payoff is given by
πi = qi −Ci +
∑︂
k
αi ,k ·Ck ·1[Ck≥T ],
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where qi −Ci corresponds to the amount she transfers to her private account. 1[Ck≥T ] is an
indicator function which equals one if the group’s total contribution to collective account k
meets or exceeds the corresponding threshold T and zero otherwise.
The game employs a semi-sequential move order. In the first stage, the first mover allocates her
endowment to her private account and the collective accounts. After they have been informed
about the first mover’s allocation, followers decide simultaneously and independently about
the allocation of their endowment. If the group does not reach a threshold, contributions to
the corresponding collective account are not refunded. Contributions above the threshold are
treated like in a linear public good game, i.e., the size of the public good increases in contributions.
This reduces the setting to a linear public good game if the number of collective accounts is set
to one and the threshold is zero (Corazzini et al., 2015).
2.3.2 Analysis
The following analysis is limited to a one-shot interaction and pure strategies (Isaac et al., 1989).
The properties of the thresholds require coordination in two domains: (i) As resources are
scarce, at most one threshold is feasible. (ii) Furthermore, contributions by all individuals are
required for successful coordination as a threshold is not feasible if one or more individuals
decide to contribute only a negligibly small share of their endowment or nothing at all. In a
simultaneous setting predictions about individual contributions are not very constructive (Isaac
et al., 1989). The semi-sequential move order discussed here, however, exhibits advantages due
to the observability of the first mover’s allocation.
Regarding the choice of a collective account as one domain of the coordination problem, the
contribution of the first mover is decisive for the group. Since at most one threshold is feasible,
the first mover contributes—if at all—to one collective account k ′ ∈ k. Contributions to all
other collective accounts k ̸= k ′ are, therefore, zero for all individuals (Corazzini et al., 2015).
If the first mover transfers the entire endowment to her private account or contributes only
a negligibly small share of her endowment below a critical value ccrit1 to collective account k
′
such that the followers’ endowments are not sufficient to cover the remaining amount to reach
the threshold, i.e., c1,k ′ < ccrit1 ≡ T −
∑︁
i ̸=1 qi , followers do best by not contributing at all. The
first mover anticipates followers’ behavior in this case and does not contribute to the collective
account either. This results in individual contributions ci ,k = 0 for all collective accounts k
(including k ′) and for all individuals i which constitutes an inefficient outcome.
If the first mover contributes c1,k ′ ≥ ccrit1 to collective account k ′, the corresponding threshold is
feasible for the group and the choice of a collective account is determined by the first mover’s
contribution. Hence, followers also contribute—if at all—only to collective account k ′. The
second part of the coordination problem concerning individual contributions is mainly directed
toward the followers who play a simultaneous threshold public good game in the second stage. In
this subgame the threshold is defined by ˜︁T ≡ T −c1,k ′ . Possible equilibria of the subgame are the
inefficient equilibrium with
∑︁
i ̸=1 ci ,k ′ = 0 and numerous threshold equilibria with
∑︁
i ̸=1 ci ,k ′ = ˜︁T .
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pii = qi−γi ·T˜+αi ,k′ ·T ∀i 6= 1
with γi · T˜ = ci ,k′ ≤ qi ∀i 6= 1
and
∑
i 6=1γi = 1
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the game.
In particular, each follower’s contribution in the latter case reflects a fraction of the threshold˜︁T in the subgame, i.e., ci ,k ′ = γi ˜︁T ≤ qi ∀i ̸= 1 with∑︁i ̸=1γi = 1.2 In the full game, therefore, both
contribution vectors c= (︁c1,k ′ ,∑︁i ̸=1 ci ,k ′ = 0)︁ and c= (︁c1,k ′ ,∑︁i ̸=1 ci ,k ′ = ˜︁T )︁ for collective account
k ′ are equally plausible with individual contributions ci ,k = 0 ∀k ̸= k ′ (Andreoni, 1998). Note that
outcomes in which no threshold is reached are Pareto-dominated by outcomes which reach a
threshold. In the latter case, however, outcomes cannot be Pareto-ranked among each other
(Isaac et al., 1989).
The game features multiple equally plausible outcomes which exacerbates coordination. Yet,
some outcomes are salient. Notable instances are cases with symmetric contributions such
as the inefficient outcome with individual contributions ci ,k = 0 ∀k and the outcome which
reaches a threshold with individual contributions ci ,k ′ = 40 and ci ,k = 0 ∀k ̸= k ′. Note that in
the homogeneous treatment both types of symmetric contributions also result in symmetric
payoffs, whereas payoffs in the heterogeneous case are asymmetric for the presented threshold
outcome. In general, equal payoffs cannot be achieved in the heterogeneous treatment if the
group reaches a threshold.
The concept of equilibrium selection introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) provides ad-
ditional classifications. The numerous outcomes in which a threshold is reached are Pareto-
superior to other outcomes in which the threshold is not reached and are, thus, classified
payoff-dominant. The inverse argument of risk dominance applies to inefficient outcomes in
which all individuals transfer their entire endowment to their private account and are not at risk
of losing their contributions to a collective account if the corresponding threshold is not reached
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(Corazzini et al., 2015). Moreover, the approach by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) provides useful
insights to the simultaneous threshold public goods game played by the followers in the second
stage after the first mover has contributed ccrit1 . In this situation, followers face the decision
whether or not to contribute. Due to a high degree of strategic uncertainty about the actions of
other individuals who decide simultaneously, the risk-dominant strategy in this subgame is to
contribute zero tokens to the collective accounts as opposed to the payoff-dominant alternative
which requires positive contributions to collective account k ′ by followers to reach the threshold˜︁T in the subgame. In fact, a contribution by the first mover at or above the critical value ccrit1 is
a necessary, but not a sufficient requirement to reach the corresponding threshold in the full
game.
Having two equally plausible sets of outcomes, the actual outcome remains predominantly
an empirical question. Depending on the first mover’s contribution, however, the relation
between risk imposed on an individual follower and potential payoffs changes. If the first mover
contributes a small amount of tokens equal to or marginally larger than the minimum required
amount to reach a threshold, ccrit1 , followers have to cover a large amount to reach the threshold
which imposes not only risk on an individual follower but also reduces potential payoffs. On
the other hand, if the first mover contributes a large amount of tokens close or equal to q1,
the remaining gap to reach the corresponding threshold is smaller than in the previous case
which results in higher potential payoffs for the followers at lower risk and, hence, alleviates
the assurance problem (see Isaac et al., 1989, for a related argument). To summarize, followers’
inclination to contribute to the collective account in the subgame played in the second stage can
be influenced by the first mover’s contribution. In particular, higher contributions by the first
mover can increase followers’ willingness to act on her example (see Cartwright et al., 2013; Dong
et al., 2018, for evidence on coordination on higher effort levels in minimum effort games).
2.4 Experimental Design
2.4.1 Procedures
A total of 76 individuals participated in six sessions between April and July 2016 at Karlsruhe
Decision & Design Lab. Individuals were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) for the first and sec-
ond session and via hroot (Bock et al., 2014) for subsequent sessions. Experimental procedures
were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Upon arrival, individuals were randomly allocated to cubicles equipped with computer terminals.
After they had read the instructions and answered a set of control questions, individuals played
three trial periods with no interaction in which they had the opportunity to familiarize with the
payoff mechanism of the first part of the experiment. At the end of the trial periods, groups of
four individuals were randomly matched and one individual was randomly assigned the role
of the first mover. Individuals were not informed about the other group members’ identities.
Eventually, individuals played a threshold public good game for ten periods using a partner
matching protocol. In the second part of the experiment, individuals were matched in new
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groups of two with another individual they had not interacted with before and played a Battle of
the Sexes game (e.g., Camerer, 2003) using the strategy method (Selten, 1967). Each individual
indicated an independent decision as row player and two dependent decisions as column player.
The purpose was gathering additional information about individuals’ basic understanding of
the structure of a situation with multiple, yet conflicting equilibria.3 In the third part of the
experiment, we elicited risk preferences using the staircase approach by Falk et al. (2016). The
final questionnaire included open questions about individuals’ decisions in the previous parts of
the experiment, questions from the German socio-economic panel about impulsiveness, risk
incentives, and attitudes about trust in other people (DIW/SOEP, 2014; Dohmen et al., 2011),
a subset of the competitiveness index by Smither and Houston (1992), and questions about
demographic characteristics.
During the experiment the fictitious currency tokens was used. At the end of the experiment, one
period of the first part was randomly selected for payoff. For the second part of the experiment,
it was randomly determined which player of a group was the row player and the column player,
respectively. Payoffs were determined according to the row player’s independent decision and
the corresponding dependent decision of the column player. Additionally, individuals received a
payoff from the incentivized elicitation of risk incentives in the third part of the experiment. The
total amount of tokens earned in the experiment was converted into Euro at an exchange rate of
10 tokens = 1.00 Euro and paid out privately to each individual in cash. The experiment lasted
about 75 minutes and individuals earned on average 15.82 Euro including a show-up fee of 4.00
Euro.
2.4.2 The Game
The design of the first part of the experiment is based on a threshold public good game (e.g.,
Isaac et al., 1989; Croson and Marks, 2000) with several collective accounts and a semi-sequential
move order. Groups consist of four individuals endowed with 50 tokens each. One individual is
randomly assigned the role of the first mover for the entire experiment. Individuals can allocate
their endowment in increments of 5 tokens to their private account and to one or more of four
collective accounts. The collective accounts are labeled by colors. The order of the collective
accounts is randomly determined in each period.
In the first stage of each period, the first mover allocates her endowment. Meanwhile, followers
are asked to state their beliefs as to which account the first mover allocates the largest share of her
endowment. A correct belief is rewarded with an additional payoff of 10 tokens. In the second
stage, followers are informed about the allocation of the first mover and then allocate their
endowment simultaneously and independently. As before, the first mover is asked to state her
belief as to which account the followers allocate on average the largest share of their endowment
which is also incentivized.
Whereas the whole group is entitled to payoffs generated by the collective accounts, only the
individuals themselves benefit from the payoff of the respective private accounts. After all
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Collective account
Red Blue Yellow Green
Individual
1 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5
2 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5
3 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5
4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75
Table 2.1: Marginal per-capita returns in the heterogeneous treatment. In the homogeneous
treatment, marginal per-capita returns are equal to 0.5 for all individuals and all collective
accounts.
individuals have allocated their endowment to the collective accounts and their private accounts,
they receive a return from the collective accounts—provided the corresponding threshold of
160 tokens for a particular collective account has been reached. The return is determined by
the marginal per-capita return as fraction of the group’s total contribution to this particular
collective account. In the homogeneous treatment, the marginal per-capita return assumes a
value of 0.5 for all individuals and all collective accounts. In the heterogeneous case, however,
there is always one collective account which is more beneficial for one particular individual
with a marginal per-capita return of 0.75. At the same time, an individual’s preferred option is
different from the others’ most favorable collective accounts (see Table 2.1).
At the end of each period, individuals receive detailed feedback for all collective accounts. They
are informed about the other individuals’ contributions to each collective account and they
are told whether a threshold has been reached. Finally, they learn the return from their private
account and the collective account as well as their potential earnings from the current period.
2.4.3 Conjectures
If a threshold is reached, the payoffs of all individuals of a group are higher than in a situation in
which individuals fail to reach a threshold. A group of payoff-maximizing individuals, therefore,
strives to coordinate on a threshold. The construction of the thresholds allows the group to reach
at most one threshold. Moreover, each individual is required to contribute. In particular, the
semi-sequential move order requires the first mover to contribute at least ccrit1 tokens such that
the followers can cover the remaining amount with their endowment.
(C1) The first mover contributes a positive amount equal to or larger than ccrit1 to one collective
account k ′.
The game also requires coordination in another domain which concerns the choice of one
out of four collective accounts. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, the properties of the thresholds
allow the first mover to determine which collective account k ′ is feasible for the group. In the
homogeneous treatment, the collective accounts are indistinguishable regarding their potential
payoffs. Thus, the first mover can choose one collective account randomly. In the heterogeneous
case, however, there is one particular collective account for each individual which yields a higher
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return than the other collective accounts. As the first mover is expected to maximize her own
monetary payoff, she chooses the collective account which yields the highest payoff for herself.
(C2) When marginal per-capita returns are heterogeneous, the first mover contributes to her
preferred collective account.
Although the second movers are informed about the first mover’s allocation, an individual second
mover does not know how the others will behave as all second movers decide simultaneously
and independently. Nevertheless, the game provides incentives for the followers to contribute.
If the contribution by the first mover increases, the remaining amount to be covered by the
followers decreases which is supposed to enhance followers’ inclination to contribute.
(C3a) Followers are more inclined to contribute to the collective account if the first mover’s
contribution increases.
Even though followers have divergent incentives toward the choice of the collective account
than their first mover in the heterogeneous case, they do not oppose the first mover’s choice
because they are still better off if the corresponding threshold is reached compared to a situation
in which coordination is not successful.
(C3b) Followers act on the first mover’s suggestion even in the heterogeneous treatment.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Overview
The data set contains observations of 76 individuals in groups of four which remained unchanged
over the entire course of the experiment. Thus, there are 19 independent observations on
group level, nine in the homogeneous treatment and ten in the heterogeneous treatment. Non-
parametric tests are based on averages by groups over all periods. To control for the impact of
additional factors on individual contributions, results of regressions on random effects models
are also reported. Robust standard errors in these regressions are clustered on group level.
Figure 2.2 displays average contributions by first movers and followers in both treatments by
period. Overall, individuals contribute 30.38 tokens in the homogeneous treatment and 33.35
tokens in the heterogeneous treatment to the collective accounts. The difference between
both treatments is statistically not significant (p = 0.6831, two-sided Mann-Whitney U -test).
Relative contributions are in the range which is frequently observed in threshold public good
experiments with one collective account (see Croson and Marks, 2000, for a meta analysis).
Moreover, Corazzini et al. (2015) report a slightly lower level of average contributions (about
55% of the initial endowment) in their treatment 4G_RS which is similar to the present setting
as it uses four collective accounts and a computer-generated signal to make one collective
account salient. Within treatments, there is only a minor difference between first movers (30.72
tokens) and followers (30.26 tokens) in the homogeneous treatment as well as between first
movers (33.15 tokens) and followers (33.42 tokens) in the heterogeneous treatment. None of
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Figure 2.2: Average contributions in the homogeneous and the heterogeneous treatment by first
movers and followers across periods.
these differences by type and treatment is statistically significant, neither within treatments
(homogeneous treatment: p = 0.6350, heterogeneous treatment: p = 0.3583, two-sided Wilcoxon
signed-rank test) nor between treatments (first movers: p = 0.9345, followers: p = 0.4622, two-
sided Mann-Whitney U -test).
The fraction of successful groups which are able to reach a threshold by period and treatment
is depicted in Figure 2.3. In the first period, three out of nine groups in the homogeneous
treatment and four out of ten groups in the heterogeneous treatment are able to coordinate their
contributions to reach a threshold. By the end of the experiment, the number of successful groups
increases to five groups in the homogeneous treatment and seven groups in the heterogeneous
treatment.4 Over all periods, coordination on a threshold is successful in 50% of all cases in the
homogeneous treatment and in 58% of all cases in the heterogeneous treatment. Compared to
63.2% in the treatment 4G_RS of Corazzini et al. (2015) success rates are slightly lower in both
treatments of the present study which may be attributed to different threshold levels in both
experiments.5 The difference in the average fraction of successful periods between treatments is
statistically not significant (p = 0.7267, two-sided Z -test (two-sample)).
Figure 2.4 provides an overview of average payoffs by type and period in both treatments. On
average, individuals earn 65.38 tokens per period in the homogeneous treatment and 75.32
tokens in the heterogeneous treatment. The difference is statistically not significant (p = 0.6242,
two-sided Mann-Whitney U -test). However, it can be explained by the fact that there is al-
ways one collective account for each individual in the heterogeneous treatment which yields a
marginal per-capita return which is 50% higher than for the remaining collective accounts and
21
0.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Fr
ac
ti
o
n
Period
Homogeneous treatment Heterogeneous treatment
Figure 2.3: Frequency of thresholds reached in the homogeneous treatment and the heteroge-
neous treatment by period.
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Figure 2.4: Average income in the homogeneous treatment and the heterogeneous treatment by
type and period.
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Figure 2.5: Average fraction of followers’ correct beliefs by treatment and period.
for the other individuals. In the homogeneous treatment, the difference in average payoffs of
first movers (65.03 tokens) and followers (65.49 tokens) is statistically not significant (p = 0.6350,
two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The difference between first movers’ (94.68 tokens) and
followers’ average payoffs (68.87 tokens) in the heterogeneous treatment, in contrast, is sub-
stantial and statistically significant (p = 0.0284, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This is
an indication of first movers choosing the collective account which yields the highest potential
payoff for themselves in the heterogeneous treatment. Indeed, first movers in the heterogeneous
treatment allocate the highest contribution to a particular collective account to the alternative
which is most beneficial for themselves regarding the potential payoff in 74% of all cases—which
makes this collective account also salient for followers.
The fraction of followers’ correct beliefs in the homogeneous and the heterogeneous treatment
in each period is depicted in Figure 2.5. The differences between both treatments are statistically
not significant (p = 0.9017, two-sided Mann-Whitney U -test). The graph indicates that already
in the first period more than half of the individuals in both treatments correctly anticipate
the account which the first mover allocates the largest share of her endowment to. Whereas
followers in the homogeneous treatment frequently expect the first mover to choose the first
collective account on the screen (from left to right; see Figure A.3), followers in the heterogeneous
treatment in many cases anticipate that the first mover chooses the collective account which
yields the highest payoff for herself. Over the course of the experiment, the fraction of correct
beliefs increases such that almost all followers state a correct belief by the final periods which
indicates that the repeated interaction in fixed groups fosters learning.
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Figure 2.6: First movers’ mean contributions to the collective accounts over all periods.
2.5.2 Contributions of First Movers
Mean contributions by first movers over all periods are depicted in Figure 2.6. Two thirds of first
movers in the homogeneous treatment and even all first movers in the heterogeneous treatment
contribute on average over all periods an amount of at least 10 tokens to the collective accounts
which is the minimum required contribution of first movers such that followers can cover the
remaining amount to reach a threshold with their endowment.
In line with conjecture (C1), we find that first movers in the heterogeneous treatment contribute
on average over all periods an amount which equals at least the minimum required contribution
of 10 tokens (p = 0.0010, one-sided sign test (one-sample)). For the homogeneous treatment,
however, the null hypothesis of first movers’ contributions below the minimum required thresh-
old cannot be rejected (p = 0.2539, one-sided sign test (one-sample)).
The institution of a first mover is expected to facilitate coordination in an environment with
several alternatives and scarce resources which permits the group to coordinate at most on
one alternative successfully. By contributing a considerable amount to one particular collective
account, one alternative becomes salient for followers who can align with the first mover’s choice
of the collective account which resolves one domain of the coordination problem. In both treat-
ments, first movers make use of their strategic position to facilitate coordination in their groups:
In 74.4% of all cases in the homogeneous treatment and in 83% of all cases in the heterogeneous
treatment, first movers make one particular collective account salient by their contribution. The
difference in proportions between both treatments is statistically not significant (p = 0.6463,
two-sided Z -test (two-sample)). As collective accounts in the homogeneous treatment are indis-
tinguishable regarding potential payoffs, first movers can choose, e.g., by label, by position on
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the screen, or randomly. In 50% of all cases, first movers in the homogeneous treatment choose
the collective account which appears on the first position on the screen (from left to right) after
the private account.6 This proportion is statistically significantly different from 25% (p = 0.0416,
one-sided Z -test (one-sample)) which is the probability of choosing the collective account on
the first position if one out four collective account is chosen randomly. In the heterogeneous
treatment, there is one collective account for each individual which yields a higher potential pay-
off due to its marginal per-capita return of 0.75 compared to the marginal per-capita returns of
0.5 for all other collective accounts. Hence, first movers in the heterogeneous treatment choose
their preferred collective account in 74% of all cases which is statistically significantly different
from 25% (p = 0.0002, one-sided Z -test (one-sample)) and, therefore, supports conjecture (C2).
2.5.3 Contributions of Followers
As discussed in the previous section, the majority of first movers in both treatments make an
effort to facilitate coordination in their groups by making one out of four collective accounts
salient. Moreover, they contribute on average considerable amounts above the minimum re-
quired contribution such that followers can cover the remaining amount to reach a threshold
with their endowment. While making one collective account salient resolves the underlying
coordination problem in one domain, higher contributions by first movers reduce the remaining
amount which has to be covered to reach the corresponding threshold and, thereby, also reduce
strategic uncertainty of followers who decide simultaneously to some extent. Yet, contributing
still inhibits risk for followers as they do not know whether and how much the other followers
contribute and contributions are not refunded if a threshold is not reached. It is, therefore, under
question whether followers respond to their first mover’s contribution and support the attempt
to reach a particular threshold.
As discussed in Section 2.5.1, there are only minor differences between first movers’ and followers’
contribution in both treatments. Figure 2.7 depicts followers’ average contributions in a period
contingent on the respective first mover’s contribution. Followers in the homogeneous treatment
respond positively to first movers’ contributions which is also confirmed by a Spearman rank
correlation coefficient on average contributions over all periods (ρ = 0.9412, p = 0.0002), whereas
the rank correlation coefficient for the heterogeneous treatment is lower in magnitude and
statistically insignificant (ρ = 0.4787, p = 0.1617). Nevertheless, there is a tendency in both
treatments—albeit to different degrees—that followers are indeed willing to respond positively
to their first movers’ contributions which provides (weak) support for conjecture (C3a). While
followers in the homogeneous treatment have no reason to object to their first mover’s choice
of a particular collective account, followers in the heterogeneous treatment face the decision
whether or not to support the first mover if she chooses the collective account which yields the
highest payoff for herself. Focusing only on a subset of cases in the heterogeneous treatment
in which the first mover acts selfishly by making her preferred collective account salient, the
correlation between first movers’ and followers’ contributions is slightly negative but statistically
insignificant (ρ = −0.0988, p = 0.7868). The right panel of Figure 2.7, however, indicates that
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Figure 2.7: First movers’ contributions and followers’ mean contributions by period. The size of
the bubbles indicates the frequency of distinct observations.
in 10 of 74 instances in which the first movers chooses the alternative which yields the highest
potential payoff for herself and only contributes the minimum required amount of 10 tokens
such that followers can still reach the threshold, followers do indeed contribute their entire
endowment. This suggests—in line with conjecture (C3b)—that followers in general do not
have a strong desire to punish first movers who exploit their position strategically and focus on
reaching the corresponding threshold instead.
2.5.4 Regression Analysis
To get additional insights in individual contribution behavior, the following subsection reports
results of panel regressions with random effects. To account for interdependencies between
periods, robust standard errors are clustered on group level. Additional regressions on averages
by groups over all periods as robustness checks are reported in Appendix A.2.
The dependent variables in Table 2.2 are individual contributions by all players. Columns (1)
and (2) contain all periods, whereas column (3) only contains periods 2–10. Het and FM denote
indicator variables for the heterogeneous treatment and the role of the first mover, respectively.
Period is a continuous variable for the time trend and LagThr is a dummy variable which indicates
a group’s successful coordination on a threshold in the previous period. The dummy variables
for the treatment and the first mover are statistically not significant; neither is the interaction
term between these explanatory variables. The time trend is negative as commonly observed
in repeated public good experiments but statistically not significant in specifications (1) and
(2) either. When controlling for groups’ successful coordination in the previous period, the
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(1) (2) (3)
Het 2.975 3.157 1.464
(7.284) (7.535) (4.299)
FM 0.079 0.463 0.412
(2.602) (1.294) (1.793)
Period −0.796 −0.796 −1.461***
(0.485) (0.485) (0.432)
Het × FM −0.730 −0.949
(4.977) (5.104)
LagThr 20.460***
(3.960)
Constant 34.735*** 34.639*** 28.745***
(4.939) (4.941) (3.800)
Obs. 760 760 684
No. Groups 19 19 19
Wald-χ2 3.045 6.462 31.33
Prob. > χ2 0.385 0.167 8.05 ·10−6
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2.2: Individual contributions by all players. Generalized least squares estimates with
random effects.
time trend is statistically highly significant which indicates a decreasing effect of failure in the
previous period on individual contributions over time. The dummy variable for successful
coordination in the previous period itself is positive and statistically highly significant which
reflects individuals’ incentives to contribute a considerable share of their endowment in the
present period and, thereby, increase the prospect of sustaining successful coordination. This
observation is confirmed by column (2) of Table A.1 when using average contributions by group
and period as dependent variable.
To analyze the inclination of first movers to contribute to the collective accounts to set a good
example and guide followers towards successful coordination of the group, Table 2.3 includes sev-
eral control variables on individual characteristics and attitudes elicited in the post-experimental
questionnaire using primarily questions from the German Socio-economic Panel (DIW/SOEP,
2014). Econ is a dummy variable for individuals who study Industrial Engineering and Manage-
ment, Information Engineering and Management, Economics Engineering, Economathematics,
or a related subject. Risk is the value of the answer to the question “Would you describe yourself
as someone who tries to avoid risks (risk-averse) or as someone who is willing to take risks (risk-
prone)?” on an end-labeled Likert-scale ranging from 0 (risk-averse) to 10 (risk-prone) (Dohmen
et al., 2011). Q06 and Q07 refer to the answers on a four-point Likert-scale7 to the questions
“People can generally be trusted.” and “Nowadays you cannot rely on anyone.”, respectively.
Finally, Q08 is a dummy variable for individuals who choose the second alternative as answer
27
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Het 0.046 −0.007 0.187 3.218 0.920
(7.764) (7.392) (7.895) (9.495) (7.958)
Period −0.992 −0.992 −0.992 −0.992 −0.992
(0.637) (0.639) (0.641) (0.641) (0.641)
Econ −5.972 −6.109 −5.973 0.499 −5.878
(11.398) (11.404) (11.504) (14.165) (11.234)
Female −2.650 −2.818 −3.121 −7.107 −4.740
(12.545) (12.703) (15.117) (10.778) (13.333)
Risk −0.067 −0.149 −1.112 −0.144
(1.718) (2.680) (1.849) (1.814)
Q06 −0.353
(7.244)
Q07 7.922
(7.670)
Q08 3.289
(9.396)
Constant 42.076*** 42.673*** 43.828 21.715 41.210**
(13.280) (16.428) (32.173) (28.942) (16.853)
Obs. 190 190 190 190 190
No. Groups 19 19 19 19 19
Wald-χ2 2.665 2.736 2.775 6.110 2.786
Prob. > χ2 0.615 0.741 0.837 0.411 0.835
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2.3: First movers’ contributions. Generalized least squares estimates with random effects.
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to the question “Do you believe that most people (i) would use you if they had the chance or
(ii) that they would try to be fair to you?”. As can be seen in Table 2.3, various specifications
including control variables on individual characteristics fail to explain first movers’ contribution
behavior. In particular, the statistics of the Wald-χ2-test are very low, i.e., the null hypothesis of
joint insignificance of all explanatory variables included in the respective specification cannot
be rejected for any of these models. We can, therefore, not derive a reliable and meaningful
conclusion on what drives first movers’ contributions. The robustness check presented in table
Table A.2 using first movers’ average contributions over all periods as dependent variable does
not improve this result.
Focusing only on contributions of followers, Table 2.4 includes Salient as a dummy variable
which assumes a value of one if the first mover contributes a decent amount of her endowment
to a single collective account and makes this option salient instead of spreading an equal
amount on two or more collective accounts which is not informative for followers when trying
to solve the first domain of the coordination problem as to which collective account they are
supposed to contribute to. Additionally, ContFM corresponds to the contribution of the first
mover to the collective account in the present period. Correct Belief is a dummy variable
which indicates whether a follower correctly anticipated the account which the first mover
allocated the largest share of her endowment to. As before, neither the coefficients of the
dummy variable for the heterogeneous treatment nor the coefficients for the time trend are
statistically significant. First movers who make use of the semi-sequential order and alleviate the
coordination problem by making one collective account salient induce followers to contribute
statistically significantly higher amounts to the collective accounts. Moreover, contributions of
followers to the collective accounts rise statistically significantly in first movers’ contributions
which emphasizes the positive effect of good examples set by first movers. The interaction
term between these two explanatory variables is negative, but statistically only marginally
significant in column (6) when also controlling for correct beliefs and successful coordination
the previous period. Followers who correctly anticipate the target of the first mover’s allocation
contribute statistically marginally more to the collective account in specification (4), although
the coefficient loses its significance when controlling for successful coordination in the previous
period. Again, the dummy variable for successful coordination in the previous period itself
is positive and statistically highly significant. Changing the dependent variable to followers’
average contributions by group as in Table A.3 does not change these results except the fact that
the coefficient for the dummy variable indicating a correct belief in column (5) is statistically not
significant any more.
Unlike the regressions of Table 2.4 which take followers’ total contributions to the collective
accounts into account, the results reported in Table 2.5 are based on contributions to the salient
account—given that the first mover provides his group with a salient alternative. The coefficients
of the dummy variable for the heterogeneous treatment and the variable for the time trend
in columns (1) and (2) are statistically insignificant as before. The signs of the coefficients for
the time trend, however, change to positive which can be interpreted as followers’ improved
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Het 3.157 1.013 1.170 5.583 5.388 5.937
(7.528) (4.947) (4.428) (5.505) (5.453) (4.588)
Period −0.731 −0.011 −0.012 −0.026 −0.176 −0.576
(0.457) (0.290) (0.258) (0.268) (0.291) (0.382)
Salient 25.066*** 14.900*** 14.743** 16.175*** 14.019**
(2.590) (5.570) (5.735) (6.146) (6.739)
ContFM 0.294** 0.382** 0.353** 0.344**
(0.134) (0.151) (0.158) (0.174)
Het × ContFM −0.139 −0.133 −0.168*
(0.111) (0.110) (0.099)
Correct Belief 3.895* 2.366
(2.205) (2.381)
LagThr 11.756***
(4.087)
Constant 34.280*** 11.662*** 10.216*** 7.686* 5.231 4.904
(4.781) (3.418) (3.239) (4.271) (4.218) (4.574)
Obs. 570 570 570 570 570 513
No. Groups 19 19 19 19 19 19
Wald-χ2 2.732 119.5 161.6 223.3 265.6 721.3
Prob. > χ2 0.255 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2.4: Followers’ contributions. Generalized least squares estimates with random effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Het 1.220 0.620 19.263* 20.598** 20.585**
(5.620) (5.054) (11.396) (10.362) (9.675)
Period 0.538 0.462 0.492 0.239 −0.151
(0.409) (0.357) (0.380) (0.346) (0.289)
ContSalFM 0.368** 0.654*** 0.628*** 0.525***
(0.156) (0.138) (0.146) (0.131)
Het × ContSalFM −0.479* −0.508** −0.500**
(0.250) (0.230) (0.222)
Correct Belief 6.379** 4.130*
(2.497) (2.332)
LagThr 10.005***
(3.613)
Constant 32.787*** 19.061*** 7.961 5.402 7.181
(4.635) (6.867) (6.437) (6.123) (4.505)
Obs. 450 450 450 450 399
No. Groups 18 18 18 18 18
Wald-χ2 1.781 9.745 27.94 39.69 74.07
Prob. > χ2 0.410 0.021 1.28 ·10−5 1.73 ·10−7 0.000
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2.5: Followers’ contributions to the salient account. Generalized least squares estimates
with random effects.
understanding to act on the first mover’s suggestion over time. Contributions to the salient
account by the first mover increase followers’ contributions statistically (highly) significantly. The
coefficients of the interaction term between the dummy variable for the heterogeneous treatment
and contributions to the salient account by first movers is negative and statistically (marginally)
significant indicating a weakly negative effect of first movers’ contributions in the heterogeneous
treatment. Yet, when controlling for this interaction, the coefficients of the dummy variable
for the heterogeneous treatment themselves become statistically (marginally) significant and
increase substantially in magnitude, i.e., the overall effect when controlling for this interaction
term is still positive. Individuals who stated a correct belief as to which account the first mover is
going to allocate the largest share of her endowment contribute statistically (marginally) more to
the salient account. The coefficient of successful coordination on a threshold in the previous
period is still positive and statistically highly significant. Considering the same specification
with followers’ average contributions to the salient account by group in Table A.4 only leads to
changes in column (3) in which the coefficients of the dummy variable for the heterogeneous
treatment and the corresponding interaction term with first movers’ contributions lose their
significance.
To investigate the relation between first movers’ and followers’ contribution in the heterogeneous
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treatment more detailed, the results reported in Table 2.6 are based on followers’ contributions to
the collective accounts in the heterogeneous treatment. As in all previous regressions, the coeffi-
cients for the time trend are statistically not significant. A notable exception is the specification
reported in column (5) containing a control for success in the previous period, i.e., this declining
time trend can be attributed to groups which fail to coordinate successfully on a threshold. The
dummy variable Selfish indicates whether the first mover chooses the collective account which
yields the highest potential payoff for herself due to a higher marginal per-capita return. The
corresponding coefficients are positive and statistically highly significant. As the choice of the
preferred account by the first mover frequently coincides with making one out of four collective
accounts salient, the positive reaction of followers is not surprising. In particular, followers
understand the benefit of supporting even a selfish first mover compared to a situation in which
no threshold is reached. As seen above, contributions by the first mover also increase followers’
inclination to contribute to the collective accounts statistically significantly. The interaction term
between a selfish choice of the first mover and her contributions yields negative and statistically
significant coefficients when controlling for correct beliefs and successful coordination in the
previous period although the overall effect is still positive. The coefficient of the dummy variable
for correct beliefs is positive and statistically marginally significant in column (4) but loses its
significance when controlling for successful coordination in the previous period which itself
yields a positive and statistically highly significant coefficient. These results are by and large
confirmed by additional regressions based on average contributions of followers to the collective
accounts by group in Table A.5 with differences in the specification reported in column (5).
2.6 Conclusion
The present study investigates coordination in an environment with several alternatives and
scarce resources such that only one of these alternatives is feasible. The coordination problem
in this case comprises two domains: Firstly, individuals have to choose one particular alternative
independently and secondly, they have to decide how much to contribute to reach the corre-
sponding threshold. To facilitate coordination, we use a semi-sequential move order with a
first-moving leader and second-moving followers who make their decisions simultaneously and
independently. This structure can foster coordination as the allocation of the first mover serves
as signal for followers. In particular, the first mover’s choice of the collective account is decisive
for the group which resolves one domain of the underlying coordination problem.
On the other hand, the institution of a first mover provides a large degree of discretion for one
individual which can be exploited. In the present case, the first mover can make a contribution
so low that followers have to contribute their entire endowment to reach the corresponding
threshold. If individuals face divergent incentives regarding the collective accounts, the first
mover can also strive for the alternative which yields the highest potential payoff for herself.
Yet, followers have to recognize that supporting a selfish first mover makes them better off
than a situation in which no threshold is reached. The first mover, in turn, bears the risk
of losing her contribution to the collective account if followers do not act on her example.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Period −0.298 0.005 0.149 −0.035 −0.616***
(0.473) (0.304) (0.366) (0.392) (0.220)
Selfish 24.703*** 14.751*** 29.174*** 30.571*** 23.898***
(3.729) (5.208) (10.545) (9.408) (8.071)
ContFM 0.326*** 0.455*** 0.498*** 0.438***
(0.112) (0.053) (0.059) (0.074)
Selfish × ContFM −0.384 −0.466** −0.451**
(0.252) (0.226) (0.203)
Correct Belief 4.706* 1.189
(2.524) (3.567)
LagThr 15.810***
(5.259)
Constant 16.775*** 11.675*** 7.201** 4.490 8.346***
(4.508) (4.137) (2.865) (2.871) (2.974)
Obs. 300 300 300 300 270
No. Groups 10 10 10 10 10
Wald-χ2 63.080 50.47 184.3 188.4 1422
Prob. > χ2 0.000 6.34 ·10−11 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2.6: Followers’ contributions in the heterogeneous treatment. Generalized least squares
estimates with random effects.
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Followers themselves also face strategic uncertainty as they decide simultaneously. The risk-
dominant decision in this situation is to transfer their entire endowment to the respective private
account. To avoid this, the first mover can reduce strategic uncertainty to some extent by a
decent contribution above the minimum required amount to one particular collective account
which reduces the amount which has to be covered by followers to reach the corresponding
threshold.
Overall, we do not observe substantial differences in contributions and earnings between the
treatments with homogeneous and heterogeneous incentives, nor between first movers and
followers. The latter result provides evidence that first movers are on average indeed willing
to bear a fair share in the group’s effort to coordinate on a threshold and, therefore, set a good
example for followers. Averaging over all periods, two thirds of first movers in the homogeneous
treatment and all first movers in the heterogeneous treatment make a contribution to the
collective accounts above the minimum required amount. The analysis of followers’ contribution
behavior also emphasizes the impact of the role of the first mover. Not only contributions by
first movers induce followers to act on her example but also first movers who use the semi-
sequential move order. Making one collective account salient by contributing a decent amount
to one particular collective account serves as signal for followers’ allocations which eventually
fosters coordination. Even if the first movers behaves selfishly and the salient collective account
coincides with her preferred alternative, followers recognize the benefits of supporting the first
mover’s attempt to reach the corresponding threshold.
To conclude, the institution of a first-moving can foster coordination in a setting with several
alternatives of which only one is feasible. Despite potential drawbacks due to the discretion of
the first mover, there is no indication of first movers who systematically exploit their role. On the
contrary, first movers have strong incentives to contribute a decent amount in the heterogeneous
treatment if they choose their preferred collective accounts. Followers in this case do not object
to the first mover’s choice and strive to cover the remaining amount to reach the threshold. Thus,
using a semi-sequential move order with a first-moving leader and second-moving followers can
facilitate coordination in a situation with several alternatives—even if individuals face divergent
incentives.
Notes
1. Usually, the term step return introduced by Croson and Marks (2000) is used in the context
of threshold public good games. This concept, however, requires a pre-determined size
of the public good. This is the case under a so-called no refund rule, i.e., if contributions
above the threshold do not increase the value of the public good. In both, the study by
Corazzini et al. (2015) and the present study, a linear rebate rule is employed. Hence,
contributions above the threshold are treated as in a linear public good game (see also
Section 2.3.1).
2. Note that γi < 1 (i ̸= 1) since none of the second-moving followers can reach the threshold
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˜︁T in the subgame alone.
3. The game is depicted by the following matrix:
Row player
Column player
Rhombus Trapezoid
Square 7, 3 3, 2
Rectangle 1, 2 4, 6
The first number in each cell denotes the payoff of the row player and the second number
the payoff of the column player. There are two equilibria in pure strategies, (Square,
Rhombus) and (Rectangle, Trapezoid). When asked to indicate their decisions as colum
player conditional on the row player’s decision, all but three individuals chose “Rhombus”
conditional on “Square” and “Trapezoid” conditional on “Rectangle” which indicates that
individuals understood the underlying conflict.
4. The figures in Appendix A.1 depict total contributions to the groups’ preferred collective
accounts by period in the homogeneous and heterogeneous treatment, respectively. Note
that individuals may contribute to more than one collective account.
5. In the present study, the threshold of 160 tokens corresponds to 80% of a group’s total
endowment in each period, whereas Corazzini et al. (2015) require a total contribution by
the group to a particular collective account of 132 tokens which is equivalent to 60% of the
group’s endowment in their setting.
6. See Figure A.3 for a screenshot. Collective accounts are labeled with the colors red, blue,
yellow, and green. The order of collective goods varies between periods.
7. 1 = strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = disagree; 4 = strongly disagree.
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3 Cooperation in the Classroom†
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of an intervention which conveys social skills in a playful
way during physical education lessons to foster cooperative behavior of children aged 10–13
years. Situations which require cooperation of individuals frequently suffer from free riding
behavior if individual incentives are in contrast to collective benefits. Cooperative behavior as
one aspect of social skills has been identified as major prerequisite for success in the labor market
and at the workplace as companies increasingly rely on teamwork. To study the effectiveness
of the intervention, individuals participate in an incentivized linear public good game at three
different times during the course of the study. The results of the present study provide weak
evidence that our intervention can foster cooperative behavior despite its limited duration.
In particular, individuals from households with low socio-economic status benefit from the
intervention.
3.1 Introduction
Social dilemmas are common in human societies, ranging from efforts to mitigate the effects of
climate change (e.g., Milinski et al., 2006) to collaboration in the workplace (e.g., Gneezy et al.,
2016). The main characteristic shared by these situations is the conflict between individual
incentives and collective benefits, i.e., the socially optimal outcome is only achieved if all individ-
uals are committed to fully cooperate, whereas it is individually optimal to free ride and not to
cooperate at all and rely on contributions by others instead. With respect to the workplace, team
production requires contributions of several individuals which cannot be perfectly observed,
whereas gains from cooperation are afterwards shared equally among individuals. The lack
of perfect observability of individual contributions while being entitled to a fixed share of the
gains from cooperation induces individual incentives to free ride (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972;
Kandel and Lazear, 1992). This leads eventually to a situation in which all individuals refrain
from cooperation and efficiency gains due to collective actions cannot be realized (Kim and
Walker, 1984; Andreoni, 1988; Ledyard, 1995; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997). On the other hand,
the willingness to cooperate becomes increasingly important in the workplace as the share of
companies which rely on teamwork has increased over the past decades (Eckel and Grossman,
2005; Lazear and Shaw, 2007; Bandiera et al., 2013). Moreover, Deming (2017) reports an increase
in employment and wages in the United States for occupations which require a high degree of
social skills1 as prerequisite of efficient collaboration by reducing coordination costs (see also
Heckman, 2000; Enste et al., 2018; Acosta and Muller, 2018).2 At the same time, employers are
concerned with a lack of soft skills among applicants. While employability is often associated
with hard skills in the first place which refer to formal qualifications, soft skills which comprise
individual characteristics related to general readiness for employment, such as willingness to
work in teams, reliability, problem solving, and attitude to work, are equally relevant (Kautz et al.,
†This section is based on joint work with Petra Nieken, Hagen Wäsche, Rita Wittelsberger, and Alexander Woll (Haas
et al., 2019b).
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2014; Cobb-Clark, 2015; European Commission, 2017).3
One approach frequently proposed to close the gap between employers’ expectations and
applicants’ actual sets soft skills is sports participation (European Commission, 2016, 2017).
Although causal evidence is rare (Cabane and Clark, 2015; Schüttoff et al., 2017), there seems
to be broad agreement on the benefits of sports participation beyond direct effects on health
and physical fitness (e.g., German Bundestag, 2014). The transfer of soft skills is argued to
be facilitated by employing sports participation as means of informal learning. In particular,
organized forms of sports participation, e.g., in sports clubs which is a popular leisure time
activity of children and adolescents in Germany, are regarded favorable for the development of
soft skills (Felfe et al., 2016; German Bundestag, 2017). Effects which are commonly attributed
to sports participation and increase employability at the same time include predominantly
non-cognitive skills such as the willingness to cooperate and to work in teams, self-discipline,
communication, and resilience, as well as “managerial” skills which are essential to carry out
complex and extensive tasks (Cornelißen and Pfeifer, 2009; Lechner and Sari, 2015; Cabane and
Lechner, 2016; Felfe et al., 2016; European Commission, 2017). One possible explanation is
that organized forms of sports participation require individuals to interact with other people
who do not genuinely belong the individual’s social network otherwise (Cabane and Clark, 2015;
Felfe et al., 2016). Thus, regular and active sports participation and being embedded in an
organization fosters the capability to cooperate with others to achieve common goals which
is also crucial for collaboration in the workplace as it, e.g., refrains individuals from shirking
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Long and Caudill, 1991; Celse et al., 2017). Yet, contributions which
study the effects of sports participation on the development of soft skills in young people are
scarce (Pawlowski et al., 2018).
To contribute to this field of research, we conduct an intervention study. The novel approach
used here comprises the elicitation of preferences in incentivized standard economic games
including a linear public good game and the transmission of social skills in playful way during
purposefully designed physical education lessons. Hence, the goal of this paper is to study
the impact of an intervention employing enhanced physical education lessons on cooperative
behavior as well as its transmission to situations outside the gymnasium which require balancing
off individual incentives against collective benefits. To complement previous findings from the
literature (see Section 3.2), we study whether (i) individuals who participate in organized sports
activities, e.g., in a sports club, are more cooperative and (ii) the intervention which aims at
conveying social skills in a playful way enhances cooperative behavior compared to individuals
in the Control group who do not receive the intervention.4
3.2 Related Literature
There is broad evidence on health-related benefits of sports participation and physical activity in
general (e.g., Physical Activity Guidelines Advisory Committee, 2018). While physical inactivity
is a major cause for non-communicable diseases which account for almost half of the overall
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burden of diseases and 6% of deaths worldwide (Warburton et al., 2006; WHO, 2010), physical
activity has been recognized as effective treatment for a wide range of diseases (see, e.g., Pedersen
and Saltin, 2015, for a comprehensive overview; see also Reiner et al., 2013; Warburton and Bredin,
2016).
At the same time, positive externalities of sports participation can also be observed in other
domains not directly related to health. An exhausting overview in this regard is provided by Breuer
et al. (2016) who identify non-monetary outcomes of sports participation such as increased social
capital, improvements in educational attainments, and success in the labor market. Furthermore,
these effects translate into monetary returns from sports participation which result, e.g., in higher
wages on an individual level. While the relation between sports participation and labor market
outcomes is widely acknowledged (e.g., Cornelißen and Pfeifer, 2009; Lechner, 2009, 2015;
Lechner and Sari, 2015; Cabane and Clark, 2015; Cabane and Lechner, 2016), the underlying
mechanism is not yet fully understood. Lechner (2009) proposes three explanations that can
potentially establish this link: (i) As sports participation is an important determinant for physical
health, individuals who participate in sports are generally expected to be healthier which results
in higher individual productivity in the labor market and, thereby, results in higher levels labor
market participation and higher wages. (ii) As sports participation is often associated with
a high degree of social interactions, individuals who participate in sports are also likely to
exhibit skills which are valuable in the workplace when assignments require joint endeavors of
several individuals. (iii) Finally, sports participation can be interpreted by potential employers
as signal of an individual’s motivation to exert oneself for achieving good results also in domains
related to the workplace. Moreover, Cabane and Lechner (2016) emphasize the impact of sports
participation on non-cognitive skills which include self-discipline, the ability to perform well
even under stressful circumstances, and the willingness to cooperate with other individuals in a
team.
As noted before, it is not straightforward to draw causal conclusions on the relation between
sports participation and outcomes in other domains as there may be unobserved causes which
influence both, sports participation and the outcome of interest. There are, however, some
studies which employ sophisticated econometric approaches to disentangle potentially con-
founding effects to establish a causal relation. Felfe et al. (2016) study health, performance at
school, and behavioral development of children aged 3–10 years in Germany conditional on
their sports participation. Data is primarily provided by the 2003–2006 wave of the German
Health Interview and Examination for Children and Adolescents (KiGSS; see Kurth, 2007, for a
description). Additionally, they access the German Child Panel and use its structure to avoid
issues due to selection effects of sports participation. As a result, Felfe et al. (2016) find children
who participate in sports to score better in all aspects under study compared to their peers
who do not participate in sports. Namely, sports participation improves children’s health status
and performance at school and reduces antisocial behavior. To investigate the effect of sports
participation during childhood on labor market outcomes as adults, Cabane and Clark (2015)
use data of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent and Adult Health (Add Health) from
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the United States. Individuals participated for the first time in this study in the years 1994–
1995 when they were in grades 7–12. The third and final follow-up survey was conducted in
2008 when individuals were 24–32 years old. Information about labor market status and other
control variables, e.g., on health, lifestyle, and education from the final survey were compared
to different types of sports participation (individual vs. team) and other leisure activities dur-
ing childhood. Cabane and Clark (2015) consider different aspects of adult individuals’ labor
market outcomes, in particular (i) having a paid job with at least ten working hours per week,
(ii) job satisfaction, (iii) being in a position with managerial responsibilities, (iv) opportunity
to decide independently on material issues in the workplace, and (v) annual income. Indeed,
significant correlations between sports participation during childhood and adult labor market
outcomes 13 years later are found. The link between participation in individual sports and
managerial responsibility is particularly pronounced, whereas participation in team sports is
strongly associated with discretion over important decision in the workplace. Schüttoff et al.
(2017) study the impact of sports participation on social capital formation during adolescence
which is considered crucial for success in the labor market. They use answers from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) at two different points in time. First, individuals born between
1986–1995 answer the youth questionnaire which contains questions about the frequency of
sports participation and the organizational format at age 17. The regular personal questionnaire
is answered at age 18–19. This time, the questionnaire contains items which allow to derive
conclusions on individuals’ social engagement reflected by the frequency of voluntary work,
e.g., in clubs or social services or the frequency of civic engagement. Interpersonal networks as
additional aspect of social capital is measured by the frequency of helping friends, neighbors, or
relatives. Sports participation is classified by type (team vs. individual) and organizational format
(sports club vs. other organizational format). The results show that especially the formation
of interpersonal networks is fostered by sports participation during adolescence, whereas only
small effects on civic engagement can be observed. With respect to the organizational format,
sports clubs are apparently more relevant for social capital formation during adolescence than
other organizational formats. Whereas the studies discussed so far are limited to developed
countries, Pawlowski et al. (2018) report results of a study conducted with data from Peru. Data
were collected as part of the Young Lives study program. Beginning in the year 2002 at age 12,
individuals answered the questionnaire which contained items also on other domains of individ-
uals’ lives beyond sports participation three times in total. Additional information were elicited
by a household questionnaire which was answered by the persons primarily responsible for the
individuals’ upbringing. Outcome variables of particular interest for the study by Pawlowski et al.
(2018) include human capital as measured by the Peabody Vocabulary Picture Test, social capital
which is further divided into neighborhood trust, friends support, respect by other children, and
feeling safe outside the house, subjective well-being as satisfaction with life, and health capital as
a subjective indicator assessed by individuals themselves. Whereas individuals who participate
in sports report higher levels of subjective health status and exhibit higher measures for social
capital, a relation between sport participation and educational outcomes which are likely to
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influence labor market outcomes in later life is not observed which is in contrast in contrast to
the previous studies focusing on developed countries. Another aspect studied by Knaus et al.
(2018) is the impact of physical education in Germany on different outcome variables, including
cognitive and non-cognitive skills. They argue that physical education is a mandatory element
of the curriculum, whereas participation in sports clubs is voluntary, i.e., focusing on sports
clubs only captures individuals who are already physically active. Based on data from the activity
survey of the 2015–2017 wave of the Motorik-Modul longitudinal study (MoMo; see Woll et al.,
2017, for a description), they measure the impact of an additional lesson of physical education.
The strongest effect is on cognitive skills as measured by improvements of grades in German
and math; in particular, boys from low-income households benefit in this regard. Considering
non-cognitive skills, however, the results are less favorable. Whereas girls benefit from an addi-
tional lesson of physical education as indicated by a decrease in emotional symptoms, the effect
is reversed for boys. More specifically, they are more likely exhibit behavioral problems. Positive
outcomes for motor skills and physical activity are only found for girls, whereas health-related
effects cannot be observed at all.
To address the impact of sports participation as signal to potential employers during the hiring
process, Rooth (2011) conducts a correspondence study. The goal here is to investigate callback
rates of fictitious applications with varying information about type (team vs. individual5) and
intensity (recreational vs. competitive) of leisure sports to real job openings in Sweden. He
observes an overall increase in callback rates for those applications which contain information
about leisure sports of about 2 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant and
corresponds reportedly to two additional years of job experience. Results are heterogeneous
with respect to the type of sports and across occupations. A direct comparison reveals that
the increase in callback rates is higher for individual sports than for team sports. Moreover,
applications to job openings in physically demanding occupations benefit exceptionally from
mentioning sports participation with an increase in callbacks of 4.8 percentage points. In a
related approach, Piopiunik et al. (2018) use a broader set of signals relating to cognitive skills,
social skills, and maturity in a survey experiment with 579 HR managers in Germany who are
presented two resumes simultaneously and are then asked to decide which applicant they
would prefer to invite for a job interview at their company. The fictitious applicants are either
graduates of a secondary school applying for an apprenticeship or college graduates. The domain
of social skills is represented by information about volunteering such as neighborhood help,
youth work, elderly work, and offering German language courses or participation in team sports.
Academic performance is deliberately negatively correlated with other skill signals. Overall,
HR managers take skill signals from all three domains used in the study into account which
eventually results in an increase in the probability of being invited to a job interview. The type
of signal which is most valuable, however, differs between both types of applicants: Whereas
HR managers primarily focus on grades as one aspect of cognitive skills when hiring college
graduates, applicants for an apprenticeship benefit from signaling social skills instead. Moreover,
the specific type of engagement in the domain of social skills also differs between graduates of
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secondary schools and colleges. Whereas volunteering is a valuable signal for applicants for an
apprenticeship, college graduates benefit conversely from mentioning participation in team
sports. The authors explain this observation by the fact that participation in team sports is quite
common at the age when young people in Germany typically graduate from secondary school
and apply for an apprenticeship, whereas volunteering of college graduates may be perceived
as strategic act to mimic social skills. Heinz and Schumacher (2017) compare signals from
individuals’ resumes about their willingness to cooperate with their actual behavior in a linear
public good game. Therefore, they ask individuals to bring their resumes to the experiment.
Willingness to cooperate can be signaled by social engagement in terms of voluntary work with
individuals who need support or engagement in an association such as sports clubs,6 student
associations, or political parties. To take different degrees of engagement into account, the
relevant information in individuals’ resumes are rated on a scale from 0 to 10 by other students
in a separate part of the study. The first finding of this study is that students who are socially
engaged contribute more to the collective account in the public good game than students whose
resumes do not contain references about social engagement. Moreover, contributions in the
public good game and the intensity of social engagement are positively associated. Contributions
of students who are engaged in an association, however, are not different from their non-engaged
peers’ contributions. Additionally, Heinz and Schumacher (2017) ask HR managers to predict
individuals’ contributions in the public good game based on signals contained in individuals’
resumes about their willingness to cooperate. Predictions are particularly accurate for individuals
who are highly socially engaged which can be interpreted as HR managers’ perception of high
commitment to social engagement as convincing signal of applicants’ willingness to cooperate
in the workplace.
To investigate differences in cooperative behavior of individuals who exhibit a high intensity
of sports participation compared to average individuals, Celse et al. (2017) exploit a special
subject pool consisting of students enrolled in sports sciences and students of other fields of
study. For the former group, sports participation is an integral part of their everyday lives as
they pursue an academic degree which requires them to take mandatory sports classes and
the majority of these students additionally participates in high-level competitions on a regular
basis. Both group of students participate in a linear public good game following Fischbacher
et al. (2001) where they make one unconditional and 21 conditional decisions. The pattern of
conditional conditions allows to classify individuals as conditional cooperators, free riders, or
triangle contributors. Regarding unconditional contributions, Celse et al. (2017) do not observe
significant difference between both groups of students. The distribution of types according
to conditional contributions, however, differs. The share of conditional cooperators among
students enrolled in sports sciences is higher than among students of other fields of study. Yet, a
closer inspection of the data reveals that athletic individuals who are classified as conditional
cooperators are more likely to undercontribute. On the other hand, the proportion of free riders
is higher among individuals whose intensity of sports participation is not exceptionally high. The
authors note that success in sports requires both, the willingness to compete and the willingness
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to cooperate. What appears contradictory at first glance can be illustrated by the fact that most
types of sports require at least some degree of cooperative behavior, whereas other situations
in sports promote pursuing one’s own interests. Hence, Celse et al. (2017) argue that the higher
inclination for conditionally cooperative behavior among students enrolled in sports sciences
reflects the notion that they are indeed willing to cooperate as means to achieve their goals,
whereas they are not generally more cooperative than their peers who participate in sports at
lower intensity levels.
Another strand of literature relevant for the present paper discusses the effectiveness of interven-
tions to foster social skills. Considering a broad range of studies on intervention programs for
children and adolescents, Kautz et al. (2014) find approaches which focus on the development of
non-cognitive skills of preschoolers and primary school children to be most promising. While
both, cognitive and non-cognitive skills, are malleable at young ages, the gap in efforts necessary
to achieve desirable outcomes widens over the years. The reason is that the prefrontal cortex
which is the region of the brain associated with non-cognitive skills does not mature before the
early 20s and, thus, later than other parts of the brain (Cunha et al., 2006; Howard-Jones et al.,
2012; see also OECD, 2015). As a result, there are also interventions aiming at improvements of
non-cognitive skills of older children and adolescents (e.g., Currie, 2001; Blau and Currie, 2006;
Almond and Currie, 2011; Kautz et al., 2014; Fryer, 2017; Almond et al., 2018). However, most of
the related studies evaluating these programs focus on academic attainments, but also on welfare
dependence and criminal behavior later in life. In contrast to that, Kosse et al. (2018) conduct
a large-scale study with primary school children in Germany. They investigate the impact of a
mentoring program on the development of prosocial behavior of children from households with
low socio-economic status. More specifically, children are assigned to a mentor whom they regu-
larly meet for joint leisure activities over the course of one year. Additionally, prosocial behavior
including altruism, trust, and other-regarding preferences of children under study is elicited in
a series of incentivized economic games before and right after the intervention as well as two
years after the end of the intervention. Self-reported information about the prosocial behavior of
children’s mothers are also taken into account. At the beginning of the study, prosocial behavior
of children from households with low socio-economic status lags substantially behind their
peers from households with high socio-economic status. Moreover, children’s prosocial behavior
is strongly linked to their mothers’ attitudes. After the intervention, this gap does not occur
any more. Furthermore, the effect is enduring as even two years after the end of the study no
differences in prosocial behavior of children from households with low and high socio-economic
status can be observed. According to Kosse et al. (2018) there are two main reasons which explain
this result. As part of the intervention, children from households with low socio-economic status
are assigned to a mentor who are usually university students and expend a notable share of
their leisure time to volunteer in this program and, hence, can be considered as a role models
who convey prosocial patterns as part of informal learning. Furthermore, the high intensity of
social interaction between the child and the mentor is also expected to affects the development
of prosocial behavior positively. The authors argue that about 60% of the overall effect can be
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Female Male Total
Control 27 (45%) 33 (55%) 60
Treatment 23 (50%) 23 (50%) 46
ESS 11 (46%) 13 (54%) 24
61 (47%) 69 (53%) 130
Table 3.1: Number of observations by group and gender.
attributed to these factors, where the exposure to a role model accounts for about two thirds of
this particular effect and the high intensity of social interactions between the children and their
mentors explains remaining third.
3.3 Data Set
The study was conducted at five different upper secondary schools in Karlsruhe (Germany)
between December 2016 and April 2017. At four schools, two classes of the sixth grade were
randomly selected to participate in the study; at the fifth school, one randomly selected class of
the sixth grade participated in the study. The specific characteristic of this school is its status
as so-called elite school of sports (ESS) which offers conditions to reconcile compulsory school
attendance with extensive practicing necessary to pursue a professional career in sports and
participation in national and international competitions (e.g., Wartenberg et al., 2014). The
parents of pupils attending the classes in question received a letter via the respective schools
before the beginning of the first part of the study. This letter contained information about
the opportunity to let their children participate in a scientific study during regular lessons
and a consent form which had to be returned to the school if they agreed on their children’s
participation in the study. Neither the teachers nor the parents or their children were aware of
the purpose of this study. The study was approved by the superintendent of the local school
district (ref.-no. 71 c2-6499.25) and the board of ethics of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
(see Appendix B.3 and Appendix B.4).
In total, 199 individuals aged 10–13 years returned the consent form prior to the first part of
the study (response rate: approx. 87%). At schools with two classes under study, one class was
randomly assigned to the Treatment and the Control group, respectively. The single class at the
ESS was not under treatment.
The study comprises three measurements and an intervention (see Figure 3.1). In all three mea-
surements, individuals made decisions in a series of different standard economic experiments.
The purpose was the elicitation of preferences and personality traits in different economic en-
vironments (see Haas et al., 2019c, for more details). As the present paper focuses primarily
on cooperative behavior, contributions in a linear public good game are of particular interest.
Furthermore, competitiveness was elicited by making individuals choose between two payment
schemes in a real-effort task. For a detailed description of the procedure, see Section 3.4.1.
Additionally, individuals received questionnaires which had to be answered at home. Questions
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2016 2017
Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
50 51 52 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1st Measurement
Intervention
2nd Measurement
Waiting period
3rd Measurement
Figure 3.1: Study set-up.
covered primarily free time activities (DIW/SOEP, 2015c) and engagement in physical activities
(Bös et al., 2009) as well as several psychometric scales such as the Big Five inventory (Weinhardt
and Schupp, 2011), social self-efficacy and self-efficacy of working in a team, perspective-taking,
rivalry, and understanding of democracy (Jerusalem et al., 2009; Kunter et al., 2002; Eder, 1998;
Abs et al., 2007).7 Along with the first measurement, parents filled out a questionnaire to provide
additional information about their children, characteristics of the household, and their own
educational backgrounds (based upon DIW/SOEP, 2015a, 2015b).
In the intervention, physical education lessons of classes assigned to the Treatment group were
supplemented by a novel concept which had been developed to convey social skills in a playful
way. Instructors were students of sports sciences who were pursuing a university degree which
qualifies for teaching at upper secondary schools. They were not aware of the purpose of this
study. Each lesson covered a certain topic (e.g., cooperation, fairness, or competitiveness). The
sequence of a lesson followed a fixed protocol which included two blocks of ten minutes at
the beginning and the end of each lesson in which individuals had the opportunity to discuss
their opinions and experiences on the respective topic. The main part of each lesson involved
physical activities which had been purposefully designed to put individuals into situations which
reflect issues related to the underlying topic of the particular lesson. A detailed description of
the intervention is available in Woll et al. (2018).8
The first measurement took place in December 2016. Subsequently, classes assigned to the
Treatment group took part in the intervention for a period of six weeks in January and February
2017. The second measurement took place in February 2017 immediately after the end of the
intervention in the Treatment group. The final measurement took place in April 2017 after a
waiting period of eight weeks. The repeated measurements of decisions in different economic
environments using incentivized standard economic experiments were necessary to study both,
the immediate impact of the enhanced physical education lessons on individuals’ behavior as
well as potential long-term effects.
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3.4 Set-Up
3.4.1 Experimental Design
To elicit individuals’ cooperative behavior, we use a linear public good game. Competitiveness is
measured by a binary choice between two compensation schemes a in a real-effort task which
comprises a piece-rate based on individual performance and a winner-takes-all tournament
based on relative performance. Both experiments are described below along with a brief overview
of findings from related studies.
Public Good Game The public good game constitutes a social dilemma in groups with two or
more individuals indexed i as they face the choice between individual incentives to free ride and
collective benefits which arise from cooperation (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). Individuals
are endowed with 120 tokens each which they can allocate to a private account or to a public
account in increments of 24 tokens. If the experiment is selected for payment, four randomly
selected individuals of a class form a group. The number of tokens an individual allocates to
the private account is multiplied with a factor of two and returned to the individual. For the
collective account, the number of tokens allocated by all individuals of the group is totaled. Each
token allocated to the collective account by the group—no matter by whom—yields a payoff of
one token for every individual of that group. Thus, individual i ’s payoff πi is given by
πi = 2 · (120− ci )+
4∑︂
i=1
ci ,
where ci ∈ {0,24,48,72,96,120} denotes the individual’s contribution to the collective account.
The marginal per-capita return (MPCR) which equals the ratio of an individual’s return from a
contribution to the collective account relative to a contribution to the private account is 0.5.
The dilemma arises in a public good game with n ≥ 2 individuals if 1n <MPCR< 1 as individual
costs for contributing to the funding of the public good exceed the associated individual benefits
from its provision. A selfish individual who maximizes her own monetary payoff, therefore,
transfers the entire endowment to her private account. This situation constitutes the Nash
equilibrium in which no individual of a group contributes any tokens to the collective account.
The social optimum, however, is reached when all individuals fully cooperate and contribute their
entire endowment to the collective account (Andreoni, 1988). Empirical results of public good
games frequently report contributions between 40–60% of individuals’ endowments in one-shot
settings and the first round of repeated games, respectively (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011).
Harbaugh and Krause (2000) find no difference in children’s contribution patterns compared
to adults. Similarly, in a study at an elementary school in the United States with children
predominantly from Hispanic and African-American families, individuals contribute on average
55% of their endowment to the collective account (Cipriani et al., 2013). In a study among
children aged 10–16 years focusing on differences in cooperative behavior between different
school tracks in Germany, John and Thomsen (2015) observe an average contribution in the
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public good game of 43% of the endowment. 7% of individuals in their study are free riders
and 10% contribute their entire endowment. Overall, there are no differences between school
tracks. Hermes et al. (2019) study cooperative types according to Fischbacher et al. (2001) among
first-graders (aged 6 years) in Germany. In the unconditional setting, individuals contribute
on average 37.4% of their endowment. Regarding different types of cooperators, Hermes et al.
(2019) find a distribution which approximately corresponds to previous observations among
adult individuals. In particular, one third to one half of the first-graders under study can be
identified as conditional cooperators.
Encryption Task The encryption task is a real-effort task in which individuals have to en-
crypt words by replacing letters in two subsequent steps according to given replacement tables
(adopted from Erkal et al., 2011). Output is measured in terms of the number of correctly en-
crypted letters in a two minute working period. Individuals can choose between two payment
schemes—piece-rate and tournament—before they start working on the encryption (Niederle
and Vesterlund, 2007; Booth and Nolen, 2012; Samak, 2013; Almås et al., 2016). If this experiment
is selected for payment, an individual who chose the piece-rate scheme receives 3 tokens for
each correctly encrypted letter with a cap at 300 tokens. The tournament scheme yields a winner
prize of 600 tokens and a loser prize of zero tokens. If this experiment is selected for payoff,
the output of an individual who chose the tournament scheme is compared to the output of
a randomly selected individual of the same class. If the individual in question has the higher
output, she receives the winner prize and the loser prize otherwise; ties are broken randomly.
The choice between a piece-rate scheme based on individual performance and a tournament
with relative performance evaluation and a winner-takes-all scheme appeals to individuals’
competitiveness, i.e., individuals who like to compete opt for the latter alternative. Typical
findings are that three quarter of men and only on third of women choose the tournament
scheme (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; see also Booth, 2009, and the references cited therein). A
similar pattern, albeit with a slightly smaller gender difference in competitiveness, is observed
by Almås et al. (2016) among adolescents aged 14–15 years in Norway. Booth and Nolen (2012),
however, find in a comparison of pupils at single-sex and coeducational schools of the same
age evidence that the gender difference in competitiveness may be attributed to socialization. A
comprehensive survey on findings from the related literature is provided by Sutter et al. (2019).
3.4.2 Procedures
The experiments described above are part of a series of standard economic experiments which
was repeated at three times throughout the study (see Section 3.3). Each session was conducted
during regular lessons in classrooms. Experimenters were students of different fields of study
who were pursuing a university degree which qualifies for teaching at upper secondary schools;
they were not aware of the purpose of this study.
At the beginning of each session, individuals received cards from their teacher with an ID number
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which was the same for a given individual in all three sessions. This pseudonymization was
necessary to link decisions with individuals while keeping their identities under disguise and,
thereby, allowing for anonymity. Experimenters were not informed about the identity of an indi-
vidual and the corresponding ID number. After that, individuals were allocated in the classroom
such that communication was impeded and they were able to make their decisions individually
and independently. Before the first experiment started, general instructions were read aloud
by one of two experimenters who conducted a session. After clarifying questions had been
answered, individuals received the answer sheet for the first experiment. This sheet contained
the individual’s ID number, instructions for the experiment such as their action space and the
consequences thereof regarding the payoff, and space to indicate their decisions. Again, the
experimenter read the instructions aloud and answered clarifying questions before individuals
were asked to make their decisions individually and independently. After all individuals had
made their decisions, sheets were collected by the second experimenter and the subsequent
experiment started following the same protocol. For a detailed description of the experiments
discussed in this paper, see Appendix B.2.
After the last experiment, the teacher was asked to open an envelope containing a card which
stated the number of the experiment which was relevant for payment. For each individual,
the amount of tokens earned in this particular experiment was calculated and converted into
Euro at an exchange rate of 75 tokens = 1.00 Euro. Additionally, each individual received a
participation fee of 2.00 Euro. Payoffs in the experiments were designed to ensure that individuals’
maximum payoff from a session was 10.00 Euro which corresponds to approximately 50% of
the recommended monthly amount of pocket money for children aged 11–12 years in Germany
(Langmeyer and Winklhofer, 2014). The teacher handed out sealed envelopes which contained
the payoff of each individual in Euro in exchange for the ID card. Individuals were explicitly
told not to open the envelopes in class to prevent potential tensions. On average, individuals
received 6.37 Euro per session.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Overview
Prior to the intervention in the Treatment group, all groups participated in a series of standard
economic games, including the linear public good game and a real-effort task to elicit competi-
tiveness. Moreover, individuals and their parents answered a questionnaire to gather additional
information—inter alia—about membership in sports clubs, individual levels of physical activity,
and socio-economic status.9 Before analyzing contributions to the collective account in the
public good game, an overview of individuals’ characteristics on group level is provided.
As can be seen in Table 3.2, the ratio of female and male individuals is almost balanced in all
three groups with no statistically significant differences between the three groups (p = 0.871,
Pearson’s χ2-test). Socio-economic status,10 however, differs between the groups (p = 0.044,
Pearson’s χ2-test) as the share of individuals from households with low socio-economic status
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Control Treatment ESS
Share of female individuals [%] 45.00 50.00 45.83
Share of individuals from households with low
socio-economic status [%]
23.33 26.09 50.00
Share of sports club members [%] 86.67 65.22 91.67
Time spent at sports club [mins./week]* 163.34 133.97 271.81
Total physical activity, undifferentiated [days] 4.53 4.39 5.45
Share of tournament choice [%] 38.33 39.13 75.00
* Truncated at 600 minutes per week.
Table 3.2: Overview of control variables.
in the ESS group is statistically significantly higher than in the Treatment and Control group
(ESS vs. Treatment: p = 0.090, ESS vs. Control: p = 0.051, pairwise Pearson’s χ2-test with Holm-
Bonferroni adjustment). The shares of individuals who are member of at least one sports club is
in all three groups at least as high as the share among the corresponding age cohort (66%) of
the 2009–2012 wave in the representative MoMo study in Germany (Schmidt et al., 2017). The
shares of sports club members in the present study are not equal among the individual groups
(p = 0.007, Pearson’s χ2-test) due to the statistically significantly lower share in the Treatment
group (Treatment vs. Control: p = 0.027, Treatment vs. ESS: p = 0.032, pairwise Pearson’s χ2-test
with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment). The amount of time spent at the sports club per week is
adjusted to account for seasonal fluctuations and truncated at 600 minutes per week to account
for outliers and plausibility concerns.11 Individuals in the Treatment group spend on average
approximately as much time at the sports club as the reference group from the MoMo study with
136.17 minutes per week (Schmidt et al., 2017). Again, the null hypothesis of equality between
the three groups has to be rejected (p = 0.0072, Kruskal-Wallis H-test) due to individuals of the
ESS group who spend on average substantially more time at the sports club than individuals in
the Treatment and Control group (ESS vs. Treatment: p = 0.0027, ESS vs. Control: p = 0.0208,
pairwise Dunn test with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment). Total physical activity reflects the average
number of days an individual is physically active for at least 60 minutes irrespective of the type of
activity (WHO, 2010) in both, the last week and in an average week (Schmidt et al., 2016). For the
2003–2006 wave of the MoMo study Bös et al. (2009) report a mean in the cohort of individuals
aged 11 years of 3.9 days for boys and 3.4 days for girls, respectively. The corresponding numbers
for individuals in the present study are higher as reported in Table 3.2. In line with the previous
observations, we find individuals in the ESS group to be physically more active than individuals
in the Treatment and Control group (equality of groups: p = 0.0562, Kruskal-Wallis H-test; ESS
vs. Treatment: p = 0.0294, ESS vs. Control: p = 0.0432, pairwise Dunn test with Holm-Bonferroni
adjustment). Competitiveness is measured by a binary choice between a piece-rate and a
winner-takes-all tournament as compensation schemes in the encryption task (see Section 3.4.1).
Whereas the shares of individuals who choose the tournament scheme and are, hence, deemed
competitive does not differ between the Treatment and Control group (p = 0.520) and the
Treatment and EES group (p = 0.104), respectively, the share of competitive individuals in the
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Female Male p-value*
Control 20% 62% 0.000
Treatment 42% 60% 0.041
ESS 58% 90% 0.002
* Pearson’s χ2-test.
Table 3.3: Share of competitive individuals by gender and group.
ESS group is statistically significantly higher than in the Control group (p = 0.078, pairwise
Pearson’s χ2-test with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment). The difference in competitiveness between
female and male individuals (see Table 3.3) within the Treatment and Control group is by and
large in line with the results observed by Almås et al. (2016) for individuals aged 14–15 years in
Norway. A difference occurs also in the ESS group, albeit on a higher level which supports the
notion that competitiveness is also influenced by the environment (Booth and Nolen, 2012).
3.5.2 First Measurement: Cross-Section
We start by analyzing contributions to the collective account in the public good game in the
first measurement to study the relation between sports participation and the willingness to
cooperate prior to the intervention. As mentioned in Section 3.5.1, the intensity of sports
participation of individuals in the ESS group exceeds the intensity of sports participation of
individuals in the Treatment and Control group, respectively. It is, therefore, to consider whether
more intensive sports participation also yields different outcomes in cooperative behavior.
Figure 3.2 depicts mean contributions to the collective account in the public good game by
groups. Contributions are not equal between the three groups (p = 0.0038, Kruskal-Wallis H-
test); in particular, contributions of the ESS group are statistically significantly different from
those in both, the Treatment and Control group (ESS vs. Treatment: p = 0.0024, ESS vs. Control:
p = 0.0030, pairwise Dunn test with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment). Yet, it has to be noted that the
design of the current study does not allow to derive causal conclusions on the relation between
the intensity of sports participation and cooperative behavior due to potential selection effects,
but correlations.
The results reported in Table 3.4 confirm the difference between the ESS and Control group,
whereas cooperative behavior does not differ between the Treatment and Control group. Along
with the findings reported in column (2) for the control variables discussed in Section 3.5.1, this
result indicates that the randomization of individuals in the Treatment and Control group was
successful. The difference in contributions in the ESS group remains statistically significant
also when controlling for other potential influences related to sports participation, such as
the intensity of undifferentiated physical activity and sports participation, membership in
sports clubs, and competitiveness. Regarding the first part of our research question, we find
that neither membership in a sports club nor the level of undifferentiated physical activity
or the time spent at the sports club per week with adjustments for seasonal fluctuations can
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Figure 3.2: Mean contributions to the collective account in the first measurement by groups.
Error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
account for the different levels of contributions to the collective account of the ESS group.
In particular, the coefficient for the time spent at the sports club in column (4) is very low
in magnitude and, hence, not meaningful in economic terms. Although competitiveness is
also more pronounced for individuals in the ESS group as compared to the Treatment and
Control group, the variable cannot account for the differences in contributions to the collective
account in the regression either. Another salient difference in the ESS group refers to the share of
individuals from households with low socio-economic status. Yet, controlling for socio-economic
status does not explain the differences in in contributions to the collective account in the public
good game either. The robustness check reported in Table B.1 confirms these results as using
ordered Logit estimates instead of OLS yields qualitatively similar results regarding significance
and sign12 of the coefficients.
As there is broad evidence on achievement gaps among children by parental income (see, e.g.,
Caucutt et al., 2017, and the references cited therein), Figure 3.3 depicts contributions to the col-
lective account in the public good game in the first measurement by groups and socio-economic
status. Although the corresponding coefficient in the last column of Table 3.4 is statistically
insignificant, contributions to the collective account in the public good game reveal heteroge-
neous patterns by groups and socio-economic status. While contributions of individuals from
households with low and high socio-economic status do not differ in the Treatment and Control
group (Control: p = 0.1206, Treatment: p = 0.1140), the difference is statistically significant in
the ESS group (p = 0.0033, two-sided Mann-Whitney U -test). Furthermore, the direction of
these differences varies between the groups. The results of OLS estimates of contributions to
the collective account in the public good game reported in Table 3.5 are separated by the socio-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment −0.522 0.625 0.192 −0.078 −0.831
(2.775) (2.744) (2.558) (2.565) (3.464)
ESS 21.000*** 20.047*** 23.585*** 22.836*** 19.069***
(1.352) (2.601) (2.517) (2.567) (2.570)
Total Activity −1.471 −1.631
(1.705) (1.654)
Minutes Club −0.005
(0.015)
Member 1.511 2.901 2.674
(9.299) (7.587) (6.883)
Competitive −3.024 −2.890 −3.762
(4.397) (4.233) (4.216)
Female 2.241
(3.311)
Low SES 7.170
(8.371)
Constant 60.000*** 66.767*** 65.902*** 60.013*** 57.319***
(1.352) (6.887) (5.391) (5.935) (3.166)
Obs. 130 118 130 130 130
No. Groups 9 9 9 9 9
Adj. R2 0.080 0.035 0.073 0.064 0.081
Note: Missing values of the variable Total Activity in column (3) are replaced with
means by measurement, class, gender, and socio-economic status.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 3.4: Contributions to the collective account in the first measurement. Ordinary least
squares estimates.
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Figure 3.3: Mean contribution to the collective account in the first measurement by group and
socio-economic status. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
economic status of the households individuals live in. In columns (1)–(3) focusing on individuals
from households with high socio-economic status, individuals from the ESS group contribute
statistically (highly) significantly more to the collective account than individuals in the Control
group, whereas the difference between the Treatment and the Control group is statistically not
significant. It must be noted, however, that the adjusted R2 of these specifications is close to zero
and that the results, thus, have to be treated with caution as the models are not constructive for
individuals from households with high socio-economic status. Focusing on contributions by
individuals from households with low socio-economic status in column (4), both, the Treatment
and ESS group, are statistically (highly) significantly different from the Control group. Moreover,
the signs of the groups’ deviations differ. Whereas individuals in the Treatment group contribute
less than their counterparts from the Control group, individuals in the ESS group contribute
more. Adding additional control variables related to sports participation in columns (5) and
(6) of Table 3.5 does not provide additional insights regarding individual contributions to the
collective account in the public good game as the corresponding coefficients are statistically
insignificant. Furthermore, the significance of the coefficient for the dummy variable indicating
the ESS group remains unchanged with these additional control variables, whereas the differ-
ence in contributions between the Treatment and Control group is statistically only marginally
significant.
3.5.3 Panel Regressions
For the subsequent analyses of changes in cooperative behavior over the course of the study, we
exclude the ESS group and consider the effects of the intervention by comparing the Treatment
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High SES Low SES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 6.660 9.104 7.532 −22.286** −25.206* −24.618*
(5.446) (6.275) (5.492) (7.965) (12.165) (11.884)
ESS 9.130*** 10.494** 10.753** 25.714*** 28.123*** 32.715***
(2.623) (4.312) (4.287) (3.984) (7.577) (6.857)
Total Activity −1.822 −2.104 −3.030 −3.090
(1.476) (1.405) (4.222) (4.211)
Member −0.640 1.293 1.953 3.453
(9.281) (6.868) (14.518) (14.686)
Competitive −1.532 −0.726 −9.804 −10.722
(5.010) (5.592) (11.586) (10.092)
Constant 56.870*** 66.214*** 65.457*** 70.286*** 86.934*** 86.370***
(2.623) (8.391) (5.432) (3.984) (16.246) (16.250)
Obs. 92 82 92 38 36 38
No. Groups 9 9 9 9 9 9
Adj. R2 0.004 -0.009 -0.007 0.301 0.227 0.296
Note: Missing values of the variable Total Activity in columns (3) and (6) are replaced with
means by measurement, class, gender, and socio-economic status.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 3.5: Contributions to the collective account in the first measurement by socio-economic
status. Ordinary least squares estimates.
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Figure 3.4: Mean contributions to the collective account by group and measurement. Error bars
indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
and Control group.
An overview of mean contributions to the collective account in each measurement is provided
in Figure 3.4. As discussed in Section 3.5.2, mean contributions to the collective account are
statistically not significantly different between both groups in the first measurement (p = 0.9064,
two-sided Mann-Whitney U -test). This applies also for differences between both groups in
the subsequent measurements (second measurement: p = 0.8538, third measurement: p =
0.1712, two-sided Mann-Whitney U -test). Over the course of the study, mean contributions
to the collective account decline slightly in the Treatment group, while the differences from
measurement to measurement are statistically not significant (first vs. second measurement:
p = 0.1940, second vs. third measurement: p = 0.6139, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test). In
the Control group a slight decline occurs from the first to the second measurement (p = 0.1387,
two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test), whereas mean contributions to the collective account
increase in the third measurement (second vs. third measurement: p = 0.3280, two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-rank test) which is an untypical pattern compared to the vast majority of other
studies involving repeated public good games.
As Figure 3.3 already pointed at different contribution behavior in the first measurement due
to both, group and socio-economic status, the corresponding overview by socio-economic
status and measurement in the Treatment and Control group is depicted in Figure 3.5. The
patterns are again heterogeneous between the respective sub-groups over the course of the
study. Hence, results of random-effects regressions are reported to examine the second part of
the research question regarding the effectiveness of the intervention. Starting with the first spec-
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Figure 3.5: Mean contributions to the collective account by group, measurement, and socio-
economic status. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
ification of Table 3.6, the main effect on differences between the Treatment and Control group
as well as differences of the second and third measurement relative to the first measurement
are statistically insignificant and so are the coefficients of the corresponding interaction terms.
Controlling for socio-economic status and simultaneously adding three-way interaction terms to
account for the interdependence between the intervention in the Treatment group, the time of
measurement, and individuals’ socio-economic status reveals the influence of socio-economic
status on different patterns of contribution behavior. The main effect addressing differences
between the Treatment and Control group which is already included in the previous specification
remains statistically insignificant, whereas the coefficient of the newly added dummy variable for
individuals from households with low socio-economic status is positive and statistically highly
significant which indicates differences between contributions of individuals from households
with high and low socio-economic status in the Control group during the first measurement.
Contrary to this observation, the direction of the difference in contributions to the collective
account is reversed when considering individuals from households with low socio-economic
status in the Treatment group during the first measurement. In both, the second and third
measurement, individuals from households with low socio-economic status in the Control group
reduce their contributions as denoted by negative and statistically significant coefficients of the
corresponding interaction terms. Looking at the impact of the intervention on contributions to
the collective account by individuals from households with low socio-economic status in the
Treatment group during the second and third measurement, the positive and statistically signifi-
cant coefficients fortify the effect of the intervention applying an enhanced concept of physical
education on cooperative behavior for this particular sub-group in both, the short and the long
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run. Controlling additionally for gender and factors related to sports participation only reveals a
gap in cooperative behavior by gender due to statistically significantly higher contributions by
female individuals. Robustness checks for these results are reported in Table B.2; estimates of
ordered Logit models with random effects yield qualitatively similar results.
Focusing on individuals from households with low socio-economic status in the Treatment and
Control group in Table 3.7 allows for additional insights into changes in cooperative behavior
of this particular sub-group over the course of this study. Even before the intervention in the
Treatment group, contributions to the collective account differed between both groups. While
contributions in the Control group in the second and third measurement are statistically signifi-
cantly lower than in the first measurement, the coefficient of the interaction effect between the
Treatment group and the second measurement is positive and statistically significant. Although
the overall effects is still negative, the positive coefficients of the interaction term provide ad-
ditional support to the second part of the research question regarding the effectiveness of the
intervention as the enhanced physical education lessons seem to counterbalance the overall
decline in contributions to the collective account to some extent. Moreover, when controlling for
additional variables as in the previous regressions, the effect of the intervention on individuals
from households with low socio-economic status is positive and statistically marginally signifi-
cant which suggests that the change in cooperative behavior is present even some time after the
end of the intervention.
To summarize the results on the impact of the intervention on cooperative behavior, contribu-
tions to the collective account in general do not differ between the Treatment and Control group
in a specific measurement. However, results differ depending on the socio-economic status of
households individuals live in. Whereas individuals from households with high socio-economic
status do not increase their contributions to the collective account over time in both, the Treat-
ment and Control group, individuals from households with low socio-economic status in the
Treatment group become more cooperative over time which translates into higher contributions
to the collective account in the public good game. As reported in Table 3.6, the coefficients of
both three-way interaction terms between the dummy variables for the Treatment group, the
time of measurement, and individuals from households with low socio-economic status are
statistically significant which emphasizes the effectiveness of our intervention using enhanced
physical education lessons to foster cooperative behavior for this particular sub-group both,
directly after the end of the intervention and also nine weeks later in the final measurement.
3.6 Conclusion
The results of this study indicate the effectiveness of our intervention using a novel concept em-
ploying structured physical education lessons on cooperative behavior outside the gymnasium.
Comparisons of individuals attending an elite school of sports who integrate a high intensity
of sports participation in their everyday lives and individuals attending other schools at which
physical education and sports participation are less pronounced in the curriculum support the
57
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment −0.522 6.660 9.208 8.039
(2.797) (5.525) (7.437) (6.828)
2nd Measurement −6.400 −1.043 −0.506 −0.689
(3.961) (2.890) (3.259) (3.353)
3rd Measurement −2.400 0.522 −1.372 1.082
(5.165) (6.087) (6.542) (6.146)
Treatment × 2nd Measurement 0.139 −8.839 −11.886** −10.855*
(7.460) (6.903) (5.060) (6.076)
Treatment × 3rd Measurement −9.600 −20.286* −21.958* −21.971*
(11.778) (12.111) (12.464) (11.510)
Low SES 13.416** 14.224** 14.164**
(5.350) (6.159) (6.272)
Treatment × Low SES −28.946** −34.969** −32.176**
(12.780) (14.511) (14.232)
2nd Measurement × Low SES −22.957** −21.359* −21.530*
(10.609) (11.783) (12.363)
3rd Measurement × Low SES −12.522** −9.394 −11.093*
(5.541) (6.845) (6.382)
Treatment × 2nd Measurement × Low SES 36.839** 37.781** 37.348**
(15.216) (16.532) (17.064)
Treatment × 3rd Measurement × Low SES 42.286*** 43.100*** 42.476***
(14.795) (15.741) (14.547)
Female 9.796*** 9.214***
(3.327) (2.688)
Total Activity −1.728 −2.116**
(1.248) (1.021)
Member 0.866 4.401
(7.365) (6.746)
Competitive 2.522 1.845
(3.781) (3.772)
Constant 60.000*** 56.870*** 58.213*** 57.506***
(1.363) (2.661) (6.426) (5.398)
Obs. 318 318 296 318
No. Individuals 106 106 106 106
No. Groups 8 8 8 8
Overall R2 0.017 0.037 0.076 0.068
Note: Missing values of the variable Total Activity in column (4) are replaced with means by
measurement, class, gender, and socio-economic status.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 3.6: Contributions to the collective account in all three measurements. Generalized least
squares estimates with random effects.
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(1) (2) (3)
Treatment −22.286*** −34.680*** −33.557***
(8.075) (10.092) (9.194)
2nd Measurement −24.000** −23.312** −22.864**
(10.381) (11.020) (10.468)
3rd Measurement −12.000** −12.498* −11.586*
(4.832) (6.899) (6.313)
Treatment × 2nd Measurement 28.000** 32.249** 32.889**
(14.203) (15.946) (14.322)
Treatment × 3rd Measurement 22.000* 26.054** 25.720**
(12.294) (11.135) (10.344)
Female 16.998*** 18.888***
(5.475) (5.900)
Total Activity −1.276 −1.641
(3.864) (3.586)
Member −9.228 −4.490
(12.609) (11.115)
Competitive −7.960 −10.937
(6.521) (7.286)
Constant 70.286*** 81.756*** 80.126***
(4.039) (13.405) (13.453)
Obs. 78 75 78
No. Individuals 26 26 26
No. Groups 8 8 8
Overall R2 0.062 0.188 0.204
Note: Missing values of the variable Total Activity in column (3) are re-
placed with means by measurement, class, gender, and socio-economic
status.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 3.7: Contributions to the collective account by individuals from households with low
socio-economic status in all three measurements. Generalized least squares estimates with
random effects.
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notion that individuals in the former group who report on average substantially higher levels of
sports participation are indeed associated with higher levels of cooperative behavior. This result
is in contrast to Celse et al. (2017) who find that university students of sports sciences which
requires a considerable level of sports participation as part of the curriculum are more inclined
to conditional cooperation than their peers, albeit not generally more cooperative. Our results
from the first measurement, however, do not allow to derive causal conclusions about the effects
of sports participation on the formation of social skills since we do not explicitly address the
issue of potential selection effects. Moreover, the results of the corresponding non-parametric
and parametric statistical analyses indicate only a significant difference between individuals in
the ESS group and individuals at other schools, whereas different levels of sports participation
cannot account for different levels of contributions to the collective account in the public good
game.
Contributions in the public good game of individuals of the Treatment and Control group in
the first measurement do not substantially differ which implies that the randomization was
successful. This applies to the largest extent also for the control variables used in the regressions.
At first glance, there are hardly any changes in average contributions to the collective account
in the public good game between individuals in the Treatment and Control group over the
different measurements. Taking a closer look and considering contributions of individuals from
households with low and high socio-economic status separately, however, provides more diverse
results. More specifically, individuals from households with low socio-economic status in the
Treatment group who are initially the least cooperative sub-group respond positively to the
intervention and increase their contributions in the public good game slightly over all three
measurements and eventually catch up with their classmates whose contributions decline over
time as commonly observed in repeated public good games. Results of a regression comparing
only individuals from households with low socio-economic status in the Treatment and Control
group provide additional weak support for the effectiveness of the intervention on cooperative
behavior.
Overall, the results presented above indicate the effectiveness of our intervention as part of
regular physical education lessons. While it is generally not straightforward to evaluate benefits
of sports participation due to concerns about selection effects, our experimental design with a
randomized controlled trial avoids this issue. Moreover, the lack of significance for explanatory
variables related to sports participation indicate that the results of the intervention are not
biased due to prior sports participation. The rather weak effects can be explained by the fact that
individuals are already quite cooperative at the beginning of the study as average contributions
in the Treatment and Control group amount to half of the endowment which is in line with
common findings reported in the literature (e.g., Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). Hence, the
scope for improvements in cooperative behavior is limited. Furthermore, duration and intensity
of the intervention are moderate. In contrast to, e.g., Kosse et al. (2018) whose intervention lasts
one year, the time span of six weeks in this study is quite short. Additionally, individuals had
mandatory physical education classes before; the intervention was only a slight adjustment
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whose main contribution are two blocks of ten minutes each at the beginning and end of each
lesson in which individuals were encouraged to share and discuss their experiences about the
topic covered in a specific lecture. The nature of cooperation as conveyed in the intervention
and in the public good game is related but not perfectly congruent. In a comparison of individ-
uals’ cooperative behavior inside and outside the laboratory, Englmaier and Gebhardt (2016)
observe complementary behavioral patterns in situations which provide similar incentives for
cooperation using a within-subject design. Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez (2018), in contrast,
cannot confirm this finding as situations inside and outside the laboratory are quite different in
their setting. In line with this, the magnitude of the effects as measured by contributions to the
collective account in the public good game in the present study are quite moderate. Finally, the
share of individuals from households with low socio-economic status ranges around one quarter
in the Treatment and Control group which consequently results in a low number of observation.
Results in this regard should, therefore, be treated with caution.
Despite some limitations, we find pieces of evidence for the effectiveness of an intervention as
part of regular physical education lessons to foster cooperative behavior which is an integral
determinant for success in various domains of life, including individual labor market outcomes.
As physical education is mandatory at schools in Germany, slight adjustments of the existing
curriculum can be used to foster cooperation even with a limited input of additional resources.
Notes
1. In the literature, soft skills and non-cognitive skills are frequently used as synonyms;
either term comprises social competencies as a subset (Heckman and Kautz, 2012). Social
competencies are concerned with aspects which foster successful interaction with other
individuals such as leadership skills and social skills. The latter category describes a set of
acquired capabilities in the interpersonal domain, including cooperation, interpersonal
skills, empathy, assertion, and responsibility (Farrington et al., 2012; Gutman and Schoon,
2013).
2. Although Enste et al. (2018) describe a linear public good game, they use in fact a binary
threshold public good game which is frequently used to study coordination instead of
cooperation (see Section 1 and Section 2).
3. It is important to note that cognitive and non-cognitive skills are no strictly separated
domains; in particular, outcomes can only very rarely be attributed to exactly one of these
realms (Borghans et al., 2008; Farrington et al., 2012).
4. Due to fairness concerns, we offered teachers of the classes in the Control group the
opportunity to conduct the intervention in their classes after the end of the study.
5. Team sports: football or basketball; individual sports: jogging, swimming, golf, or tennis.
6. This does not necessarily imply physical activity. Felfe et al. (2016) note that the acquisition
of social skills in a sports club may not be achieved by physical activity in the first place.
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Rather, the fact of being involved in an organization is assumed to foster social skills (see
also German Bundestag, 2017).
7. Similar to Becker et al. (2012), we find no cogent relation between decisions in the eco-
nomic experiments and the psychometric scales. Thus, these data are not included in the
analysis.
8. Note that the intervention is not designed to replicate the properties of a public good game.
In contrast, Fan (2000) uses an approach which explicitly informs individuals about the
consequences of different actions in a prisoner’s dilemma for individuals themselves, the
other individual, and the group. Positive effects of this kind of intervention are only found
within a few minutes after the provision of this information.
9. Unlike their parents, individuals also answered the questionnaire after the second and
third measurement. For sake of clarity, however, only answers from the first measurement
are used in this overview.
10. In line with Kosse et al. (2018) the socio-economic status of a household is deemed low
if one or more of the following criteria apply: (i) low education: both parents left school
without a university entrance certificate; (ii) low income: equivalence income below 1,033
Euro, i.e., 60% of the median net equivalent income in Germany in 2015 (Destatis, 2017);
(iii) single parent.
11. Non-parametric and parametric results are robust with respect to this truncation.
12. Note that the coefficients reported in Table B.1 are exponentiated.
62
4 Guilt and Shame‡
This paper studies the impact of private and social image concerns on sabotage decisions in
a tournament. More specifically, we use different layers of information disclosure to either
individuals themselves or their opponent to study the effect of visibility of the implication of
one’s sabotage activities on individuals’ private and social image, respectively. Furthermore, we
provide individuals with the opportunity to pay a price to prevent information disclosure, i.e.,
individuals can prevent that—depending on the treatment—they or their opponent are informed
about the implication of the individual’s sabotage activities. The results show that the decision
to inflict sabotage on the opponent per se is not affected by different layers of information
disclosure. Having the opportunity to prevent information disclosure, however, individuals in
the treatment which makes the implication of their sabotage activities visible for the opponent
and, hence, addresses social image concerns exhibit a significantly higher willingness to pay.
4.1 Introduction
Rank-order tournaments are commonly used in companies, e.g., when trying to find the suitable
candidate for a promotion (Prendergast, 1999; Lazear and Shaw, 2007). One major advantage
of this approach is that it only requires an ordinal ranking of candidates based on their relative
performance. Moreover, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show in their seminal contribution that the first-
best solution of a principal-agent setting with verifiable effort can be attained in a tournament
even under asymmetric information. Besides increasing one’s probability to win the tournament
by exerting more effort, decreasing the opponent’s output by means of sabotage yields the same
effect (Lazear, 1989).1 Ample empirical evidence—primarily from studies conducted in the
laboratory—suggests that sabotage is indeed a serious issue when only relative performance is
evaluated (e.g., Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2011; Harbring et al., 2007; Carpenter
et al., 2010; Vandegrift and Yavas, 2010; Balafoutas et al., 2012; Dato and Nieken, 2014; see also
Chowdhury and Gürtler, 2015, for an overview).
The present paper is to study how an individual’s decision to inflict sabotage on her opponent
is influenced by potential impairment of her private and social image. Even if the opponent
is not aware that the individual inflicted sabotage on him, the individual herself may find it
difficult to maintain a positive private image if sabotage is generally considered illegitimate.
Furthermore, the individual’s social image can suffer if the opponent is informed that he has
been subject of sabotage by the individual. There is evidence that individuals do not only care
about material outcomes but also have concerns for both, their private and social image. The
former refers to the notion that an individual attempts to act upon her own standards which
allows to think of herself as a good person (Mazar et al., 2008; Matthey and Regner, 2011). On
the other hand, actions taken by the individual convey a signal of her attitudes which induces
the individual to present herself as, e.g., prosocial in order to be perceived pleasantly by others
‡This section is based on joint work with Sandra Ludwig and Petra Nieken (Haas et al., 2019a).
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(Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009). The corresponding
terms used in the psychological literature are guilt and shame. While the former occurs as a
result of inappropriate behavior towards someone else even if the sufferer is not aware of any
harm inflicted on him, the latter involves disapproval by the affected individual (Savikhin Samek
and Sheremeta, 2014; see also de Hooge et al., 2007).
In certain situations, the desire for a positive social image is at odds with an individual’s actual
preferences. Experimental studies on dictator games suggest that a substantial fraction of
individuals who share their endowment with another individual in an anonymous laboratory
setting prefer not to be put in a situation in which they have to decide on the allocation of
the endowment between themselves and someone else. This observation indicates that the
individual may suffer from disutility even under anonymity due to fears to violate expectations of
another individual in a setting with common knowledge about the action space of the individual
(Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009).
Hence, when offered the opportunity to opt out of a situation in which they can share an
endowment between themselves and another individual without letting the potential recipient
know about the fact that he could have received money as part of a game, a substantial fraction
of those reluctant sharers indeed chooses the alternative to opt out (Dana et al., 2006; Lazear
et al., 2012; see also DellaVigna et al., 2012, for a related field study). Moreover, individuals in the
role of dictators frequently engage in strategic ignorance by exploiting a “moral wiggle room” to
ensure a high payoff for themselves when their accountability for adverse results of the recipient
is not unambiguous (Dana et al., 2007; Larson and Capra, 2009; Golman et al., 2017).
To study the impact of private and social image concerns on sabotage when the individual’s
accountability is not obvious we run an experiment employing a tournament with a real-effort
task. Unlike other studies on tournaments in which the individual with the higher output is
directly awarded the winner prize, in the present study the spread of both individuals’ outputs
translates into winning probabilities which determine which player receives the winner and
loser prize, respectively. Sabotage does not reduce the opponent’s winning probability for sure
which provides a moral wiggle room for the individual. Additionally, we offer individuals the
opportunity to prevent the disclosure of information about the effectiveness of their sabotage
either to themselves or to the other individual by paying a price.
4.2 Related Literature
The focus of the present study is on an individual’s decision to improve her relative position in a
real-effort tournament by inflicting sabotage on her opponent if information about this decision
is or may be disclosed to the individual and—depending on the treatment—to the opponent.
Hence, the decision to sabotage can affect not only the individual’s private image, but also her
social image.
In the domain of dishonest behavior, Mazar et al. (2008) observe that cheating is prevalent in
their experiments—but predominantly on levels far below the maximum possible magnitude.
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This does not change when monetary benefits from cheating increase. They corroborate their
findings with the notion that the cost-benefit analysis of whether or not to behave honestly is not
restricted to monetary terms. Moreover, individuals have a conception on patterns of behavior
which are desirable and violations thereof decrease the individual’s overall utility. Yet, low levels
of dishonest behavior observed by Mazar et al. (2008) suggest that there is a certain range of
deviation from the desirable behavior which individuals deem tolerable. This can be either
explained by individuals who disguise situations in which they exhibit deviating behavior with a
euphemistic reinterpretation or temporarily disregard their standards on desirable behavior.
To study the influence of private image concerns on giving in a dictator game, Dana et al. (2007)
provide individuals in their treatments with different opportunities to remain uninformed about
the payoff of the recipient. In one situation, the dictator can choose between two alternatives in
a binary version of the dictator game. While she knows which alternative yields a higher payoff
for herself, the individual is uninformed whether the recipient’s payoff is aligned with hers or
not. Although dictators can acquire this information without bearing any monetary costs, only
slightly more than half of the dictators use this opportunity while the others remain uninformed
which is one explanation for an increase in selfish behavior compared to the baseline treatment
in which dictators know the implication of their choice for the recipient’s payoff. Moreover,
similar observations are obtained by Dana et al. (2007) in a treatment with multiple dictators in
which the selfish alternative is only implemented if both dictators independently choose this
option or in another treatment in which dictators can defer their decision until eventually a
computer intervenes and chooses one of the alternatives with equal probability. To summarize,
the results show that dictators deliberately exploit situations which provide a moral wiggle
room, i.e., circumstances which do not allow to unambiguously map the decision of the dictator
with the implication for the recipient’s payoff as an excuse to themselves for selfish behavior to
maintain a positive private image. A robustness check by Larson and Capra (2009) using a slight
modification of the experimental design confirms this result and assures that the results are not
driven by an omission bias which makes dictators perceive harm for the recipient caused by
inaction less objectionable than actively inflicting harm on the recipient. While Grossman (2014)
also finds evidence for dictators who prefer to stay uninformed and engage in selfish behavior,
dictators in this study must actively choose to stay uninformed which decreases the share of
dictators deciding to stay uninformed compared to the previous studies.
In a related study, Matthey and Regner (2011) use a within-subject design to distinguish dictators
who are intrinsically motivated to share their endowment with the respective recipients from
those dictators who share reluctantly to avoid adverse sentiments if they are confronted with
the implication of their allocation for the recipient’s payoff. Based on the work of Konow (2000),
they test a model of cognitive dissonance which postulates psychological costs in case of an
individual who finds herself confronted with a choice between two diametrically opposed
alternatives, namely to comply with a norm which advocates sharing and their actual intention
to keep the entire endowment. To resolve this problem, dictators who share reluctantly in a
situation with full information prefer to remain ignorant about the implication of their choice if
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possible. The results obtained by Matthey and Regner (2011) are in line with those of Dana et al.
(2007). Furthermore, they provide evidence that dictators who are not intrinsically motivated to
share their endowment with a recipient still do so in a situation with full information about the
implication of their decision on the recipient to avoid disutility incurred by cognitive dissonance.
A different approach to study the impact of strategic ignorance in situations which contrast
individual benefits and negative externalities is the experiment by Kajackaite (2015). Individuals
can earn money by working on a real-effort task which yields a piece-rate for each correctly
solved task. In some treatments, however, individuals’ effort also generates a donation for
the National Rifle Association (NRA) which represents a predominantly negatively perceived
organization. Both, individuals who are not informed whether or not the NRA benefits from their
effort and individuals who explicitly decide to stay ignorant about this fact, exert more effort
than individuals who know that they are generating a donation for the NRA. While this result is
by and large in line with findings of other studies on strategic ignorance cited above, a closer
look reveals that the results in the treatment in which individuals can choose to remain ignorant
is mainly driven by a sorting effect when individuals have the choice whether they want to be
informed about the implication of their action for a third party or stay ignorant instead.
The studies outlined so far focus on the impact of selfish behavior on individuals’ private image.
In contrast to that, concerns for their social image can also influence individuals’ decisions
to engage in behavior which may affect others negatively. More precisely, the decision not to
behave selfishly is likely to foster a benevolent perception of an individual by others. In the study
by Ariely et al. (2009), individuals work on a tedious real-effort task which consists of pressing X
and Z keys alternating on a keyboard. At the same time, a donation for a charity is generated
which depends on the individual number of X-Z key strokes. Ariely et al. (2009) use a 2×2×2
between-subject design in which the charity is either the Red Cross or the NRA, individuals work
without or with private incentives in form of a piece-rate, and their performance is disclosed
to an audience or not. When donations accrue to the Red Cross, individuals exert more effort
when their result is visible for an audience to signal their prosocial attitude. If the recipient of the
donation is the NRA, individuals still exert positive levels of effort but on a substantially lower
magnitude compared to the case generating donations for the Red Cross. Monetary incentives
for individuals induce higher levels of effort only in the private settings as the signal of high effort
levels is perceived differently by the audience as they cannot disentangle the actual motivation
behind individuals’ effort. Therefore, exerting high levels of effort can have detrimental effects
on individuals’ social image in a public setting and individual monetary rewards which provides
an explanation for the insensitivity to incentives when the result is disclosed to an audience.
To test the relevance of social image concerns for giving in dictator games, Dana et al. (2006)
offer dictators the opportunity to quit the game. If the dictator chooses this option, the potential
recipient is not informed about the game which was supposed to be played. The quitting dictator
receives a fixed payment which is slightly below the endowment of the related dictator game. The
rationale behind this set-up is that a dictator who is maximizing her monetary payoff decides to
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play the dictator game—and keeps the entire endowment for herself. If the dictator is, however,
concerned about her social image, violating possible expectations of the recipient by not sharing
the endowment induces disutility which outweighs monetary gains from keeping the entire
endowment compared to the fixed payment when quitting. Hence, giving in dictator games must
not be confused with generosity. In particular, dictators who are concerned about their social
image share their endowment with a recipient although they have no intrinsic motivation to do
so. Merely the fact that they find themselves in a situation which imposes a risk of damaging their
social image makes them imitate generous behavior. Therefore, a decent share of dictators in
the experiment of Dana et al. (2006) forgo a small share of the maximum possible payoff to elude
the dictator game without letting the potential recipient know in order to avoid an impairment
of their social image.
A more detailed overview on a dictator’s choice whether to remain in a situation which facilitates
sharing the endowment with a recipient or not is provided by Lazear et al. (2012). Complemen-
tary to the approach by Dana et al. (2006), they distinguish individuals who have an intrinsic
motivation to share from those who prefer not being asked to share but nevertheless share for the
sake of maintaining a positive social image. When the payment for the outside option equals the
endowment in the dictator game, the results are in line with Dana et al. (2006), i.e., a substantial
fraction of dictators decides to quit the game. Additional support for this finding is provided by
a related field experiment of DellaVigna et al. (2012). In a door-to-door fundraising campaign,
the percentage of households which open the door decreases if the time when the solicitors
come over is announced in advance. Similar to the laboratory experiments, individuals who
prefer not to donate but do not refute a request when being asked by the solicitor face-to-face to
maintain a positive social image can elude this situation by not opening the door. In another
laboratory experiment, Klinowski (2018) observes that female individuals in a dictator game
with an endowment of 10 tokens share a higher fraction than their male counterparts. Yet, when
given the opportunity to retract their previous choice by assigning a higher probability on an
outcome which yields 9 tokens for themselves and 0 tokens for the recipient, female individuals
choose this alternative to a larger extent than males which suggests that female dictators only
appear more generous, although they may not generally be more intrinsically motivated to share
than male dictators.
To shed light on the interaction of both, private and social image concerns, in an individual’s
decision to share her endowment with a recipient in a dictator game, Cappelen et al. (2017) use
an experimental design which systematically varies both dimensions. To address the individuals’
private image concerns, there are two treatment manipulations which either emphasize the
entitlement or neediness of the recipient. Orthogonal to this variation, a distinction whether
the potential recipient is informed about the procedure of the dictator game or not covers
the second domain focusing on social image concerns. Compared to a baseline condition
in which no information about the recipient is provided, both manipulations which address
the individuals’ private image concerns result in higher shares of the endowment sent to the
recipients. Regarding social image concerns, Cappelen et al. (2017) observe that the disclosure
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of information to the recipients per se does not increase dictators’ generosity. However, when
aligned with information about entitlement or neediness of the recipient affecting private image
concerns in the first place, disclosure of information to the recipients additionally increases the
share of the endowment sent to the recipients. The authors explain this finding by a crowding-
in effect evoked by a convincing argument for sharing. In a slightly modified version of this
experiment, individuals have the opportunity to switch to the opposite information policy
after they have made their decision which amount to send to the recipient. In general terms,
individuals who send a small share of their endowment to the recipient prefer a situation in
which no information is disclosed, whereas generous dictators do not object to visibility of their
decision. In line with evidence from the studies cited above, this supports the notion that social
image concerns are indeed a crucial determinant for giving in dictator games.
To promote truth-telling in a cheap talk sender-receiver game, Greenberg et al. (2015) introduce
ex-post disclosure in one of their treatments. The sender sees the result of a die roll on his
screen and is then asked to communicate this result to a receiver. Payoffs depend on the sum
of the pips. If the receiver states the correct number, both players receive the same payoff,
whereas an incorrect number yields a higher payoff for the sender at the expense of the receiver.
Although the setting of the experiment is anonymous and concerns for reputation can be ruled
out due to its one-shot nature, ex-post disclosure of the actual outcome of the die roll which
is presented to the sender before passing a message to the receiver is an appropriate device
to prevent the sender from exploiting her edge on information to attain a monetary gain by
deceiving the receiver. In particular, if being exposed as an impostor even at the very end of the
experiment after all decisions have been made and payoffs have been determined to an unknown
other participant who is not aware of the sender’s identity causes negative sentiments with the
sender, the institution of ex-post disclosure can be expected to foster truth-telling compared to
a situation which lacks this institution. Indeed, Greenberg et al. (2015) observe a substantial
increase in the share of senders who communicate the actual outcome of the die roll in the
treatment using ex-post disclosure. Notably, this effect is more pronounced for male senders
than for females.
The study most closely related to the present paper is by Harbring and Wilhelm (2016). Indi-
viduals work on a real-effort task and the individual with the higher output receives a winner
prize. To enhance their output relative to the opponent, individuals can either exert more effort
in the real-effort task or inflict sabotage on the opponent. Besides a differentiation between
active and passive sabotage in tournament by means of commission and omission, Harbring
and Wilhelm (2016) also vary whether sabotage is detected and consequentially disclosed to
the sufferer or not. More specifically, one of their treatment variations reveals sabotage with
a probability of 70% and the information about the amount of sabotage inflicted on the other
individual is supplemented by a photo of the delinquent. As a partial unveiling of anonymity by
showing the respective individual’s photo erodes the social image in case of detection, sabotage
occurs less frequently under a positive detection probability irrespective of the type of sabotage.
Yet, results of a questionnaire presented to delinquents immediately after their sabotage activity
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INFO SELF100 OPP0 INFO SELF70 OPP0 INFO SELF100 OPP70
Period 1 individual always learns
whether sabotage in-
flicted on opponent was
effective
individual learns with
probability of 70%
whether sabotage in-
flicted on opponent was
effective
individual always learns
whether sabotage in-
flicted on opponent was
effective (same as in INFO
SELF100 OPP0)
opponent never learns
whether individual in-
flicted sabotage on him
nor whether individual’s
sabotage was effective
opponent never learns
whether individual in-
flicted sabotage on him
nor whether individual’s
sabotage was effective
(same as in INFO SELF100
OPP0)
opponent learns with
probability of 70%
whether individual in-
flicted sabotage on him
and whether individual’s
sabotage was effective,
i.e., individual’s sabotage
may become visible for
victim (opponent)
Period 2 difference to Period 1: in-
dividual can prevent infor-
mation disclosure to her-
self about effectiveness of
sabotage inflicted on op-
ponent by herself by pay-
ing up to 10 tokens
difference to Period 1: in-
dividual can prevent infor-
mation disclosure to her-
self about effectiveness of
sabotage inflicted on op-
ponent by herself by pay-
ing up to 10 tokens (same
as in INFO SELF100 OPP0)
difference to Period 1: in-
dividual can prevent in-
formation disclosure to
opponent about effective-
ness of sabotage inflicted
on opponent by herself by
paying up to 10 tokens
Note: Individuals can prevent information disclosure in period 2 for sure only if they are willing
to pay the maximum possible price of 10 tokens; otherwise, information disclosure is only
prevented if their willingness to pay is at least as high as the randomly determined price.
Table 4.1: Differences between treatments in part 2 of the experiment.
is exposed indicate that these individuals by the majority do not regret their choice and, hence,
report only a low willingness to pay for the opportunity to prevent detection.
4.3 Experimental Design
4.3.1 Set-Up
We implement three treatments to study the impact of private and social image concerns on
sabotage behavior in competitions. Sabotage, however, is not effective for sure to provide a
moral wiggle room for individuals. The treatments only differ with respect to the information
individuals receive about the implication of their sabotage decisions. More precisely, individuals
learn or may learn whether their sabotage inflicted on the opponent is effective and reduces
his winning probability and whether the opponent may learn the extent and implication of the
sabotage inflicted on him.
All treatments comprise three parts, beginning with three practice periods which give individuals
the opportunity to familiarize with the payoff mechanism (see Section 4.3.2). In these rounds,
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WTP < price
INFO SELF100 OPP0
INFO SELF70 OPP0
INFO SELF100 OPP70
WTP ≥ price
INFO SELF100 OPP0
INFO SELF70 OPP0
INFO SELF100 OPP70
Period 2
INFO SELF100 OPP0
INFO SELF70 OPP0
INFO SELF100 OPP70
Period 1
Individual Opponent
Probabilities: 0% 70% 100%
WTP: willingness to pay
Figure 4.1: Probabilities of information disclosure about individuals’ sabotage activities in part 2
of the experiment.
individuals play the role of both contestants and can simulate different strategies to observe the
outcomes.
In the INFO SELF100 OPP0 treatment, individuals are in the first period of part 2 always informed
about the implication of their sabotage inflicted in the opponent. In the second period, individ-
uals can prevent receiving this information by paying a price up to 10 tokens. The opponent,
however, never receives information about sabotage inflicted on him in the INFO SELF100 OPP0
treatment. The INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment is identical to the INFO SELF100 OPP0 treatment,
except for the fact that individuals receive information about the effectiveness of their sabotage
inflicted on the opponent only with a probability of 70%. As in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 treatment,
individuals in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment are always informed about the effectiveness of
their sabotage inflicted on the opponent. Moreover, the opponent is also informed about the
sabotage inflicted on him by the individual and its implication with a probability of 70%. In the
second period of part 2, individuals can prevent the disclosure of this information by paying a
price up to 10 tokens. Individuals in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70 OPP0 do not receive
information about the implication of sabotage inflicted on the opponent if the stated willingness
to pay is sufficiently high. In the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment, however, individuals can prevent
the disclosure of information to the opponent. Please note that individuals themselves are still
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Winning probability
Absolute performance difference (points) Leader Trailing
0–20 50% 50%
20.5–45 60% 40%
45.5–70 70% 20%
70.5–100 80% 20%
100.5 or more 90% 10%
Table 4.2: Translation of performance differences into winning probabilities.
informed in any case about the effectiveness of their sabotage inflicted on the opponent in the
second period of part 2 of the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment. Table 4.1 summarizes the differ-
ences between our treatments. A visual representation of different probabilities for information
disclosure about individuals’ sabotage activities to individuals themselves and their opponent is
provided in Figure 4.1.
In both, the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment, the opponent never learns
about an individual’s sabotage decision. Hence, only private image concerns can matter in
an individual’s decision whether or not to choose a positive level of sabotage. As individuals
always receive information about the effectiveness of their sabotage inflicted on the opponent in
the INFO SELF100 OPP0 treatment, but only with a probability of 70% in the INFO SELF70 OPP0
treatment, the latter treatment provides a moral wiggle room which alleviates the impairment
of an individual’s private image due to a positive sabotage decision. The effect on an individ-
ual’s private image in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment is identical to the INFO SELF100 OPP0
treatment as information to the individual herself is always disclosed in either treatment. The
difference between both treatments is attributed to the information the opponent may receive
in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment. In contrast to the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70
OPP0 treatment which at most affect the individual’s private image, the INFO SELF100 OPP70
treatment can also refer to social image concerns as the decision to sabotage and its implication
becomes visible for the opponent with a probability of 70%. If these concerns affect individuals’
decisions and cause disutility either due to an impairment of the private or social image (or
both) when deciding whether or not to choose positive levels of sabotage, individuals can make
use of our mechanism to prevent information disclosure. More precisely, individuals can state
their willingness to pay between 0 and 10 tokens. If their willingness to pay is at least as high
as the randomly determined price, individuals have to pay this price and—depending on the
treatment—no information is disclosed either to the individual herself or to the opponent.
4.3.2 Procedures
After the initial practice periods in which individuals have the opportunity to familiarize with
the payoff mechanism, the second part of the experiment begins with a real-effort task followed
by two periods with a dyadic tournament each. Individuals have to code five-letter words into
numbers for ten minutes. Each letter of the alphabet corresponds to a two-digit number (Erkal
71
et al., 2011; Dato and Nieken, 2014). Each correctly coded letter is rewarded with one point,
whereas each wrongly coded letter leads to a deduction of 0.5 points. All individuals get the
same words in the same order. After the end of the ten-minute working period, each individual
is informed about her performance, i.e., the number of achieved points. Subsequently, all
individuals are matched in groups of two. Each group enters a two-player competition. The
winner of the competition receives the winner prize of 75 tokens while the loser gets 25 tokens.2
In order to determine the winner, the performance of both individuals in a group is compared.
The performance difference translates into a winning probability for both individuals. If the
absolute performance difference is rather low (between zero and 20 points), both contestants
have a 50% chance of winning. If the difference is larger than 20 but lower than 45.5 points, the
leading individual has a 60% and the trailing individual a 40% winning probability (see Table 4.2
for all combinations of winning probabilities and performance differences). Each individual is
informed whether she obtained the higher or lower score within the group and the corresponding
winning probability. Subsequently, all contestants have the opportunity to inflict sabotage on
the opponent by potentially lowering his winning probability by zero to 9 percentage points.
A higher amount of sabotage leads to higher costs, which have to be paid by the sabotaging
individual in any case. All individuals know the cost function and that each contestant has the
opportunity to sabotage. The chosen sabotage, however, may not be effective in reducing the
winning probability of the opponent. Each session consists of 18 groups of two individuals:3
• For 12 randomly determined groups, the sabotage decisions of both individuals are imple-
mented.
• For 5 randomly determined groups, only one of the sabotage decisions of the group is
implemented.
• For one randomly determined group, the sabotage decisions of both individuals are inef-
fective.
When making their sabotage decisions, individuals do not know whether or not their own
or the opponent’s sabotage decision is effective. They only know the possible scenarios and
their frequencies. For the second period, individuals are matched with a new opponent. As
before, the performance difference between the two contestants determines their winning
probabilities. Both individuals can then again select their desired sabotage levels. In contrast to
the previous period, they can now affect the information disclosure concerning the sabotage
decisions and their implication. Depending on the treatment, individuals can either prevent
receiving information about the implication of their sabotage on their opponent or prevent the
opponent from being informed about the amount and implication of sabotage inflicted on him
by paying a price (see Section 4.3.1). We elicit the willingness to pay following Becker et al. (1964).
In all treatments, individuals can spend between 1 to 10 tokens to prevent information disclosure.
The computer randomly determines the price to prevent information disclosure at the end of
the second part. If the price is equal to or lower than the amount an individual is willing to pay,
information is not disclosed and the individual has to pay the price. If the price is higher than
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the individual’s willingness to pay, the information is disclosed. At the end of the experiment, all
individuals are informed about the outcomes of both tournament periods of part 2.
In part three, we elicit additional controls on the social value orientation of each individual using
the Equality Equivalence Test (Kerschbamer, 2015). In the final questionnaire, we also elicit
risk attitudes using the risk aversion scale from the German socio-economic panel (Dohmen
et al., 2011), measures for private and public self-consciousness (Heinemann, 1979; based upon
Fenigstein et al., 1975), competitiveness via the competitiveness index (Smither and Houston,
1992), and demographics such as gender, age, and field of study.
We conducted 14 sessions with 36 individuals each between July 2017 and January 2018 at
Karlsruhe Decision & Design Lab.4 Each individual was only allowed to enroll in one session and
we used a between-subject design. The data set contains observations of 469 individuals (181
women, 288 men).5 We recruited individuals via hroot (Bock et al., 2014) and programmed the
experiment in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each session lasted about 90 minutes. At the end of
each session, earnings were converted into Euro at a rate of 1 token = 0.20 Euro (5 tokens = 1.00
Euro); the average payment was 15.36 Euro.
4.3.3 Behavioral Conjectures
Whereas monetary incentives remain unchanged, our treatments differ with respect to the
information about sabotage activities which are disclosed or not to either individuals themselves
or their opponent and the specific probabilities. Hence, any differences in individuals’ behavior
between the treatments can be attributed to different information policies. To derive predictions
for the empirical analysis, we compare the impact of different information policies on individuals’
private and social image based on the results of the experimental studies discussed in Section 4.2
which provide evidence on the impact of private and social image concerns on individuals’
behavior.
The upper half of Table 4.1 describes the differences in information disclosure between our
treatments. If only private image concerns are decisive for the individual’s choice of a sabotage
level in period 1, differences between the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment
do not occur as individuals are always informed about the implication of sabotage inflicted on the
opponent in both treatments. In the INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment, however, this information is
only disclosed with a probability of 70% which is expected to result in higher levels of sabotage as
the individual may not learn whether or not her sabotage decision in fact harmed the opponent:
sabotageINFO SELF70 OPP0 > sabotageINFO SELF100 OPP0 = sabotageINFO SELF100 OPP70 .
Conversely, if only social image concerns matter for the individual’s decision to inflict sabotage
on the opponent in period 1, the sabotage levels in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70
OPP0 treatment do not differ as the opponent is not informed in either treatment. This changes
in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment in which the opponent is informed in 70% of the cases
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Score
Sabotage
period 1
Sabotage
period 2
WTP
positive
WTP [%]
INFO SELF100 OPP0 202.96 3.27 3.04 0.44 15.22
INFO SELF70 OPP0 196.60 3.00 2.67 0.41 18.13
INFO SELF100 OPP70 202.41 3.09 2.77 1.31 44.00
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics.
about sabotage inflicted on him which is expected to decrease sabotage activities:
sabotageINFO SELF70 OPP0 = sabotageINFO SELF100 OPP0 > sabotageINFO SELF100 OPP70 .
Finally, if both, private and social image concerns, influence the individual’s decision to inflict
sabotage on the opponent, the lowest level of sabotage in period 1 prevails in the INFO SELF70
OPP0 treatment as only individuals themselves are informed about the implication of their
sabotage activities with a probability of 70%. In the INFO SELF100 OPP0 treatment, individuals
are always informed and, thus, choose lower levels of sabotage. As the opponent is additionally
informed in 70% of the cases in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment, this is expected to result in a
further decrease in sabotage activities of the individual:
sabotageINFO SELF70 OPP0 > sabotageINFO SELF100 OPP0 > sabotageINFO SELF100 OPP70 .
In period 2, the interdependence between sabotage activities and the opportunity to prevent
information disclosure by paying a price is not straightforward to disentangle. The newly
introduced opportunity to prevent information disclosure may affect individuals’ considerations
in different ways: Individuals can either choose a higher level of sabotage and simultaneously
indicate a positive willingness to pay to keep the impact on their private and/or social image
constant, or they do not change their sabotage activity and use the opportunity to prevent
information disclosure to restore their private and/or social image. A positive willingness to pay
to prevent information disclosure can, hence, be interpreted as evidence regarding the influence
of—depending on the treatment—private and social image concerns on individuals’ decisions
to inflict sabotage on their opponent. Yet, predictions about individuals’ behavior in period 2 are
not unambiguous due to this interdependence and remain an empirical question.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Overview
An overview of the outcome variables is provided in Table 4.3. According to a non-parametric test,
the scores achieved in the real-effort task do statistically not significantly differ between the treat-
ments (p = 0.2245, Kruskal-Wallis H-test). The allocation of groups to categories according to
both individuals’ winning probabilities in period 1 differs slightly between treatments (p = 0.095,
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Pearson’s χ2-test). Pairwise comparisons between the treatments using the Holm-Bonferroni
adjustment, however, reveal no statistically significant differences. In period 2, the differences
between treatments are statistically not significant (p = 0.105, Pearson’s χ2-test). Within treat-
ments, the allocation of groups according to both individuals’ winning probabilities does not
shift into one specific direction from period 1 to period 2 (INFO SELF100 OPP0 : p = 0.7707, INFO
SELF70 OPP0: p = 0.8958, INFO SELF100 OPP70: p = 0.1229, Bowker test of symmetry).
Sabotage levels in period 1 and period 2 by treatment are depicted in Figure 4.2. There are no
statistically significant differences between treatments in period 1 (p = 0.8105) and period 2
(p = 0.3979, Kruskal-Wallis H-test). The difference between leading and trailing individuals
within groups is statistically not significant in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 (period 1: p = 0.3004, period
2: p = 0.4653) and the INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment (period 1: p = 0.1185, period 2: p = 0.4859).
In the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment, leading individuals inflict statistically significantly higher
levels of sabotage on their opponent (period 1: p = 0.0990, period 2: p = 0.0039, two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Sabotage levels between treatments in period 1 are statistically not
signficantly different for leading (p = 0.1740) and trailing individuals (p = 0.5026, Kruskal-Wallis
H-test). Sabotage levels between treatments in period 2 are statistically not significantly different
for leading individuals (p = 0.1646), whereas they are for trailing individuals (p = 0.0474, Kruskal-
Wallis H-test). In partiular, trailing individuals in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 choose statistically
significantly lower levels of sabotage than in the other treatments (INFO SELF100 OPP0 vs. INFO
SELF100 OPP70: p = 0.0339, INFO SELF70 OPP0 vs. INFO SELF100 OPP70: p = 0.0534, pairwise
Dunn test with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment).6
Overall, there is a slight decline in sabotage levels from period 1 to period 2. This is indicated in
Figure 4.37 as the slope of the solid red line representing the linear fit is flatter than the dashed
45◦-line. Within treatments, sabotage levels decrease statistically significantly from period 1 to
period 2 in the INFO SELF70 OPP0 (p = 0.0509) and INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment (p = 0.0259),
but not in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 treatment (p = 0.3140, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
The willingness to pay to prevent information disclosure in period 2 is notably higher in the INFO
SELF100 OPP70 treatment than in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment; this
difference is statistically highly significant (equality of groups: p = 0.0001, Kruskal-Wallis H-test;
INFO SELF100 OPP0 vs. INFO SELF70 OPP0: p = 0.3557, INFO SELF100 OPP0 vs. INFO SELF100
OPP70: p = 0.0000, INFO SELF70 OPP0 vs. INFO SELF100 OPP70: p = 0.0000, pairwise Dunn test
with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment). Moreover, the share of individuals who indicate a positive
willingness to pay differs statistically significantly between treatments (p = 0.0000, Pearson’s χ2-
test). More specifically, there are statistically significantly more individuals in the INFO SELF100
OPP70 treatment who are willing to pay a positive price to prevent information disclosure than in
the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment (INFO SELF100 OPP0 vs. INFO SELF100
OPP70: p = 0.0000, INFO SELF70 OPP0 vs. INFO SELF100 OPP70: p = 0.0000, pairwise Pearson’s χ2-
test with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment). In the INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment, trailing individuals
indicate a statistically marginally higher willingness to pay than leading individuals (p = 0.0781),
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Figure 4.2: Sabotage in period 1 and period 2 by treatment. Error bars indicate the 95% confi-
dence intervals.
whereas the difference between leading and trailing individuals is statistically not significant in
the other treatments (INFO SELF100 OPP0: p = 0.5651, INFO SELF100 OPP70 p = 0.2219, two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
4.4.2 Sabotage Behavior
The results of regressions analyses on sabotage behavior in period 1 and period 2 are reported in
Tables 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. Starting with period 1, there are no differences between the INFO
SELF70 OPP0 and the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment and the INFO SELF100 OPP0 treatment. The
coefficients of the dummy variables for either treatment are statistically insignificantly different
from zero. Despite this insignificance it has to be noted that the negative sign of the coefficients
of the dummy variable for the INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment is not inline with our conjecture
according to which a lower probability of information disclosure than in the INFO SELF100
OPP0 treatment is expected to result in higher levels of sabotage if the individuals’ decision is
influenced by self image concerns. The negative and statistically highly significant coefficients for
the squared distance from the 50/50-category which corresponds to equal winning probabilities
for both individuals of a given group indicates that sabotage activities decrease substantially
for both individuals the further their group is away from the from the 50/50-category which
corresponds to increasingly unequal winning probabilities within these groups. Put differently,
sabotage is used more intensively when both individuals of a group are head-to head. An
illustration of this relation is provided in Figure 4.4. The variable Distance indicates individuals’
winning probabilities relative to the reference category with a balanced competition. The
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distinct observations.
values of this variable range from −4 for individuals with a winning probability of 10% to 4 for
individuals with a winning probability of 90%, respectively. Note that the absolute distance
for both individuals within a group is the same. The red lines indicating an inverted U-shape
represent the quadratic fit of sabotage levels by distance from the 50/50-category. Adding
additional control variables in columns (3) and (4) does not change these results. Individuals
who are prepared to take risks inflict statistically significantly higher levels of sabotage on their
opponent. The same applies for females in specification (4), although the effect is statistically
not significant any more when adding interaction terms for females and the treatment variables.
Additional control variables are the three sub-scales emotion, argument, and games from the
competitiveness index by Smither and Houston (1992), measures for private and public self-
consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Heinemann, 1979), and dummy variables for different
types according to the social value orientation (Kerschbamer, 2015).8
Looking at the regression results on sabotage in period 2 reported Table 4.5, results remain by and
large unchanged. One notable exception, however, are the coefficients for the dummy variable
INFO SELF70 OPP0 in columns (2)–(4). Whereas this coefficient is statistically not different from
zero for conventional significance levels in column (1) containing only dummy variables for
the treatments, the coefficient is negative and statistically marginally significant when adding
additional control variables due to more precise estimates.
Robustness checks with separate regressions for leading and trailing individuals in both periods
are reported in Tables C.4 and C.5. These results are largely in line with the results for the pooled
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
INFO SELF70 OPP0 −0.430 −0.576 −0.569 −0.684
(0.433) (0.430) (0.415) (0.508)
INFO SELF100 OPP70 −0.339 −0.333 −0.358 −0.684
(0.423) (0.413) (0.400) (0.491)
Distance −0.030 −0.051 −0.053
(0.088) (0.087) (0.087)
Squared distance −0.213*** −0.224*** −0.222***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Risk 0.294*** 0.300***
(0.086) (0.086)
Econ 0.121 0.116
(0.335) (0.335)
Female 1.035*** 0.584
(0.372) (0.688)
INFO SELF70 OPP0 × Female 0.359
(0.862)
INFO SELF100 OPP70 × Female 0.872
(0.840)
Constant 2.843*** 3.709*** 2.836* 2.911**
(0.324) (0.375) (1.463) (1.466)
Competitiveness No No Yes Yes
Self-consciousness No No Yes Yes
Social value orientation No No Yes Yes
Obs. 469 469 469 469
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.012 0.026 0.027
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 4.4: Sabotage in period 1. Tobit estimates (lower limit: 0, upper limit: 9; 128 observations
left-censored, 20 observations right-censored).
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Figure 4.4: Individual winning probabilities and sabotage in period 1 and period 2. The size of
the bubbles indicates the frequency of distinct observations. Positive and negative values of the
variable Distance correspond to leading and trailing individuals, respectively.
sample discussed above. Moreover, the robustness checks do not reveal major differences in
sabotage behavior between leading and trailing individuals which complements the results
from the non-parametric tests in Section 4.4.1. Treatment differences in period 1 only occur
between the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and the INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment for leading individuals
when controlling for a large set of individuals’ characteristics. The negative sign of the coefficients
for the dummy variable representing the INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment which indicate a lower
propensity to inflict sabotage on the opponent is not in line with our behavioral conjectures as
the individual’s probability of being informed about the implication of her sabotage activities is
lower than in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 treatment. In period 2, differences occur between the INFO
SELF100 OPP0 and the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment for trailing individuals. This observation
corroborates the notion that the possibility of information disclosure to the opponent induces
individuals to choose lower levels of sabotage due to social image concerns. This effect is,
however, not particularly robust.
4.4.3 Preventing Information Disclosure
Besides the decision whether and how much sabotage to inflict on their opponent, individuals
have in period 2 additionally the opportunity to prevent information disclosure about their
sabotage activities, depending on the treatment either to themselves or to the opponent by
paying a price. More specifically, individuals indicate their willingness to pay a price between 1
and 10 tokens; if their willingness to pay is at least as high as the randomly determined price, no
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
INFO SELF70 OPP0 −0.667 −0.811* −0.763* −1.054*
(0.474) (0.468) (0.448) (0.556)
INFO SELF100 OPP70 −0.709 −0.626 −0.568 −0.727
(0.474) (0.464) (0.449) (0.563)
Distance 0.107 0.091 0.084
(0.100) (0.099) (0.100)
Squared distance −0.222*** −0.239*** −0.240***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Risk 0.389*** 0.390***
(0.094) (0.094)
Econ 0.050 0.039
(0.375) (0.375)
Female 0.916** 0.457
(0.407) (0.719)
INFO SELF70 OPP0 × Female 0.791
(0.950)
INFO SELF100 OPP70 × Female 0.473
(0.943)
Constant 2.405*** 3.277*** 0.802 0.938
(0.345) (0.387) (1.648) (1.655)
Competitiveness No No Yes Yes
Self-consciousness No No Yes Yes
Social value orientation No No Yes Yes
Obs. 469 469 469 469
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.012 0.029 0.029
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 4.5: Sabotage in period 2. Tobit estimates (lower limit: 0, upper limit: 9; 162 observations
left-censored, 17 observations right-censored).
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Figure 4.5: Willingness to pay to prevent information disclosure in period 2 by treatment.
information is disclosed. In the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment, the oppo-
nent never receives information about sabotage inflicted on him and the implication thereof;
thus, individuals only have the opportunity to prevent themselves from receiving information
about the implication of their sabotage activities by paying a price. If the willingness to pay
is lower than the randomly determined price, individuals in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 treatment
are informed for sure and individuals in the INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment are informed with a
probability of 70%. In contrast, individuals in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment always receive
this information. In this treatment, they can prevent the opponent from being informed about
sabotage inflicted on him and the corresponding implication. If an individual’s willingness to
pay is not sufficiently high, the opponent receives this information with a probability of 70%.
In line with non-parametric tests reported in Section 4.4.1, Figure 4.5 shows that a higher share
of individuals in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment indicates a positive willingness to pay than
in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment. Moreover, the average willingness
to pay indicated in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment is higher than in the other treatments
as the corresponding panel for the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment exhibits more observations
for strictly positive values on the horizontal axis (see also Table 4.3). This is confirmed by the
regression results reported in Table 4.6 as all coefficients for the dummy variable representing
the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment are positive and statistically highly significant. Individuals in
the 50/50-category indicate a statistically (marginally) lower willingness to pay. One possible
interpretation may be that individuals who face close competition tend to consider sabotage
a legitimate means to surpass their opponent and reduce the impact of chance on receiving
the winner prize. Similarly, leading individuals indicate a statistically (marginally) significantly
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
INFO SELF70 OPP0 0.207 0.115 0.199 0.166 0.239 0.498
(0.709) (0.712) (0.678) (0.590) (0.556) (0.697)
INFO SELF100 OPP70 3.104*** 2.981*** 2.986*** 1.675*** 1.556*** 1.657***
(0.638) (0.641) (0.601) (0.578) (0.544) (0.623)
Tie −1.338* −1.808** −1.587** −1.309** −1.316**
(0.736) (0.714) (0.667) (0.622) (0.620)
Leading individual −1.001* −1.116** −0.760* −0.748* −0.738
(0.556) (0.503) (0.458) (0.451) (0.451)
Sabotage 0.617*** 0.468*** 0.443*** 0.445***
(0.101) (0.102) (0.098) (0.098)
Belief 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.064***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Risk −0.106 −0.106
(0.105) (0.103)
Econ 0.001 0.010
(0.410) (0.409)
Female 0.965** 1.254
(0.443) (0.860)
INFO SELF70 OPP0 × Female −0.591
(1.143)
INFO SELF100 OPP70 × Female −0.234
(1.014)
Constant −4.032*** −3.280*** −4.725*** −5.618*** −4.084** −4.187**
(0.623) (0.660) (0.702) (0.693) (1.775) (1.821)
Competitiveness No No No No Yes Yes
Self-consciousness No No No No Yes Yes
Social value orientation No No No No Yes Yes
Obs. 469 469 469 469 469 469
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.042 0.093 0.171 0.188 0.189
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 4.6: Willingness to pay to prevent information disclosure in period 2. Tobit estimates (lower
limit: 0, upper limit: 10; 351 observations left-censored, 2 observations right-censored).
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lower willingness to pay to prevent information disclosure except in column (6). This can be
interpreted evidence supporting the notion that individuals who obtain a higher score than their
opponent perceive sabotage a legitimate means to assure receiving the winner prize which they
may feel entitled to. Higher levels of sabotage inflicted on the opponent also increase statistically
highly significantly the willingness to pay to prevent information disclosure. One potential
explanation for this relation may be that the disutility incurred in case of information disclosure
either to the individuals themselves or to the opponent due to an impairment of the private
and/or social image increases in the level of sabotage inflicted on the opponent. If this expected
disutility is larger than the monetary reduction of the final payoff due to the costs to prevent
information disclosure, individuals’ willingness to pay increases with their sabotage activities.
The coefficients of individuals’ beliefs regarding the share of other individuals who indicate a
positive willingness to pay to prevent information disclosure are also positive and statistically
highly significant. As the level of sabotage inflicted on the opponent and the belief about other
individuals’ willingness to pay are positively correlated (Spearman’s ρ = 0.1841, p = 0.0000),
this may be indirectly related to ex-post rationalization of individuals who assume others to
behave similar to themselves. Finally, females are willing to pay a statistically significantly higher
amount to prevent information disclosure pointing at different levels of disutility incurred by
gender if information about one’s own sabotage activities is revealed. This effects disappears,
however, when adding interaction terms between the dummy variables for the treatments and
female individuals.
Table C.6 reports robustness checks using a truncated normal hurdle model to disentangle the
decisions of (i) whether or not to pay to prevent information disclosure and (ii) how much to pay
if the previous decision was positive. In the first stage of the hurdle model, the coefficients of
the dummy variable for the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment are positive and statistically highly
significant which confirms a substantially higher propensity of individuals in this treatment to
indicate a positive willingness to pay as compared to the reference group in the INFO SELF100
OPP0 treatment. For those individuals who report a positive willingness to pay, no treatment
differences occur except between the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment
in column (6) when controlling for a large set of individual characteristics. Individuals facing
close competition in the 50/50-category exhibit a statistically (marginally) lower willingness to
pay, whereas the effect for leading individuals with winning probabilities of 60–90% is no longer
statistically significant. The coefficients for the level of sabotage inflicted on the opponent in
period 2, however, is still positive and statistically highly significant which supports the notion
that the disutility in case of disclosure of an individual’s sabotage activities increases in the level
of sabotage inflicted on the opponent.
4.5 Conclusion
The present paper studies the influence of private and social image concerns on individuals’
decision to inflict sabotage on their opponent in a tournament. Whereas sabotage potentially
increases the probability of winning the tournament and receiving the winner prize, the disclo-
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sure of information about the implication of sabotage activities for the opponent either to the
individuals themselves or to the opponent can induce disutility due to an impairment of the
private and/or social image.
The results of our experiment show no differences in sabotage levels between our treatment
groups establishing different levels of information disclosure. Thus, individuals’ decision to
inflict sabotage on their opponent is neither influenced by the fact they (may) obtain information
about the implication of their sabotage activities nor that their opponent may receive this
information. This observation is in line with Harbring and Wilhelm (2016) who find a substantial
share of individuals whose sabotage has been exposed not to indicate any signs of regret as
they state their intention to behave similarly again if the scenario is repeated. One explanation
for this phenomenon may be the nature of the underlying experiment. As the opportunity to
inflict sabotage on the opponent as well as the implication for the opponent and its probability
of occurrence are explicitly mentioned in the instructions, individuals may consider sabotage
as legitimate means to increase their winning probability in the tournament as these rules are
common knowledge—unlike in situations outside the laboratory.
Offering the option to pay a price to prevent information disclosure about the implication
of sabotage either to individuals themselves or the opponent reveals differences between the
treatment groups. In particular, individuals in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment indicate
a statistically significantly higher willingness to pay to prevent information disclosure than
individuals in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment. Whereas only individuals
themselves are informed about the implication of their sabotage activities for the opponent
in the latter treatments with probabilities of 100% and 70%, respectively, the INFO SELF100
OPP70 treatment comprises the possibility of additionally disclosing this information to the
opponent with a probability of 70%. As individuals themselves are informed in any case about
the implication of their sabotage activities just as in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 treatment, the
possibility of being exposed to the sufferer induces individuals in the INFO SELF100 OPP70
treatment to pay a substantially higher amount of tokens to prevent information disclosure
to the opponent. This provides evidence that even in an anonymous setting in the laboratory
the peril of one’s sabotage activity becoming visible for another individual induces disutility in
terms of an impairment of individuals’ social image which is reflected by a higher willingness to
pay to prevent information disclosure to the opponent. Furthermore, leading individuals with
winning probabilities of 60–90% and individuals in the 50/50-category facing close competition
indicate a lower willingness to pay to prevent information disclosure than trailing individuals
with winning probabilities of 10–40%. Possible explanations for these observations are that
individuals who already obtained a higher winning probability due to a better performance in
the real-effort task than their opponent may feel entitled to receiving the winner prize and use
sabotage, hence, to assure their claims. For individuals in the 50/50-category, the impact of
chance on receiving the winner prize is substantial as both individuals of a group have equal
winning probabilities. To enhance one’s prospect of winning the tournament, the use of sabotage
may be considered legitimate which decreases their willingness to pay to prevent information
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disclosure. Furthermore, the level of sabotage inflicted on the opponent and the belief regarding
the share of other individuals who indicate a positive willingness to pay to prevent information
disclosure increase the willingness to pay. Considering the extensive and intensive margin of
the willingness to pay to prevent information disclosure, however, yields that the participation
decision is substantially more pronounced for individuals in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment,
whereas the remaining control variables can hardly provide a clear-cut picture of the indicated
amounts except the level of sabotage inflicted on the opponent.
The results of this study show that neither private nor social image concerns fully prevent
individuals from inflicting sabotage on their opponent in a tournament as part of controlled
laboratory study. Moreover, we do not observe notable differences in sabotage levels between
the respective treatments. Yet, when offered the opportunity to prevent information disclosure
about their sabotage activities, individuals in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment who can avoid
being exposed to their opponent indicate a higher willingness to pay than individuals who can
only prevent the disclosure of this information to themselves, i.e., concerns for individuals’ social
image do matter in this context.
Notes
1. Another alternative is cheating, i.e., claiming a higher output than actually achieved (e.g.,
Schwieren and Weichselbaumer, 2010; Cartwright and Menezes, 2014).
2. The exchange rate is 5 tokens = 1.00 Euro.
3. The reason for this partition is to induce an environment in which an individual’s decision
to sabotage the opponent is effective with a probability of approximately 80%:
Pr(both decisions effective)= 0.8 ·0.8= 0.64≈ 1218
Pr(one decision effective)= (0.8 ·0.2)+ (0.2 ·0.8)= 0.32≈ 518
Pr(no decision effective)= 0.2 ·0.2= 0.04≈ 118
4. We conducted three more sessions that are not part of the paper. Due to technical problems,
the recorded data was incomplete.
5. The deviation from the theoretical number of individuals (14 ·36= 504) is due to the fact
that in some sessions our student assistants had to replace participants who did not show
up for the experiment. This was necessary to guarantee that that exactly 18 groups parti-
cipated in each session (see Note 3 above). Our student assistants and participants who
interacted with them were excluded from the data set. Of the remaining 484 individuals, 15
made inconsistent choices in the Equality Equivalence Test and were, thus, also excluded.
6. A detailed overview of sabotage levels by individual winning probabilities is reported in
Appendix C.1.
7. Note that individuals with the same and different winning probabilities in period 1 and 2
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are depicted separately. Overall, sabotage levels are statistically not significantly different
in period 1 (p = 0.1216) and period 2 (p = 0.2512, two-sided Mann-Whitney U -test) for
individuals who obtain the same or different winning probabilities.
8. The reference category is Selfish which accounts for 66.53% of all individuals. Figure C.4
indicates the frequencies of the respective types.
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5 Conclusion
The research presented in this thesis relates to different aspects which are prevalent in the work-
place if individuals are required to work together: coordination, cooperation, and sabotage in
tournaments. As outlined in Section 1, companies make frequently use of organizational settings
in which individuals have to collaborate. A major advantage of such instances is that individuals
can complement each other in their skills and knowledge and, thereby, realize efficiency gains
over individual work settings. It is, however, necessary that individuals refrain from free riding
and coordinate their activities to utilize the advantages of team production. Furthermore, com-
panies frequently use tournaments in which individuals compete for a prize such as a bonus
or promotion. These settings are particularly beneficial if individual performance is difficult to
measure in absolute terms. Hence, rank-order tournaments using a relative information can
alleviate the measurement issue. The major drawback is, however, that individuals cannot only
improve their prospects of winning by increasing their productive effort—but also by means of
sabotage, i.e., destructive effort.
The study discussed in Section 2 is concerned with coordination in a threshold public good
game. In particular, groups of several individuals are required to (i) choose one out of four
collective accounts and (ii) coordinate their contributions to reach the corresponding threshold.
To alleviate coordination in absence of communication, a semi-sequential structure is employed,
i.e., the allocation of a first-moving leader is disclosed to the second-moving followers before
they decide about their allocations simultaneously and independently. By design, all individuals
of a group are required to contribute some share of their endowment to reach a threshold which
refrains individuals from cheap riding. The institution of a first-moving leader whose allocation
becomes visible before second-moving followers are asked to make their allocation can reduce
strategic uncertainty. If the first mover does not contribute at all or makes only a negligibly
small contribution to a collective account, none of the thresholds is feasible for the group. The
alternative is a contribution by the first mover to one particular collective account which meets
or exceeds some critical value such that the followers’ endowment is sufficient to reach the
corresponding threshold. This allocation solves one domain of the coordination problem, the
choice of one out of four collective accounts. Followers are then left with a subset of the original
coordination problem, namely to coordinate their contributions to reach the corresponding
threshold. If first movers and followers have homogeneous incentives regarding the collective
accounts, followers have no reason to object to the first mover’s choice of a particular collective
account. On the other hand, if individuals have different incentives regarding the choice of
a collective account, the allocation by a first mover to the collective account which yields the
highest return for herself may change followers’ perceptions—despite the fact that they are
better off supporting a selfish first mover as compared to an outcome in which no threshold
is reached. The results of the corresponding experiment provide evidence that individuals do
not behave differently under homogeneous and heterogeneous incentives. In fact, first movers
contribute notable amounts to a collective account in the first stage to act as good example for
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the second-moving followers and, thereby, alleviate coordination. Although first movers in the
setting with heterogeneous incentives frequently choose the alternative which yields the highest
return for themselves, followers do not object to selfish behavior by first movers and provide the
remaining amount to reach the corresponding threshold instead. Put differently, even followers
in the setting with heterogeneous incentives do realize the material advantage of supporting
the first mover’s choice which is different from their own preferred choice over not reaching a
threshold at all.
An approach to foster cooperative behavior of children aged 10–13 years who attend upper
secondary schools in Germany by using an intervention which provides enhanced physical edu-
cation lessons is presented in Section 3. Although positive effects of physical activity and sports
participation on labor market outcomes are widely acknowledged, it is difficult to establish a
causal link due to concerns about selection effects. To account for this issue, the current study
using a randomized controlled trial provides a comparison of a Treatment group of individuals
who participate in the intervention and a Control group of individuals who attend regular phys-
ical education lessons during the same period. The intervention is designed to convey social
skills including cooperativeness in a playful way. To measure the impact of the intervention,
individuals in the Treatment and Control group participated in a series of different incentivized
standard economic experiments including a linear public good game. These measurements were
conducted before the start and right after the end of the intervention as well as nine weeks later.
The comparison with the Control group allows to disentangle the effect of the intervention on
cooperative behavior from effects which may occur due to the repeated measurements. A com-
parison of decisions in the first measurement before the beginning of the intervention does not
reveal any differences between individuals in the Treatment and Control group which indicates
that the randomization was successful. A comparison with individuals who attend a so-called
elite school of sports which provides conditions to reconcile compulsory school attendance with
high intensity levels of sports participation reveals a higher willingness to cooperate than among
individuals in the Treatment and Control group. While this difference is striking, the design of
the current study does not allow draw causal conclusions on the relation between the intensity of
sports participation and cooperative behavior. A comparison of cooperative behavior of individ-
uals in the Treatment and Control group as measured by contributions to the collective account
in the linear public good game over the course of the study does not reveal substantial differences
at first sight, neither between nor within both groups. When taking the socio-economic status
of the households individuals live in into account, a more differentiated pattern of cooperative
behavior over the course of the study emerges. In particular, individuals from households with
low socio-economic status in the Treatment group become more cooperative over time which
emphasizes the effectiveness of the intervention. Considering the nature of the intervention,
this finding appears promising: Physical education lessons were only slightly adapted during the
intervention. The most obvious changes are two periods of ten minutes at the beginning and
end of each lessons in which individuals are encouraged to discuss their views and experiences
on the topic covered in the respective lesson. Furthermore, cooperative behavior conveyed
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in the intervention and measured in the linear public good game relate to the same domain
of individuals’ behavior but are not perfectly congruent to prevent potential demand effects.
Finally, the intervention was conducted during a very limited time span of six weeks. Despite
these constraints, a positive effect on cooperative behavior for individuals from households
with low socio-economic status is observed which suggests that even cautious changes in the
curriculum can induce improvements in prosocial behavior. Moreover, physical education at
school provides a reasonable environment due to the possibility to promote approaches of
informal learning which benefits all children irrespective of their background—which is usually
not the case in, e.g., sports clubs.
To tackle issues which arise due to sabotage in situations with relative performance evaluation,
it is essential to understand the underlying motives. Therefore, Section 4 reports the results of
an experiment designed to assess the impact of different layers of information disclosure about
the implication of sabotage inflicted on the opponent on sabotage behavior in tournaments.
More specifically, three different treatments are implemented to vary whether the individual
herself and the opponent receives or may receive information about the individual’s sabotage
activities. The rationale behind this approach to assess whether this kind information disclosure
provides an effective countermeasure to reduce the extent of sabotage in tournaments if the
individual incurs disutility when being exposed as saboteur due to impairment of her private
and social image, respectively. Moreover, individuals can indicate their willingness to pay to
prevent information disclosure—depending on the treatment—either to themselves or the
opponent in the second stage of the experiment. Overall, sabotage levels do not substantially
differ between the treatments using different layers of information disclosure. When looking
at individual winning probabilities as defined by differences in the scores from a previous real-
effort task between both individuals of a group, it turns out that individuals who face close
competition, i.e., find themselves in a group with (almost) balanced winning probabilities for
both individuals, decide to sabotage their opponent more severely. In both treatments in which
only individuals themselves receive information about the implication of their sabotage activities,
the opportunity to prevent information disclosure by paying a price is barely used. In contrast, if
it is possible that the opponent receives this information, individuals are willing to pay a positive
amount to prevent information disclosure. This observation suggests that individuals who have
the opportunity to inflict sabotage on their opponent do not only trade off the direct costs of
sabotage against the increased probability of receiving the winner prize in a payoff-maximizing
fashion. In fact, the possibility that the opponent receives information about sabotage inflicted
on him induces individuals to sacrifice some share of their payoff to keep this information under
disguise. Whereas in the other two treatments only the individual herself—albeit with different
probabilities—receives information about the implications of her sabotage activity, the third
treatment features the possibility that the opponent is informed as well which indicates that
individuals’ willingness to pay is influenced by concerns about their social image. Although
disclosure of information about the implications individuals’ sabotage activities to the opponent
does not reduce sabotage levels per se, the positive willingness to pay suggests that individuals do
89
not want their opponent to be informed about sabotage inflicted on him despite the anonymous
environment in the laboratory which emphasizes the impact of non-monetary motives on
unethical behavior.
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Appendix A Supplementary Material for Section 2
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Figure A.1: Total contributions to the groups’ preferred collective accounts by period in the
homogeneous treatment. The dashed red line indicates the threshold of 160 tokens.
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Figure A.2: Total contributions to the groups’ preferred collective accounts by period in the
heterogeneous treatment. The dashed red line indicates the threshold of 160 tokens.
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A.2 Additional Parametric Specifications
(1) (2)
Het 2.975 1.267
(7.308) (4.256)
Period −0.796 −1.445***
(0.487) (0.433)
LagThr 19.922***
(3.980)
Constant 34.754*** 29.018***
(5.166) (4.038)
Obs. 190 171
No. Groups 19 19
Wald-χ2 2.845 25.96
Prob. > χ2 0.241 9.70 ·10−6
Clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table A.1: Average contributions by group and period. Generalized least squares estimates with
random effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Het 0.046 −0.007 0.187 3.218 0.920
(8.415) (8.271) (9.141) (10.994) (9.215)
Econ −5.972 −6.109 −5.973 0.499 −5.878
(12.353) (12.759) (13.320) (16.401) (13.008)
Female −2.650 −2.818 −3.121 −7.107 −4.740
(13.596) (14.212) (17.503) (12.479) (15.438)
Risk −0.067 −0.149 −1.112 −0.144
(1.923) (3.103) (2.141) (2.100)
Q06 −0.353
(8.387)
Q07 7.922
(8.881)
Q08 3.289
(10.879)
Constant 36.619** 37.217* 38.372 16.259 35.754
(14.163) (18.705) (37.004) (32.248) (20.203)
Obs. 19 19 19 19 19
R2 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.104 0.030
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table A.2: Average contributions of first movers by group over all periods. Ordinary least squares
estimates.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Het 3.157 1.216 1.348 3.926 3.585 7.407
(7.555) (5.195) (4.673) (5.638) (5.528) (4.793)
Period −0.731 −0.080 −0.075 −0.081 −0.228 −0.525
(0.458) (0.302) (0.270) (0.278) (0.316) (0.391)
Salient 22.687*** 13.383*** 13.260*** 14.769*** 12.585*
(3.049) (4.654) (4.888) (5.232) (6.426)
ContFM 0.274** 0.329** 0.295** 0.407**
(0.109) (0.149) (0.149) (0.177)
Het × ContFM −0.081 −0.071 −0.207*
(0.132) (0.128) (0.122)
Correct Belief 3.839 3.214
(2.634) (2.808)
LagThr 8.681**
(3.479)
Constant 34.280*** 13.809*** 12.304*** 10.729** 8.398* 4.546
(4.798) (3.778) (3.711) (4.767) (4.838) (4.794)
Obs. 190 190 190 190 190 171
No. Groups 19 19 19 19 19 19
Wald-χ2 2.7130 81.40 96.06 110.9 152.7 328.9
Prob. > χ2 0.258 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table A.3: Average contributions of followers by group over all periods. Generalized least squares
estimates with random effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Het 1.213 0.470 15.621 18.585* 19.836*
(5.751) (5.168) (11.562) (10.566) (10.234)
Period 0.467 0.381 0.418 0.195 −0.202
(0.415) (0.361) (0.381) (0.363) (0.307)
ContSalFM 0.380*** 0.623*** 0.608*** 0.529***
(0.139) (0.164) (0.160) (0.146)
Het × ContSalFM −0.391 −0.459* −0.484**
(0.254) (0.234) (0.234)
Correct Belief 6.438** 5.489*
(3.115) (2.959)
LagThr 8.742**
(3.625)
Constant 32.964*** 18.887*** 9.479 6.291 7.000
(4.655) (6.278) (7.499) (6.839) (5.283)
Obs. 150 150 150 150 133
No. Groups 18 18 18 18 18
Wald-χ2 1.315 10.46 18.82 27.60 54.09
Prob. > χ2 0.518 0.015 0.001 4.35 ·10−5 7.08 ·10−10
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table A.4: Average contributions of followers to the salient account by group over all periods.
Generalized least squares estimates with random effects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Period −0.342 0.010 0.079 −0.009 −0.435
(0.507) (0.315) (0.372) (0.458) (0.281)
Selfish 21.416*** 8.442* 18.216* 18.348* 16.924
(4.625) (4.811) (11.060) (10.041) (13.201)
ContFM 0.393*** 0.451*** 0.471*** 0.439***
(0.068) (0.061) (0.069) (0.070)
Selfish × ContFM −0.244 −0.275 −0.347
(0.252) (0.220) (0.302)
Correct Belief 2.146 0.096
(3.602) (3.792)
LagThr 12.464***
(3.881)
Constant 19.448*** 14.091*** 11.684*** 10.682*** 12.011***
(5.426) (4.978) (4.524) (3.949) (3.562)
Obs. 100 100 100 100 90
No. Groups 10 10 10 10 10
Wald-χ2 40.20 41.27 94.86 85.51 677.6
Prob. > χ2 1.86 ·10−9 5.74 ·10−9 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table A.5: Average contributions of followers in the heterogeneous treatment by group over all
periods. Generalized least squares estimates with random effects.
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A.4 Instructions
Note: Instructions for the homogeneous and the heterogeneous treatment are identical for the
largest part. Differences are highlighted.
Welcome to this Experiment!
You are participating in an economic experiment. All decisions are made privately, meaning that
none of the other participants learns the identity of someone having made a certain decision.
The payment is private information as well; none of the participants learns how much others
have earned.
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have trouble understanding the instructions, please
take a second look at it. If you still have questions, please give us a signal.
General Information
• This experiment consists of three parts and a questionnaire.
• You will receive instructions for each part before the respective part starts. You will receive
longer instructions in paper form, whereas short instructions will appear on the screen.
Please click OK only after you have read the instructions carefully and do not have any
questions left.
• At the end of the experiment, you will get an overview of your results.
• Each part of the experiment affects your payoff. Therefore, please think carefully about
every decision.
• In the experiment, we use the currency “tokens”. At the end of the experiment, your payoff
will be converted into Euro; the conversion rate is 10 tokens = 1.00 Euro.
• Please stay at your seat at the end of the experiment and wait until we approach you to
hand out your payoff.
Part I
The first part of the experiment comprises of ten periods.
You form a group with three other players. Groups are assigned randomly. You will not know the
identity of the other players and none of the other players will be informed about your identity.
One player of your group is type A the other three players are type B. The assignment of the
types is randomly. You will be informed about which player type you are prior to the beginning
of the first period.
At the beginning of each period, you and the other players receive 50 tokens each on an indi-
vidual experimental account. You can split his amount between your private account WHITE
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and four collective accounts RED, BLUE, YELLOW, and GREEN. For each token you allocate to
your private account, you will receive one token at the end of the period. For each collective
account your contribution and the contributions of the other players in your group will be added.
If the total sum of contributions to of one community account reaches at least 160 tokens,
the amount will be multiplied with a certain factor and distributed equally among the group
members. <HOM> The table below provides an overview on the factors for each of the collective
accounts.</HOM> <HET> Please note that the factors may differ for each player.</HET>
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
(type A) (type B) (type B) (type B)
FactorRED 2 2 2 2
FactorBLUE 2 2 2 2
FactorYELLOW 2 2 2 2
FactorGREEN 2 2 2 2
(Note: The table displays factors for the homogeneous treatment. In the heterogeneous treat-
ment, factors on the diagonal are all equal to three.)
The factors which are relevant for you will be displayed on the screen. Throughout the experi-
ment, the factors will not change. If there are less than 160 tokens on a collective account you
receive no payoff from this collective account.
The payoff from your private account WHITE in a period (in tokens) is given by
PayoffWHITE =ContributionWHITE.
For the collective accounts your payoff in a period (in tokens) is calculated by:
• collective account RED
PayoffRED =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
FactorRED×SumRED
4
if SumRED ≥ 160
0 if SumRED < 160
• collective account BLUE
PayoffBLUE =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
FactorBLUE×SumBLUE
4
if SumBLUE ≥ 160
0 if SumBLUE < 160
• collective account YELLOW
PayoffYELLOW =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
FactorYELLOW×SumYELLOW
4
if SumYELLOW ≥ 160
0 if SumYELLOW < 160
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• collective account GREEN
PayoffGREEN =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
FactorGREEN×SumGREEN
4
if SumGREEN ≥ 160
0 if SumGREEN < 160
Thus, your total payoff in a period (in tokens) is:
PayoffTOTAL =ContributionWHITE
+
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
FactorRED×SumRED
4
if SumRED ≥ 160
0 if SumRED < 160
+
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
FactorBLUE×SumBLUE
4
if SumBLUE ≥ 160
0 if SumBLUE < 160
+
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
FactorYELLOW×SumYELLOW
4
if SumYELLOW ≥ 160
0 if SumYELLOW < 160
+
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
FactorGREEN×SumGREEN
4
if SumGREEN ≥ 160
0 if SumGREEN < 160
Sequence of a Period
Each period consists of two stages. At first, the type A player allocates his or her endowment to
his or her private account and the collective accounts. At the same time, type B players state
their beliefs as to which of the five accounts the type A player will contribute the largest share of
his or her endowment. If the belief is correct, the corresponding type B player will receive 10
tokens. If the type A player contributes an equally large share of his or her endowment to two
or more accounts, the corresponding type B player receives the payoff of 10 tokens if his or her
belief matches any of these accounts.
Subsequently, type B players will be informed about the allocation of the type A player in the
first stage and decide now individually upon the allocation of their endowment to their private
account and the collective accounts. At the same time, the type A player states his or her belief
as to which of the five accounts the type B players will on average contribute the largest share of
their endowment. If the belief is correct, the type A player will receive 10 tokens. If type B players
contribute on average an equally large share to two or more accounts, the type A player receives
the payoff of 10 tokens if his or her belief matches any of these accounts.
Type A player As type A player, you have one minute to allocate your endowment to your
private account and the collective accounts in the first stage. Please note that it is only possible
to allocate your endowment to the individual account and the collective accounts in increments
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of 5 tokens. Please ensure also that the sum of your contributions to the private account and
the collective accounts equals your endowment of 50 tokens. In the second stage, you have one
minute to state your belief as to which of the five accounts the type B players will on average
contribute the largest share of their endowment. If your belief is correct, you will receive 10
tokens. If type B players contribute an equally large average share to two or more accounts, you
receive a payoff of 10 tokens if your belief matches any of these accounts. Finally, you and the
other players receive an overview on the result of the current period.
Type B player As type B player you have one minute to state your belief as to which of the five
accounts the type A player will contribute the largest share of his or her endowment in the first
stage. If your belief is correct, you will receive 10 tokens. If the the type A player contributions
an equally large share of his or her endowment on two or more accounts, you will receive 10
tokens if one of these accounts matches your belief. In the second stage, you have one minute to
allocate your endowment to your private account and the collective accounts. Please note that it
is only possible to allocate your endowment on the private account and the collective accounts
in increments of 5 tokens. Please ensure also that the sum of your contributions to the private
account and the collective accounts equals your endowment of 50 tokens. Finally, you and the
other players receive an overview on the result of the current period.
Determination of the Payment for Part I
At the end of the first part, i.e., after period 10, one period will be randomly chosen for each
player. Only earnings from this particular round are relevant for the payoff from the first part of
the experiment.
Control Questions and Practice Periods
Before the beginning of the payoff-relevant part, we would like to ask you to answer some control
questions. You will then have the opportunity to familiarize with the procedure of the experiment
during three practice periods.
If you still have any questions, please give us a sign, so the experiment leaders can come to you
and answer your question. If there are no questions left, please click OK.
Part II
For the subsequent part, you will form a group with one randomly chosen player. You will not
know about the identity of the other player and the other player will not know your identity.
In this part of the experiment, there are two types, type C and type D. Each type can choose
between two options. Type C can choose between SQUARE and RECTANGLE; accordingly, type D
can choose between RHOMBUS and TRAPEZOID.
For each type, the payoff depends on the own choice and the choice of the other type:
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• If type C chooses SQUARE and type D chooses RHOMBUS, type C receives 7 tokens and type
D receives 3 tokens.
• If type C chooses SQUARE and type D chooses TRAPEZOID, type C receives 3 tokens and
type D receives 2 tokens.
• If type C chooses RECTANGLE and type D chooses RHOMBUS, type C receives 1 tokens and
type D receives 2 tokens.
• If type C chooses RECTANGLE and type D chooses TRAPEZOID, type C receives 4 tokens and
type D receives 6 tokens.
You and the other player decide on the choice of the options simultaneously. Your decision
consists of two parts, an independent and a dependent decision.
• Independent decision: You decide as type C and choose from the options SQUARE and
RECTANGLE. You have one minute for this decision. The other player makes this decision
as well.
• Dependent decision: You make your decision as type D depending on the decision of the
other type.
– Assuming type C chooses SQUARE, do you choose RHOMBUS or TRAPEZOID?
– Assuming type C chooses RECTANGLE, do you choose RHOMBUS or TRAPEZOID?
You have 1 minute for both decisions. The other player makes this decision also.
After all decisions have been made, it is randomly determined whether you are type C or type D.
• For type C, the independent decision is implemented.
• For type D, the dependent decision is implemented.
– If type C chose SQUARE, the corresponding decision of type D is implemented.
– If type C chose RECTANGLE, the corresponding decision of type D is implemented.
If you still have any questions, please give us a sign, so the experiment leaders can come to you
and answer your question. If there are no questions left, please click OK.
Part III
In this part of the experiment, you do not play with any of the other participants, so your
decisions only influence your own payoff.
Please put yourself in the following Situation: You can choose between a safe payment and a
lottery. The lottery generates a payment of 30 tokens with a probability of 50%. You receive
nothing with the same probability.
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Now assume you have to choose between the lottery and the safe payment. We will show you
five different situations subsequently. The lottery is the same in each situation. The amount of
the safe payment changes from situation to situation. For each decision you have 30 seconds.
After you have made all of your decisions, you will receive a payoff for this part of the experiment.
If you chose the safe payment in the fifth situation, you receive this amount. If you choose the
lottery in the fifth situation, then your payoff depends on the result of the lottery.
If you still have any questions, please give us a sign, so the experiment leaders can come to you
and answer your question. If there are no questions left, please click OK.
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Appendix B Supplementary Material for Section 3
B.1 Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment 0.957 1.020 0.968 0.964 0.926
(0.254) (0.278) (0.231) (0.230) (0.312)
ESS 4.430*** 3.864*** 5.096*** 5.007*** 3.779***
(0.251) (0.931) (1.111) (1.170) (0.676)
Total Activity 0.921 0.906
(0.114) (0.111)
Minutes Club 0.999
(0.001)
Member 1.030 1.144 1.150
(0.731) (0.678) (0.617)
Competitive 0.922 0.902 0.863
(0.337) (0.320) (0.320)
Female 1.255
(0.326)
Low SES 1.796
(1.162)
Constant cut 1 0.056*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.055*** 0.068***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.025) (0.033) (0.031)
Constant cut 2 0.164*** 0.108*** 0.112*** 0.161*** 0.201***
(0.047) (0.053) (0.043) (0.069) (0.062)
Constant cut 3 0.877 0.603 0.612 0.867 1.092
(0.092) (0.326) (0.259) (0.429) (0.222)
Constant cut 4 6.605*** 4.309*** 4.613*** 6.520*** 8.540***
(0.887) (2.406) (2.138) (2.813) (2.586)
Constant cut 5 23.153*** 18.051*** 16.064*** 22.889*** 30.843***
(7.048) (8.492) (6.054) (8.630) (9.598)
Obs. 130 118 130 130 130
No. Groups 9 9 9 9 9
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.024 0.035 0.033 0.039
Note: Missing values of the variable Total Activity in column (3) are replaced with
means by measurement, class, gender, and socio-economic status.
Exponentiated coefficients.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table B.1: Robustness check for contributions to the collective account in the first measurement.
Ordered Logit estimates.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.999 1.632 1.920 1.767
(0.195) (0.578) (0.924) (0.799)
2nd Measurement 0.624** 0.869 0.879 0.894
(0.146) (0.199) (0.191) (0.222)
3rd Measurement 0.812 0.961 0.804 0.983
(0.263) (0.345) (0.297) (0.342)
Treatment × 2nd Measurement 0.941 0.525 0.433** 0.466*
(0.492) (0.260) (0.153) (0.200)
Treatment × 3rd Measurement 0.517 0.250 0.223* 0.226*
(0.427) (0.213) (0.190) (0.180)
Low SES 2.921** 2.942** 3.088**
(1.270) (1.360) (1.473)
Treatment × Low SES 0.119** 0.080** 0.092**
(0.110) (0.081) (0.093)
2nd Measurement × Low SES 0.189** 0.234* 0.203*
(0.153) (0.196) (0.185)
3rd Measurment × Low SES 0.414** 0.587 0.456*
(0.180) (0.329) (0.213)
Treatment × 2nd Measurement × Low SES 13.446** 13.580** 14.561**
(14.656) (15.802) (17.777)
Treatment × 3rd Measurement × Low SES 16.978*** 17.575*** 18.469***
(17.240) (19.204) (18.512)
Female 2.060*** 1.975***
(0.484) (0.358)
Total Activity 0.894 0.866**
(0.074) (0.060)
Member 1.010 1.328
(0.555) (0.714)
Competitive 1.141 1.102
(0.306) (0.295)
Constant cut 1 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.070*** 0.074***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.036) (0.033)
Constant cut 2 0.153*** 0.182*** 0.158*** 0.171***
(0.049) (0.066) (0.071) (0.067)
Constant cut 3 0.952 1.190 1.111 1.138
(0.099) (0.222) (0.496) (0.425)
Constant cut 4 5.980*** 7.759*** 6.998*** 7.509***
(1.023) (1.472) (3.637) (3.512)
Constant cut 5 19.083*** 25.178*** 21.203*** 24.309***
(5.669) (5.512) (12.587) (13.100)
Obs. 318 318 296 318
No. Individuals 106 106 106 106
No. Groups 8 8 8 8
Note: Missing values of the variable Total Activity in column (4) are replaced with means by
measurement, class, gender, and socio-economic status.
Exponentiated coefficients.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table B.2: Robustness check for contributions to the collective account in all three measurements.
Ordered Logit estimates with random effects.
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B.2 Instructions
General Instructions
• Dear participants, welcome to this session. My name is <name of experimenter 1> and
together with my colleague <name of experimenter 2> and your teacher <name of teacher>
I will guide you through the following 90 minutes.
• Today we want to play different games with you and the other children of your class. For
your participation you will receive a payment, depending on the decisions you and the
other children of your class will make.
• In each game, you will make decisions which either concern just yourself or other children
of your class. The decision you will have to make will be explained in detail at the beginning
of each game. In any case, you will receive a minimum amount of 2.00 Euro.
• At the end of the 90 minutes we will pay out one of the games. That means, we will
convert all tokens you received in that game into Euro and pay them out in addition to the
minimum amount. Therefore, it is worth it to think carefully about your decision in every
game.
• The number of the game we will pay out is in this sealed envelope. After we have played
the last game, we will ask your teacher to open this envelope.
• Your decisions are confidential, that means neither the other children of your class nor
your teacher will learn about your decisions. You will not learn about the decisions of the
other children of your class either. Therefore, it is important that you do not talk about
your decisions with the person sitting next to you.
• The payment at the end of the games is also confidential. That means the other children of
your class will not learn which payment you receive. You will not learn anything about the
payments of the other children of your class either.
• In every game, we use the currency token. At the end, tokens will be converted into Euro.
75 tokens equal 1.00 Euro. Your teacher will do the payment. As stated before, you will
receive a minimum amount of 2.00 Euro for your participation.
• At your table you find a card with a number. This number is important in order to ensure
that you will receive the correct number of tokens in Euro. Please check on every sheet
you receive that the number in the right upper corner corresponds to the number of your
card. Only if the numbers are the same we are able to identify your sheet and make sure
you receive your payment.
• Please keep this card until you have received your payment. After the last game we will put
your payment in an envelope marked with your number. Your teacher will give you this
envelope in exchange for the card with your number.
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• Before starting a game, we will hand out a new sheet to you. On this sheet you will find
a description of the game which we will also read out aloud. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand.
• Do you have any questions? If not, we will begin.
Game 3
In this game you play together with three other children of your class who will be selected
randomly after all sheets have been collected.
You and the other children of your class receive 120 tokens. You can allocate these 120 tokens to
your own private account or to a collective account in intervals of 24 tokens. For every token you
allocate to your own account, you receive 2 tokens in return.
For every token which is allocated to the collective account, you receive 1 token. At the end, we
will sum up the total number of tokens which have been allocated to the collective account and
distribute this amount to each player. Since everyone can contribute to the shared account, you
benefit if other children of your group allocate tokens to the collective account and they benefit
from your allocation.
Do you have any questions? If not, we will continue.
How many tokens do you want to allocate to your own account and how many tokens do you
want to allocate to the collective account?
In the following illustration, one coin is equal to 24 tokens. Please draw the number of coins you
want to allocate to your own account on the left side of the diagram. Likewise, you can draw the
number of coins you want to allocate to the collective account on the right side of the diagram.
24 24 24 24 24
x xxxx
Individual account
Every allocated token yields a
payoff of 2 tokens
Collective account
Every allocated token (no mat-
ter by whom) yields a payoff of
1 token for each player
Please ensure that you allocated exactly 5 coins.
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Game 5
Please do not turn the sheet until we made the start signal.
In this game you can encrypt words into a secret code. The letters have to be exchanged by other
letters in two subsequent steps.
The tables below show the replacement for each letter:
1st step
Replace A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
with K L W U B F N M O E P J A I S D V X R G Y H Z C T Q
2nd step
Replace A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
with P T F E S D U O G V B Z H N M C R Q Y I X W J K L A
You have two minutes to encrypt the words on the back of the sheet. Before we start, you can
choose one out of two payoff schemes:
1. For every correctly encoded letter you receive 3 tokens with a maximum of 300 tokens.
2. We compare your result with the result of another child of your class who will be selected
randomly. The one with the higher number of correctly encoded letters receives 600 tokens.
The other one receives zero tokens. In case of a tie we will determine randomly who
receives 600 tokens and who receives zero tokens.
Do you have any questions? If not, we will continue.
Which payoff scheme do you choose? Please tick one box.
□ 3 tokens for every correctly encoded letter
□ 600 tokens for you if you encode more letters correctly than the other randomly-selected
child of your class and zero tokens otherwise
On the back of this sheet you find more words which are to be encrypted into the secret code.
Please do not turn the play bar until we made the start signal. After we made the start signal, you
have 2 minutes to encrypt as many words two times as possible. The moment we make the end
signal, please cease writing immediately.
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B.3 Approval by the Superintendent
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B.4 Approval by the Board of Ethics
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Appendix C Supplementary Material for Section 4
C.1 Sabotage by Winning Probability
pairwise comparisons†
Winning
probability
Equality
of groups*
INFO SELF100 OPP0
vs.
INFO SELF70 OPP0
INFO SELF100 OPP0
vs.
INFO SELF100 OPP70
INFO SELF70 OPP0
vs.
INFO SELF100 OPP70
10% p = 0.3875 – – –
20% p = 0.6287 – – –
30% p = 0.3759 – – –
40% p = 0.3831 – – –
50% p = 0.4942 – – –
60% p = 0.0349 p = 0.0336 p = 0.4995 p = 0.0417
70% p = 0.2866 – – –
80% p = 0.2943 – – –
90% p = 0.0563 p = 0.1417 p = 0.1502 p = 0.0246
* Kruskal-Wallis H-test.
† Pairwise Dunn test with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment.
Table C.1: Comparison of sabotage between treatments by winning probability in period 1.
pairwise comparisons†
Winning
probability
Equality
of groups*
INFO SELF100 OPP0
vs.
INFO SELF70 OPP0
INFO SELF100 OPP0
vs.
INFO SELF100 OPP70
INFO SELF70 OPP0
vs.
INFO SELF100 OPP70
10% p = 0.2585 – – –
20% p = 0.3272 – – –
30% p = 0.0350 p = 0.0788 p = 0.0144 p = 0.1469
40% p = 0.9309 – – –
50% p = 0.8677 – – –
60% p = 0.3768 – – –
70% p = 0.5804 – – –
80% p = 0.4681 – – –
90% p = 0.2525 – – –
* Kruskal-Wallis H-test.
† Pairwise Dunn test with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment.
Table C.2: Comparison of sabotage between treatments by winning probability in period 2.
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comparison within treatments: period 1 vs. period 2*
Winning
probability
INFO SELF100 OPP0 INFO SELF70 OPP0 INFO SELF100 OPP70
10% — p = 0.3173 –
20% p = 0.1536 p = 0.8527 p = 0.2498
30% p = 0.0891 p = 0.2622 p = 0.0138
40% p = 0.2922 p = 0.7455 p = 0.5442
50% p = 0.2863 p = 0.2278 p = 0.0460
60% p = 0.2495 p = 0.4995 p = 0.1636
70% p = 0.3003 p = 0.1055 p = 0.2326
80% p = 0.2775 p = 0.3173 p = 1.0000
90% p = 0.3173 – –
* Two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Table C.3: Comparison of sabotage within treatments by winning probability between period 1
to period 2 (only individuals with same winning probability in both periods).
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The figures below provide an overview of sabotage by winning probability and treatment. Note
that the variable Distance depicted on the horizontal axis indicates individuals’ winning proba-
bilities relative to the reference category with a balanced competition, i.e., a situation in which
either individual within a group has a winning probability of 50%. The values of this variable
range from −4 for individuals with a winning probability of 10% to 4 for individuals with a
winning probability of 90%, respectively.
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Figure C.1: Sabotage in the INFO SELF100 OPP0 treatment. The size of the bubbles indicates the
frequency of distinct observations. The bars indicate mean sabotage levels for the respective
categories.
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Figure C.2: Sabotage in the INFO SELF70 OPP0 treatment. The size of the bubbles indicates the
frequency of distinct observations. The bars indicate mean sabotage levels for the respective
categories.
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Figure C.3: Sabotage in the INFO SELF100 OPP70 treatment. The size of the bubbles indicates the
frequency of distinct observations. The bars indicate mean sabotage levels for the respective
categories.
119
C.2 Social Value Orientation
0.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
2.5
2.5
−0.5
−0.5
−1.5
−1.5
−2.5
−2.5
x
y
Figure C.4: Distributional types according to Kerschbamer (2015). Individuals with coordinates
−0.5 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 and −0.5 ≤ y ≤ 0.5 are categorized as selfish. The remaining individuals in
quadrants 1–4 are deemed altruistic, inequality averse, spiteful, and equality averse. The size of
the bubbles indicates the frequency of distinct observations.
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C.3 Robustness Checks
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd stage
INFO SELF70 OPP0 −1.265 −1.193 −1.125 −1.082 −0.510 0.620
(1.233) (1.144) (0.825) (0.827) (0.635) (0.822)
INFO SELF100 OPP70 −0.017 −0.012 0.022 0.020 0.263 1.407**
(0.969) (0.902) (0.678) (0.673) (0.504) (0.599)
Tie −1.850* −1.846*** −1.923*** −1.269** −1.296**
(0.965) (0.691) (0.682) (0.598) (0.551)
Leading individual −0.868 −0.638 −0.639 −0.803* −0.826*
(0.697) (0.481) (0.481) (0.444) (0.440)
Sabotage 0.536*** 0.527*** 0.420*** 0.419***
(0.137) (0.146) (0.096) (0.094)
Belief 0.007 0.011 0.009
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Risk 0.214** 0.179*
(0.104) (0.099)
Econ −0.460 −0.322
(0.429) (0.408)
Female 0.817* 2.517***
(0.428) (0.879)
INFO SELF70 OPP0 × Female −2.056*
(1.232)
INFO SELF100 OPP70 × Female −2.142**
(1.000)
Constant 1.841** 2.475*** 0.681 0.337 1.577 1.168
(0.838) (0.849) (0.847) (0.871) (1.644) (1.653)
Competitiveness No No No No Yes Yes
Self-consciousness No No No No Yes Yes
Social value orientation No No No No Yes Yes
1st stage
INFO SELF70 OPP0 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109
(0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175)
INFO SELF100 OPP70 0.836*** 0.836*** 0.836*** 0.836*** 0.836*** 0.836***
(0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165)
Constant −1.049*** −1.049*** −1.049*** −1.049*** −1.049*** −1.049***
(0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132)
Obs. 469 469 469 469 469 469
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.043 0.071 0.072 0.099 0.102
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table C.6: Willingness to pay to prevent information disclosure in period 2. Truncated normal
hurdle model (threshold: 0).
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C.4 Instructions
Welcome to this Experiment!
You are participating in an economic experiment. All decisions are made privately, meaning that
none of the other participants learns the identity of someone having made a certain decision.
The payment is private information as well; none of the participants learns how much others
have earned. Please read the instructions carefully. If you have trouble understanding the
instructions, please take a second look at it. If you still have questions, please give us a signal.
General Information
• This experiment consists of a main part with a working stage and two decision-making
stages. A short second part and a questionnaire will follow. You will receive a compensation
for these two parts as well. The details of the payoff in the second part are given directly on
the screen. For the questionnaire, you receive an additional payoff of 2.00 Euro.
• At first, you will receive instructions for the working stage and the first decision-making
stage. You will receive the instructions for the second decision-making stage after the first
decision-making stage. You can read short instructions and the questionnaire directly on
the screen. Please click “Next” after you have read the instructions completely and do not
have any questions.
• At the end of the experiment, one of the two decision-making stages will be drawn ran-
domly. This decision-making period determines your payoff from the main part.
• In each decision-making stage, two players form a group. In each decision-making stage,
you will be randomly assigned to a new player whose identity will not be revealed.
• In each decision-making stage, one player from the group will receive a high payoff of 75
tokens while the other player will receive a lower payoff of 25 tokens. In the instructions
below you can find details on how this payoff is determined.
• At the end of the experiment, you will get an overview of your results.
• Each of your decisions can affect your payoff, so please think carefully about every decision.
• In the experiment, we use the currency “token”. At the end of the experiment, your payoff
will be converted into Euro. The conversion rate is 5 tokens= 1.00 Euro.
• Please stay at your seat at the end of the experiment and wait until we approach you to
hand out your payoff.
Working Stage
• The main part starts with a working stage in which each player works on their own.
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• Your task is to encode words to numbers. You have to replace each letter of a word with the
numbers given in table at the end of the instructions.
– Example: The word “camel” appears on the screen. According to the table, “C” = 80,
“A” = 92, “M” = 35, “E” = 55, and “L” = 20, so the code for “camel” is: 8092355520.
– For each letter, you have to enter the assigned number in a separate box. You can go
from box to box by using the tab key. The tab key can be found on the keyboard left of
the letter “Q”.
Position of the tab key on the keyboard:
– The easiest way to enter the numbers is by using the numeric keypad on the right
side of the keyboard. The numeric keypad should be activated automatically. If the
input does not work, press the “Num Lock” key, which is located in the upper left
corner of the numeric keypad. Before you begin to code, please select the (first) input
field with the mouse; otherwise your input will not be recorded.
Position of the Num-Lock key on the keyboard:
• Five-digit words will appear. You will earn one point for each correctly encoded letter.
Please note that incorrectly encoded letters will lead to a deduction of 0.5 points. The sum
of the points is the obtained score.
• When you have entered the code and pressed “OK”, you will automatically receive a new
word for encoding. You do not have the option to return to previous words.
• The processing time is 10 minutes. After that, the processing time stops automatically.
• At the end of the working stage, you will be informed about your score.
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At first, each player encodes words into numbers for 10 minutes. All players receive identical
words in the same order.
Decision-Making Stage 1: Course of Action
• Below, you will find information about the first decision-making stage.
• After completing this stage, you will get the instruction for the second decision-making
stage.
• In this decision-making stage, two players form a group and enter a competition.
• If this decision-making stage is drawn, one player of the group will receive a high pay-
off of 75 tokens while the other player will receive a lower payoff of 25 tokens. In the
instructions below you can find details on how this payment is determined.
• First, the difference between the obtained scores of both players from the working stage is
calculated in order to determine the performance difference.
• The performance difference determines the probability that a player wins the competition
and thus receives the high payoff as shown in the following table:
Absolute performance difference Probability (in %) for the player with
the higher score to receive the high
payment (Probability for the player
with the lower score to receive the
high payment)
greater or equal to 100.5 90 (10)
70.5–100 80 (20)
45.5–70 70 (30)
20.5–45 60 (40)
0–20 50 (50)
• Example: If you have achieved 50 points more than the other player in your group in the
working stage, your probability of getting the high payoff is 70% (otherwise you will get
the lower payoff). This means for the other player in your group that he will get the high
payoff with a probability of 30% (and otherwise he will get the lower payoff). Keep in mind
that only one player in your group will get the high payoff and the other one will get the
lower payoff.
• We will inform you of the performance difference in your group and whether you have
achieved the higher or lower score. The other player receives this information as well.
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Decision-Making Stage 1: Choice of Number Z
• Now you can select a number Z which may influence the probability that you or the other
player will win the competition and thus get the high payoff. For this purpose, you select a
number Z between 0 and 9.
• Depending on the selected number Z , the other player’s probability of winning decreases
by the appropriate number of percentage points and your profit probability increases by
the appropriate number: If you select zero, the probabilities of winning do not change.
For selecting 1, the other player’s probability of winning is reduced by one percentage
point, while your percentage increases by one percentage point. For selecting 2, the
other player’s probability of winning is reduced by two percentage points, while your
probability of winning increases by two percentage points, and so on.
• The higher the selected number Z , the higher the associated costs. The costs are listed in
the following table. If this round is randomly drawn for payoff at the end, the costs for the
number Z will be deducted from your payoff.
Number Z 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Cost in token 0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25
• The other player in your group also selects a number Z that may reduce your probability of
get-ting the high payoff and increase his probability of getting the high payoff, respectively.
For the other player, the same rules for the selection of Z apply.
• Whether the number Z selected by you and/or the number Z selected by the other player in
your group are implemented and have an effect on the probability of winning is determined
as follows:
• The 18 attendant groups are separated in:
– 12 randomly determined groups in which the selected numbers Z of both players
have an effect.
– 1 randomly determined group in which the selected numbers Z of both players have
no effect.
– 5 randomly determined groups in which only the number Z of one of the two players
has an effect.
• Please note that neither you nor the other player knows which of the conditions mentioned
above applies to your group when choosing Z , and that the cost of selecting Z always
incur.
• After you and the other player have selected a number Z , the computer will first check the
condition which applies to your group, and then it will calculate the final probabilities
of winning in your group according to this condition and the selected numbers Z (if
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relevant).
• Finally, the computer will determine who gets the high payoff and who gets the lower
payoff, given the final probabilities of winning.
Decision-Making Stage 1: Information about Z
• <INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70 OPP0> No player will be informed about the number
Z selected by the other player and whether or not this has an effect on the probability
of winning.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> Every player will always be informed whether or not the number Z
he has selected has an effect on the probability of winning.
• <INFO SELF100 OPP0> In any case, you will be informed about the effect of the number Z
you have selected.
<INFO SELF70 OPP0> However, there is the possibility that you will be informed about the
effect of the number Z you have selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> Additionally, there is the possibility that you will be informed about
the number Z the other player has selected and whether this has an effect.
• <INFO SELF100 OPP0> Also, the other player will be informed about the effect of the
number Z selected by him in any case.
<INFO SELF70 OPP0> For the other player, there is also the possibility that he will be
informed about the effect of the number Z he has selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> For the other player, there is also the possibility that he will be
informed about the effect of the number Z you have selected.
• <INFO SELF70 OPP0 and INFO SELF100 OPP70> There are four scenarios in total which occur
with different probabilities:
– <INFO SELF70 OPP0> Scenario 1: In 50% of the cases, both players receive informa-
tion. That means, you will be informed about the effect of the number Z you have
selected, and the other player will be informed about the effect of the number Z he
has selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> Scenario 1: In 50% of the cases, both players receive infor-
mation. That means, you will be informed about number Z the other player has
selected and its effect, and the other player will be informed about the number Z
you have chosen and its effect.
– <INFO SELF70 OPP0> Scenario 2: In 20% of the cases, only you receive information.
That means, you will be informed about the effect of the number Z you have selected,
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but the other playerwill not be informed about the effect of the number Z he has
selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> Scenario 2: In 20% of the cases, only you receive information.
That means, you will be informed about the number Z the other player has selected
and its effect, but the other player will not be informed about the number Z you
have selected and its effect.
– <INFO SELF70 OPP0> Scenario 3: In 20% of the cases, only the other player receives
information. That means, you will not be informed about the effect of the number
Z you have selected, but the other player will be informed about the effect of the
number Z he has selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> Scenario 3: In 20% of the cases, only the other player receives
information. That means, you will not be informed about the number Z the other
player has selected and its effect, but the other player will be informed about the
number Z you have selected and its effect.
– <INFO SELF70 OPP0> Scenario 4: In 10% of the cases, no player receives information.
That means, you will not be informed about the effect of the number Z you have
selected, and the other player will not be informed about the effect of the number Z
he has selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> Scenario 4: In 10% of the cases, no player receives informa-
tion. That means, you will not be informed about the number Z the other player has
selected and its effect, and the other player will not be informed about the Z you
have selected and its effect.
<INFO SELF70 OPP0>
Scenario Probability (in %)
for this scenario to
occur
You receive infor-
mation about the
effect of your num-
ber Z
The other player re-
ceives information
about the effect of
his number Z
1 50 Yes Yes
2 20 Yes No
3 20 No Yes
4 10 No No
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<INFO SELF100 OPP70>
Scenario Probability (in %)
for this scenario to
occur
You receive infor-
mation about the
number Z of the
other player
The other player re-
ceives information
about your num-
ber Z
1 50 Yes Yes
2 20 Yes No
3 20 No Yes
4 10 No No
Decision-Making Stage 1: Information about the Result
• At the end of the experiment, you will be informed about your payoff. The payoff is made
up as follows:
– winner of the competition: 75 tokens − costs for the choice of Z
– loser of the competition: 25 tokens − costs for the choice of Z
• At the end of the experiment, we will inform you about the number Z you have selected
and the associated costs from decision-making stage 1.
• <INFO SELF100 OPP0> You will be informed about the effect of the number Z you have
selected.
<INFO SELF70 OPP0> Additionally, you may be informed about the effect of the number Z
you have selected, see description above.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> You will be informed about the effect of the number Z you have
selected. Additionally, you may be informed about the effect of the number Z the other
player has selected and its effect, see description above.
Before the working stage starts, you have the opportunity to become acquainted with the process
decision-making stage 1 in 3 trial periods. For this purpose, you take the role of both players in a
group and can determine the numbers Z . After the end of the trial periods, we will ask you to
answer a couple of comprehensive questions. If you still have questions, please give us a signal.
Decision-Making Stage 2: Course of Action and Choice of Number Z
• At the beginning of this round, two players form a group. Note that in no case you will be
assigned to a group with the same player as in decision-making stage 1.
• The process essentially corresponds to the previous decision-making stage. Again, there
will be a competition. As in decision-making stage 1, your result and the result of the other
player from the working stage prior to decision-making stage 1 will be used to determine
the performance difference in your new group. The performance difference determines,
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as in decision-making stage 1, the probability with which a player wins the competition
and receives the high payoff of 75 tokens. Here you can see the table that is the same as the
round before.
Absolute performance difference Probability (in %) for the player with
the higher score to receive the high
payment (Probability for the player
with the lower score to receive the
high payment)
greater or equal to 100.5 90 (10)
70.5–100 80 (20)
45.5–70 70 (30)
20.5–45 60 (40)
0–20 50 (50)
• You and the other player select a number Z again, which is associated with the same
consequences and costs as in decision-making stage 1. The cost associated with each
number Z is given in the following table.
Number Z 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Cost in token 0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25
• The only difference to round of decision 1 is that an additional decision is made regarding
the information about the number Z . This additional decision is explained below.
Decision-Making Stage 2: Influencing Information about Z
• <INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70 OPP0> In contrast to decision-making stage 1, you
now have the opportunity to prevent us from informing you about the effects of the
number Z you have selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> In contrast to decision-making stage 1, you now have the opportu-
nity to prevent us from informing the other player about the number Z you have selected
and its effect.
• <INFO SELF70 OPP0 and INFO SELF100 OPP70> Reminder: There are four scenarios which
occur with different probabilities.
– <INFO SELF70 OPP0> Scenario 1: In 50% of the cases, both players receive informa-
tion. That means, you will be informed about the effect of the number Z you have
selected, and the other player will be informed about the effect of the number Z he
has selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> Scenario 1: In 50% of the cases, both players receive infor-
mation. That means, you will be informed about number Z the other player has
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selected and its effect, and the other player will be informed about the number Z
you have chosen and its effect.
– <INFO SELF70 OPP0> Scenario 2: In 20% of the cases, only you receive information.
That means, you will be informed about the effect of the number Z you have selected,
but the other player will not be informed about the effect of the number Z he has
selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> Scenario 2: In 20% of the cases, only you receive information.
That means, you will be informed about the number Z the other player has selected
and its effect, but the other player will not be informed about the number Z you
have selected and its effect.
– <INFO SELF70 OPP0> Scenario 3: In 20% of the cases, only the other player receives
information. That means, you will not be informed about the effect of the number
Z you have selected, but the other player will be informed about the effect of the
number Z he has selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> Scenario 3: In 20% of the cases, only the other player receives
information. That means, you will not be informed about the number Z the other
player has selected and its effect, but the other player will be informed about the
number Z you have selected and its effect.
– <INFO SELF70 OPP0> Scenario 4: In 10% of the cases, no player receives information.
That means, you will not be informed about the effect of the number Z you have
selected, and the other player will not be informed about the effect of the number Z
he has selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> Scenario 4: In 10% of the cases, no player receives informa-
tion. That means, you will not be informed about the number Z the other player has
selected and its effect, and the other player will not be informed about the Z you
have selected and its effect.
<INFO SELF100 OPP0> By paying a certain price, you can ensure that you do not receive
information about the number Z you have chosen in any case.
<INFO SELF70 OPP0> By paying a certain price, you can ensure that you do not receive
information about the number Z you have chosen in any scenario described above.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> By paying a certain price, you can ensure that the other player
does not receive information about the number Z you have selected and its effect in any
scenario described above.
• This price is between 1 and 10 tokens (in integer increments) and will be determined
randomly by the computer at the end. Each price occurs with the same probability.
• Please indicate the maximum price you are willing to pay. This means, you are willing to
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pay this price and any price below. For this purpose, we will show you a table in which you
can enter your decision (see screenshot at the end of the instructions).
• <INFO SELF70 OPP0> If a price is drawn for which you have ticked the option “pay”, you
will not be informed about the effect of the number Z you have selected on the probability
of winning in any scenario. At the end, the corresponding price will be deducted from
your payoff.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> If a price is drawn for which you have ticked the option “pay”, the
other player will not be informed about the effect of the number Z you have selected on
the probability of winning in any scenario. At the end, the corresponding price will be
deducted from your payoff.
• <INFO SELF100 OPP0> If a price is drawn for which you have ticked the option “do not pay”
option, you will be informed about the effect of the number Z you have selected in any
case—just as in decision-making stage 1. In this case, nothing will be deducted from your
payoff.
<INFO SELF70 OPP0> If a price is drawn for which you have ticked the option “do not
pay” option, you will be informed about the effect of the number Z you have selected
depending on the scenario—just as in decision-making stage 1. In this case, nothing will
be deducted from your payoff.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> If a price is drawn for which you have ticked the option “do not
pay” option, the other player will be informed about the effect of the number Z you have
selected depending on the scenario—just as in decision-making stage 1. In this case,
nothing will be deducted from your payoff.
• <INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70 OPP0> For the other player, there is also the op-
portunity to prevent him from being informed about the effect of the number Z he has
selected.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> For the other player, there is also the opportunity to prevent you
from being informed about the number Z he has selected and its effect.
• The computer draws the price which applies to both players of a group.
Decision-Making Stage 2: Information about the Result
• At the end of the experiment, you will be informed about your payoff. The payoff is made
up as follows:
– winner of the competition: 75 tokens − costs for the choice of Z − cost of preventing
information disclosure/price (if applicable)
– loser of the competition: 25 tokens − costs for the choice of Z − cost of preventing
information disclosure/price (if applicable)
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• At the end of the experiment, we will inform you about the number Z you have selected
and the associated costs from decision-making stage 2.
• <INFO SELF100 OPP0 and INFO SELF70 OPP0> Additionally, you may be informed about the
effect of the number Z you have selected, see description above.
<INFO SELF100 OPP70> You will be informed about the effect of the number Z you have
selected. Additionally, you may be informed about the effect of the number Z the other
player has selected and its effect, see description above.
Part 2
In this part, groups of two players are formed again. Note that you are in a group with a player
with whom you have not played together in part 1.
You will make a decision in 10 situations that can affect your payoff and the payoff of the other
player. In each of the 10 situations, you can choose between two alternatives: “Left” and “Right”.
For each alternative, you will see two values: the first value is your potential payoff and the
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second value indicates the possible payoff of the other player.
In each of the 10 situations, please select one of the two alternatives and tick the corresponding
circle in the middle column of the table that will appear on the screen.
The other player also chooses one of the two alternatives in each of the 10 situations.
Example of a situation (there is a total of 10 situations):
Left Right
You receive The other player
receives
You receive The other player
receives
a tokens b tokens Left⃝ ⃝ Right c tokens d tokens
The letters a, b, c, and d are only for illustrative purposes and will be replaced by numbers.
Payoff
After you and the other player have made a decision for all 10 situations, the computer randomly
draws one situation that is relevant to the payoff. Afterwards, the computer also randomly deter-
mines whether your decision or that of the other player will be implemented for this situation.
So there are two scenarios.
If the computer has randomly drawn the situation described in the table above:
• Scenario 1: Your decision is relevant for payoff.
– You have selected alternative Left for the selected situation: You will receive a tokens
and the other player will receive b tokens.
– You have selected alternative Right for the selected situation: You will receive c tokens
and the other player will receive d tokens.
• Scenario 2: The decision of the other player is relevant for the payoff.
– The other player has chosen the alternative Left for the selected situation: You will
receive b tokens and the other player will receive a tokens.
– The other player has chosen the alternative Right for the selected situation: You will
receive d tokens and the other player will receive c tokens.
At the end of this part, you will be informed which line has been drawn for the payoff. You will
also be informed whether your decision or the decision of the other player is relevant for the
payoff. We will also inform you about the payoff from this part.
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Appendix D Statistical Methods
D.1 Pearson’s χ2-Test
The Pearson’s χ2-test (named after Pearson, 1900) is used to test whether two unpaired samples
of categorical data which are stored in a k×m1 contingency table are independent.
j = 1 j = 2 · · · j =m Σi
i = 1 h11 h12 · · · h1m N1•
i = 2 h21 h22 · · · h2m N2•
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
i = k hk1 hk2 · · · hkm Nk•
Σ j N•1 N•2 · · · N•m N
hi j is the number of observations of the cell in the i -th row and the j -th column. Ni• and N• j
denote the sum of observations in the i -th row and the j -th column, respectively, and N is the
total number of observations.
The test statistic is given by
χ2 =
k∑︂
i=1
m∑︂
j=1
(hi j −ei j )2
ei j
,
where
ei j =
Ni• ·N• j
N
is the expected number of observations of the cell in the i -th row and j -th column.
For a sufficiently high number of observations in each cell (expected number of observations
in each cell must be at least 1; at most 20% of the cells may exhibit an expected number of
observations of less than 5), the test statistic asymptotically approaches a χ2-distribution with
(k−1) · (m−1) degrees of freedom (Bortz and Lienert, 2008; Bortz et al., 2008; Rasch et al., 2014b).
To account for family-wise error rates due to multiple hypothesis testing in pairwise comparisons,
the Holm-Bonferroni correction (Holm, 1979) is used. Let P(1), . . . ,P(v) be the sequence of p-
values (in ascending order) of a family of v null hypotheses H(1), . . . , H(v). Given a significance
level α, the lowest rank u ∈ {1, . . . , v} is determined which satisfies the inequality
P(u) > α
v +1−u .
Finally, the null hypotheses H(1), . . . , H(u−1) are rejected and the null hypotheses H(u), . . . , H(v) are
not.2
D.2 Bowker Test of Symmetry
The Bowker test of symmetry (Bowker, 1948) compares changes in a variable with k levels for a
paired sample during two distinct measurements. hi j denotes the observed frequency in the
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i -th row and j -th column of the corresponding k ×k contingency table. The null hypothesis
is that changes in either direction between the two measurements are equally likely, i.e., the
contingency table is symmetric with respect to the main diagonal. The test statistic is given by
χ2 =
k∑︂
i=1
k∑︂
j=1
(︁
hi j −h j i
)︁2
hi j +h j i
, i > j
and approximates the χ2 distribution with
(︁k
2
)︁= k·(k−1)2 degrees of freedom. It is required that
the expected frequencies ei j = (hi j+h j i )2 are equal to or larger than 5 for at least 80% of the pairs
(Bortz and Lienert, 2008; Bortz et al., 2008).
D.3 Sign Test
The one-sample sign test is used to test whether the median of a sample is statistically different
from a specific value η.3 Under the null hypothesis, an equal number of positive and negative
deviations from the median, N+ and N−, is expected and N+, N− ∼Binom(n,0.5), where n is the
sample size.
If the actual median is larger than the hypothesized value η, the number of observed negative
deviations, n−, is lower than expected. The corresponding p-value is calculated by
p = Pr(N− ≤ n−)=
n−∑︂
i=0
(︄
n
i
)︄
·
(︃
1
2
)︃n
for small samples (n < 30) (Bradley, 1968; Schaich and Hamerle, 1984).
D.4 Mann-Whitney U -Test
The Mann-Whitney U -test (Mann and Whitney, 1947; see also Wilcoxon, 1945; Kruskal, 1957) is
used to test whether two unpaired samples of ordinal data are drawn from the same population.
To calculate the test statistic, the observations are ranked in ascending order. Ties are assigned
the average rank. The rank sum Ti of sample i = 1,2 is denoted by
Ti =
ni∑︂
mi=1
Rmi ,
where Rmi is the rank of the m-th observation in sample i . For each sample, the test statistics
U1 = n1 ·n2+ n1 · (n1+1)
2
−T1
and
U2 = n1 ·n2+ n2 · (n2+1)
2
−T2
are calculated with n1,n2 as number of observations in the first and second sample, respectively.
The smaller value of U1 and U2, U =min{U1,U2}, is compared to the critical value for a given
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significance level which is usually retrieved from tables for small samples (e.g., Table 8.2 in
the appendix of Sani and Todman, 2006). For larger samples (n1,n2 > 20), the test statistic U
approaches a normal distribution and the critical value is given by
zU =
U − n1·n22√︂
n1·n2·(n1+n2+1)
12
To account for ties in larger samples (n1 > 20 or n2 > 20), the following correction is used:
zU (corr) =
U − n1·n22√︄
n1·n2
N ·(N−1) ·
(︃
N 3−N
12 −
r∑︁
s=1
τ3s−τs
12
)︃
with N = n1+n2 as total number of observations, r as total number of ties, and τs as number of
ties for the s-th tied value (Bortz and Lienert, 2008; Bortz et al., 2008; Rasch et al., 2014b).
D.5 Kruskal-Wallis H-Test
Similar to the Mann-Whitney U -test, the Kruskal-Wallis H-test (Kruskal, 1952; Kruskal and
Wallis, 1952) tests whether k > 2 samples of ordinal data belong to the same population. The test
statistic in case of no ties is denoted by
H = 12
N · (N +1) ·
k∑︂
i=1
T 2i
ni
−3 · (N +1),
where N is the total number of observations. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic ap-
proaches a χ2-distribution with k−1 degrees of freedom.
To account for ties in the ranks, the following correction can be applied:
Hcorr = H
1−
r∑︁
s=1
(τ3s−τs)
N 3−N
with r as total number of ties and τs as number of ties for the s-th tied value (Bortz and Lienert,
2008; Bortz et al., 2008; Rasch et al., 2014b).
To test which samples are statistically different from each other, the Dunn test (Dunn, 1964) is
used as post-hoc test for the Kruskal-Wallis H-test. In particular, h = k·(k−1)2 pairwise tests are
performed. Let A and B be a pair of samples which are to be compared. The corresponding test
statistic is denoted by
z = |R¯ A− R¯B |⌜⃓⃓⃓
⎷
⎛⎝N ·(N+1)
12 −
r∑︁
s=1
(τ3s−τs)
12·(N−1)
⎞⎠ · (︂ 1nA + 1nB )︂
,
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where R¯ A = RAnA is the mean rank of sample A with RA as rank sum and nA as number of observa-
tions of sample A (and R¯B similarly for sample B). To account for family-wise error rates, the
resulting p-values have to be corrected, e.g., by using the Holm-Bonferroni method (Dinno,
2015).
D.6 Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
To consider statistical differences in two paired samples of ordinal data, the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test (Wilcoxon, 1945) is used. The absolute difference di = xAi −xBi for each pair of observations
i ∈ {1, . . . , N } in both samples A and B is calculated and ordered in an ascending sequence. T− and
T+ are the rank sums of differences in absolute terms with negative and positive sign, respectively.
Tied values are assigned the average rank. The test statistic T is the smaller value of T− and T+,
T =min{T−,T+}. The critical values for small samples can be retrieved from tables (e.g., Table
8.1 in the appendix of Sani and Todman, 2006). For larger samples (N > 50), the test statistic T
approaches a normal distribution and the critical value is given by
zT =
T − N ·(N+1)4√︂
N ·(2N+1)·(N+1)
24
.
To correct for tied ranks and zero differences (di = 0), the critical value can be corrected in the
following way:
zT (corr) =
T − N ·(N+1)4√︄
N ·(2N+1)·(N+1)−
r∑︁
s=1
(τ3s−τs)
2
24
with r as total number of ties and τs as number of ties for the s-th tied value (Bortz and Lienert,
2008; Bortz et al., 2008; Rasch et al., 2014b).
D.7 Z -Test
The Z -test is used to test whether the relative frequency of an event in a sample is statistically
different from particular proportion (one-sample test) or whether the relative frequencies of two
independent samples are statistically different from each other (two-sample test). Unlike the
statistical tests discussed above, this test relies on the assumption that the data are approximately
normally distributed.
The test statistic for the one-sample test is given by
z = pˆ−p√︂
p·(1−p)
n
,
where pˆ = xn is the observed relative frequency with x as the number of successful outcomes and
n as the number of observations, and p the theoretical proportion. To meet the approximate
normality assumption, it is required that n ·p ≥ 5 and n · (1−p)≥ 5.
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The test statistic for the two-sample test is given by
z = p1ˆ−p2ˆ√︃
pˆc ·
(︁
1− pˆc
)︁ · (︂ 1n1 + 1n2 )︂
,
where pˆ1 = x1n1 and pˆ2 =
x2
n2
are the observed relative frequencies with x1, x2 as the number of
successful outcomes and n1,n2 as the number of observations in the two samples, and pˆc = x1+x2n1+n2
is the is the observed relative frequency of the pooled samples. To meet the approximate
normality assumption, it is required that n1,n2 ≥ 30 (Zou et al., 2003).
D.8 Spearman’s ρ
Spearman’s ρ (named after Spearman, 1904, 1906) measures the association between two ordinal
variables. The rank correlation coefficient is given by
ρ = 1−
6 ·
N∑︁
i=1
d 2i
N · (N −1) ,
where di =Rxi −Ryi is the difference of ranks between two variables x and y of individual i and
N denotes the number of observations.
The rank correlation coefficient is asymptotically normally distributed with expected value µ= 0
and variance σ2 = 1N−1 for N > 30. Hence, the critical value is
z = ρ ·
⎷
N −1
(Bortz and Lienert, 2008; Bortz et al., 2008; Rasch et al., 2014a).
D.9 Ordinary Least Squares
The ordinary least squares approach estimates the coefficients of a linear model
yi = x′iβ+ui , i = 1, . . . , N
such that the sum of squared residuals,
∑︁N
i=1(yi −x′iβ)2, i.e., the difference between the observed
and estimated values, is minimized. β is a K ×1 column vector of coefficients which are to be
estimated, x′i is a 1×K row vector of observed regressors for individual i , and ui is the residual.
The corresponding estimator βˆOLS is given by
βˆOLS =
(︁
X′X
)︁−1 X′y
=
(︄
N∑︂
i=1
xi x
′
i
)︄−1 N∑︂
i=1
xi yi
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=⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
N∑︁
i=1
x21i
N∑︁
i=1
x1i x2i · · ·
N∑︁
i=1
x1i xK i
N∑︁
i=1
x2i x1i
N∑︁
i=1
x22i · · ·
N∑︁
i=1
x2i xK i
...
...
. . .
...
N∑︁
i=1
xK i x1i
N∑︁
i=1
xK i x2i · · ·
N∑︁
i=1
x2K i
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
−1⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
N∑︁
i=1
x1i yi
N∑︁
i=1
x2i yi
...
N∑︁
i=1
xK i yi
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
where X is a N ×K matrix of observed regressors for all individuals, i.e., X consists of N row
vectors x′i and y is a N ×1 column vector of observed outcomes yi for all individuals.4
To obtain consistent estimates it is required that
(i) the residuals have an expected value of zero and must not be correlated with the regressors
(exogneity),
(ii) the variance σ2 of the residuals is constant (homoskedasticity), and
(iii) (yi ,xi ), i = 1, . . . , N are independent and identically distributed (independence).
If these assumptions are met, the variance-covariance matrix of the estimator (VCE) is asymptot-
ically normally distributed and given by
Vˆ default(βˆ)= σˆ2
(︁
X′X
)︁−1
with σˆ2 = 1N−K
∑︁N
i=1 uˆ
2
i as consistent estimator of the variance σ and uˆi = yi −x′iβ.
When residuals are correlated within clusters (groups), the third assumption is violated. To
account for this issue, a cluster-robust VCE is obtained by
Vˆ cluster(βˆ)=
(︁
X′X
)︁−1 (︄ G
G−1
N −1
N −K
G∑︂
g=1
Xg uˆg uˆ
′
g X
′
g
)︄(︁
X′X
)︁−1 ,
where g = 1, . . . ,G denotes the clusters, uˆg is a vector of residuals for cluster g , and Xg is the
corresponding matrix of regressors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Wooldridge, 2010; Greene, 2012;
Stock and Watson, 2015).
D.10 Generalized Least Squares with Random Effects
Unlike cross sectional data, panel data contain repeated measures of the same individuals
over time and, hence, are valuable to analyze changes over time on individual level. Repeated
measures of the same individual over time, however, are serially correlated, i.e., not independent.
The linear model is given by
yi t = x′iβ+αi +εi t ,
where αi is the individual-specific and time-invariant component of the residual and εi t is
the component of the residual which varies over time and over individuals. Depending on the
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treatment of αi , the linear model is estimated with a fixed-effects or a random-effects estimator.
If αi is assumed be correlated with the regressors, the fixed-effects estimator is appropriate,
whereas the random-effects estimator is to be used when no such correlation is assumed. If the
random-effects estimator is erroneously used instead of the fixed-effects estimator, the results
are not consistent due to endogeneity. On the other hand, the fixed-effects estimator does not
allow to include time-invariant regressors in the model.
The estimator βˆRE is given by
βˆRE =
(︄
N∑︂
i=1
X′i Ωˆ
−1
Xi
)︄−1 (︄ N∑︂
i=1
X′i Ωˆ
−1
yi
)︄
with VCE
Ωˆ= σˆ2εIT + σˆ2αj′T jT ,
where σˆ2ε and σˆ
2
α are consistent estimators of the variance of εi t andαi , respectively. IT is a T ×T
identity matrix and jT is a T ×1 column vector of ones (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Wooldridge,
2010; Greene, 2012; Andreß et al., 2013).
D.11 Tobit
The Tobit (I) model (named after Tobin, 1958) is used to account for a limited dependent variable,
i.e., the dependent variable assumes only values within a certain range. Coefficients estimated
with ordinary least squares are not consistent in this case.
The regression model is given by
y∗i = x′iβ+ui ,
where y∗i is a latent variable, x
′
i is a K ×1 vector of regressors, and ui ∼N (0,σ2) is the error term.
The relation between the observed variable yi and the latent variable y∗i is established by
yi =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
yL if y∗i ≤ yL
y∗i if yL < y∗i < yU
yU if y∗i ≥ yU
,
where yL and yU denote the lower and upper boundary, respectively.
The estimator βˆTobit is obtained using the following log-likelihood function:
βˆTobit = arg max
β
⎧⎨⎩ ∑︂
y∗i ≤yL
log
(︃
Φ
(︃
yL−x′iβ
σ
)︃)︃
+ ∑︂
yL<y∗i <yU
log
(︃
1
σ
·φ
(︃
y∗i −x′iβ
σ
)︃)︃
+ ∑︂
y∗i ≥yU
log
(︃
1−Φ
(︃
yU −x′iβ
σ
)︃)︃⎫⎬⎭ ,
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whereΦ(•) andφ(•) denote the cumulative distribution function and the probability density func-
tion of the standard normal distribution, respectively (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Wooldridge,
2010; Greene, 2012).
D.12 Truncated Normal Hurdle Model
The truncated normal hurdle model (Cragg, 1971) is a two-part model which extends the Tobit
model by allowing for different mechanisms to describe an individual’s decision (i) whether
or not to take an action (participation) and (ii) which quantity of this action to choose if the
previous decision was positive (intensity), i.e., it separates the extensive and intensive margin.
More formally, the first part of the model is estimated using the Probit estimator
Pr(y∗i > 0)=Φ
(︁
x′iγ
)︁
,
where y∗i is a latent variable and
yi =
⎧⎨⎩y
∗
i if y
∗
i > 0
– if y∗i ≤ 0
.
The linear regression model is given by
yi = x′iβ+ui .
The estimator βˆTNH is obtained using the following log-likelihood function:
βˆTNH = arg max
β
{︁
1[yi=0] · log
(︁
1−Φ(xiγ)
)︁+1[yi>0] · log(︁Φ(xiγ))︁
+1[yi>0] ·
[︃
− log
(︃
Φ
(︃
xiβ
σ
)︃)︃
+ log
(︃
φ
(︃
yi −xiβ
σ
)︃)︃
− log(σ)
]︃}︃
(Wooldridge, 2010; Greene, 2012).
D.13 Ordered Logit
The Ordered Logit model is used to estimate coefficients in a model with a latent variable y∗i :
y∗i = x′iβ+ui .
The observed outcome variable yi can assume one of k = 1, . . . ,m discrete values sk (in ascending
order). The relation between the latent variable y∗i and the observed variable yi is denoted by
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yi =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
s1 if y∗i ≤ δ1
s2 if δ1 < y∗i < δ2
...
sm−1 if δm−2 < y∗i < δm−1
sm if y∗i ≥ δm−1
,
where δ• are m−1 thresholds which separate the observed values of the outcome variable.
The estimator βˆOrdered Logit is obtained using the following log-likelihood function:
βˆOrdered Logit = arg max
β
⎧⎨⎩ ∑︂
y∗i ≤δ1
log
(︄
exp
{︁
δ1−x′iβ
}︁
1+exp{︁δ1−x′iβ}︁
)︄
+
m−1∑︂
k=2
⎛⎝ ∑︂
δk<y∗i <δk+1
log
(︄
exp
{︁
δk −x′iβ
}︁
1+exp{︁δk −x′iβ}︁ −
exp
{︁
δk−1−x′iβ
}︁
1+exp{︁δk−1−x′iβ}︁
)︄⎞⎠
+ ∑︂
y∗i ≥δm−1
log
(︄
1− exp
{︁
δm−1−x′iβ
}︁
1+exp{︁δm−1−x′iβ}︁
)︄⎫⎬⎭
(Greene and Hensher, 2010).
Notes
1. k,m ≥ 2. The case of k,m = 2 refers to binary data.
2. To facilitate the interpretation, p-values adjusted with the Holm-Bonferroni method in this
thesis are multiplied with (v +1−u) for P(1), . . . ,P(u−1) and can, thus, be directly compared
to conventional significance levels.
3. Note that the sign test is a special case of the Binomial test (Schaich and Hamerle, 1984).
4. Note that the first column of X typically consists of ones to allow for the intercept.
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